Because of our disposition we need not pass upon Appellant's alternative contention that even if the three-year statute of limitations is found to be applicable, then the suit is still not barred because she did not have knowledge of the defect until a time less than three years from the date of the filing of the suit. In Barfield v. United States Rubber Company, Fla.Dist.Ct. of App. 1970, 234 So.2d 374, an intermediate appellate Court of Florida held that a cause of action by the ultimate consumer against a manufacturer with whom the consumer has no privity was not the kind of obligation toward which the "contract" statute (note 1, supra) was directed. In September 1970 the Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari in Barfield.

If a common law implied warranty claim does exist under Florida law in these circumstances, an additional question arises as to how that cause of action is to be considered for purposes of the statute of limitations' borrowing statute. In a pre- West opinion, Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So.2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 239 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1970), a district court of appeals held that the implied warranty claims were not governed by the then three-year statute of limitations for contract actions, but rather by the four-year statute relating to actions for relief not specifically provided for in the chapter. The court "recede[d] from any suggestion [in a prior decision] that a suit based on implied warranty by an ultimate consumer against a manufacturer is based on contract."

A commentator states the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in two state cases raising the issue, and has declined to review one federal case. Bak v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 882, 91 S.Ct. 117, 27 L.Ed.2d 121 (1970); Mitchell v. Illinois, 400 U.S. 882, 91 S.Ct. 117, 27 L.Ed.2d 120 (1970); Stanley v. United States, 400 U.S. 936, 91 S.Ct. 234, 27 L.Ed.2d 242 (1970); see Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 825 (1971). The opposing considerations have been widely discussed.

In all other respects the petition for writ of certiorari is denied." Stanley v. United States, 400 U.S. 936, 91 S.Ct. 234, 27 L.Ed.2d 242 (1970). Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented and would deny certiorari; Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a dissent from the remand and would have denied certiorari.

The above conclusion is not inconsistent with Florida case law. There are, admittedly, numerous cases which have held that an implied warranty action against a manufacturer is not a U.C.C. action, Ford Motor Co. v. Pittman, 227 So.2d 246, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So.2d 374, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Favors v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 309 So.2d 69, 71-72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Vandercook Son v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965); Autrey v. Chemtrust Ind. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085 (D.Del. 1973), though the continued validity of these is doubtful after the West decision. 336 So.2d at 92; Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 556 F.2d at 730; see also Official Comment 1 to § 672.2-318, 19A Fla. Stat.Ann. 264 (1966). But each of these cases specifically distinguished a manufacturer's warranty from a seller's warranty, the latter of which was viewed as ex contractu and subject to the provisions of the U.C.C. Where a breach of implied warranty action has been brought against a seller standing in a relation of privity with the consumer, Florida courts have uniformly applied the provisions of the U.C.C. Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Barry v. Ivarson, Inc., 249 So.2d 44 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Sheppard v. Revlon,Inc., 267 So.2d 662, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).

Although Count III is entitled strict liability in tort, it is clear that plaintiff has alleged a claim for Florida's breach of implied warranty, a tort which closely resembles the doctrine of strict liability. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 367 F.Supp. 27, 38 (M.D.Fla.1973) citing Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So.2d 374 (2 D.C.A.Fla.1970); Royal v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 205 So.2d 307 (3 D.C.A.Fla.1968).          The Florida Supreme Court originated this theory of action against manufacturers in Green v. American Tobacco Company, 154 So.2d 169 (Fla.1963).

Breach of implied warranty has evolved into a form resembling the doctrine of strict liability. See Barfield v. United States Rubber Co., 234 So.2d 374 (2 D.C.A.Fla. 1970), cert. denied 239 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1970); Royal v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., 205 So.2d 307 (3 D.C.A.Fla. 1968), cert. denied 211 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1970). See also Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1969); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1963).

Certiorari denied. 234 So.2d 374. ERVIN, C.J., and ROBERTS, THORNAL, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.

stination imposes on the carrier an obligation to do so in a reasonably safe manner, that what the law implies from the relation of the parties created by the contract is as much a part of the contract as its express terms, and that the obligation was therefore founded on the written instrument, so that the five-year statute of limitations applied. Appellee argues that the trial court properly relied on K/F Development and Investment Corporation in ruling that section 95.11(3)(p) governs actions based upon a breach of the implied warranty of habitability, and argues that cases dealing with products liability implied warranty actions also support the conclusion that this statute should govern implied warranty cases, citing Creviston v. General Motors Corporation, 225 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1969); Putnam v. Roudebush, 352 So.2d 908 (Fla.2d DCA 1977); Smith v. Continental Insurance Company, 326 So.2d 189 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Lauck v. General Telephone Company, 300 So.2d 759 (Fla.2d DCA 1974); and Barfield v. United States Rubber Company, 234 So.2d 374 (Fla.2d DCA), cert. den., United States Rubber Company v. Barfield, 239 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1970). It distinguishes Long on the ground that it was based upon an express warranty which was clearly contractual in nature, and argues that rulings that legal obligations implied by law are actually parts of written contracts do not lead to the conclusion that an implied warranty action is governed by a contractual statute of limitations, asserting that the fact that the legal obligation is implied by law would indicate that the action is not truly contractual in nature.

Therefore, we must reverse the trial court's dismissal of the negligence count. In Barfield v. U.S. Rubber Co., Fla. App.2d 1970, 234 So.2d 374, we rejected the contention that a consumer's action against a manufacturer based on an implied warranty is governed by the three year statute of limitations which relates to contract actions not founded on instruments in writing. In Barfield this court expressly receded from any suggestion in its prior opinion in Creviston v. General Motors Corp., Fla.App.2d 1968, 210 So.2d 755, rev'd.