Barker v. Wilkinson

4 Citing cases

  1. Wheeler's, Inc. v. Wilson

    196 Ga. App. 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 13 times
    In Wheeler's, the defendant pleaded insufficient service of process in its Answer, but did not move for a hearing on the issue until after this court had ruled on its appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment.

    Stallings has been consistently relied on as authority for the proposition that "pleading to the jurisdiction and ... excepting thereto" will vitiate any waiver that may otherwise be implied when the party also pleads to the merits. See, e.g., Shaheen v. Dunaway Drug Stores, 246 Ga. 790 ( 273 S.E.2d 158) (1980); Weems v. Weems, 225 Ga. 154 ( 166 S.E.2d 352) (1969); Barker v. Wilkinson, 222 Ga. 329 ( 149 S.E.2d 698) (1966); Milam v. Terrell, 214 Ga. 199 ( 104 S.E.2d 219) (1958); Gaddis v. Dyer Lumber Co., 168 Ga. App. 334 ( 308 S.E.2d 852) (1983). This case comes within that class of cases acknowledged in Roberts where a party by its conduct waives a legal right. That principle was applied in Roberts and it was the court's opinion that defendant did not fall within its governance.

  2. Roberts v. Bienert

    183 Ga. App. 751 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 33 times
    In Roberts, this court stated that while the plaintiffs were initially justified in relying on the marshall's return of service, their receipt of the defendant's responsive pleading to the complaint raising deficiency of service should have alerted them to the problem and inspired them, through counsel, to use the "greatest possible diligence to ensure proper and timely service."

    The filing of a plea to the merits where a plea to the jurisdiction had previously been filed does not waive the jurisdiction even though the plea to the merits is not expressly made subject to the plea to the jurisdiction." Milam v. Terrell, 214 Ga. 199 (1) ( 104 S.E.2d 219) (1958); accord Weems v. Weems, 225 Ga. 154, 155-156 ( 166 S.E.2d 352) (1969); Barker v. Wilkinson, 222 Ga. 329 (1) ( 149 S.E.2d 698) (1966). The Supreme Court continues to follow this line of cases.

  3. Bell v. Cooper

    CASE NO. 5:08-CV-086 (CDL) (M.D. Ga. Jul. 14, 2008)

    Furthermore, Mrs. Bell points to Georgia law which, while not squarely addressing the precise question at issue here, permits an executor to bring a petition for construction of a will even if she is a legatee under the will and arguably requires that in such a proceeding the executor "must name as defendants . . . all persons named in the will as legatees." E.g., Barker v. Wilkinson, 222 Ga. 329, 330-31, 149 S.E.2d 698, 699-700 (1966). Thus, Georgia law appears to authorize Plaintiff's alignment of the parties.

  4. Jennings v. Srp

    521 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that sections 33 and 93 of the Probate Code do not expressly require joinder of any party to a will contest but applying Rule 39 to will contest without addressing section 33's requirement that the Probate Code expressly provide for joinder

    Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v. Holloway, 50 F.2d 197 (N.D.Tex.1931); Barker v. Wilkinson, 222 Ga. 329, 149 S.E.2d 698 (1966); Hitch v. Hitch, 261 A.2d 858 (Me.Sup.Ct.1970); Township of Cinnaminson v. First Camden National Bank and Trust Company, 99 N.J.Super. 115, 238 A.2d 701 (1968); Kirkley v. Bailey, 282 Ala. 115, 209 So.2d 398 (1968); Moore v. Cavett, 368 P.2d 224 (Okl.Sup.Ct.1961); Steele v. Pedroja, 178 Kan. 441, 289 P.2d 738 (1955); In re Bridge's Estate, 40 Wash.2d 133, 241 P.2d 439 (1952); Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009, 33 S.W.2d 369 (1930); In re Cordes' Estate, 116 S.W.2d 207 (Mo.App.--1938); Hancock v. Reedy, 181 Miss. 830, 180 So. 81 (1938). See also City Trust Company v. Bulkley, 151 Conn. 598, 201 A.2d 196 (1964); Wells v. Dickens, 274 N.C. 203, 162 S.E.2d 552 (1968); 96 C.J.S. Wills ยง 1088.