Opinion
Case No. 3:15-cv-02726-GPC-JMA
02-08-2016
AISHA R. BARI-SHARIFF, Plaintiff, v. EVELYN PETERS, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND
[ECF No. 3]
Before the Court is Plaintiff's unopposed motion to remand the case back to state court. Pl. Mot., ECF No. 3. Having reviewed Defendant's notice of removal, the Court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and therefore GRANTS the motion to remand.
DISCUSSION
Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A state court action can only be removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, for an action to be removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of substantial questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983). Alternatively, a federal court may have diversity jurisdiction over an action involving citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction "is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. A review of the state court complaint in this case shows that Plaintiff alleges an unlawful detainer claim under California state law. Compl., ECF No. 1-2. Plaintiff also alleges that the amount demanded does not exceed $10,000. Id.
"The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction." Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.1988). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
In the notice of removal, Defendant alleges that the Court has federal question jurisdiction over the case. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Defendant contends that there is a federal question surrounding Plaintiff's "refus[al] to permit, reasonable modification of the premises of the premises necessary to afford full enjoyment of the premises to Defendant [sic] roommate and co-tenant who is physically handicapped" as well as with the "building NOT being up to code" with respect to the width of the doors in violation of the Fair Housing Act and various federal statutes. Id. at 2.
Defendant's alleged federal "claims" are actually defenses and potential counterclaims against Plaintiff. However, neither defenses nor counterclaims are considered in evaluating whether a federal question appears on the face of a Plaintiff's complaint. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (federal question jurisdiction cannot "rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim"); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) ("A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer jurisdiction on a federal court, even if the defense is that of federal preemption and is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint."). As such, Defendant's allegations do not establish federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Nor is there diversity jurisdiction. Not only does Defendant not plead diversity of citizenship, but also, in unlawful detainer actions, the amount of damages sought in the complaint, not the value of the subject real property, determines the amount in controversy. Evans v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 162, 170 (1977) (quoting Cheney v. Trauzettel, 9 Cal. 2d 158, 159 (1937)). Here, these damages are less than $75,000.
Defendant has not adequately established a basis for this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Court must remand the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to remand, ECF No. 3, is GRANTED. The Court REMANDS the action to the Superior Court of the State of California for San Diego County. The hearing set for February 12, 2016, is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: February 8, 2016
/s/_________
HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL
United States District Judge