Opinion
No. 2008 CA 2431.
May 8, 2009.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY, STATE OF LOUISIANA NUMBER: 2004-14670; DIVISION: "A" THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. CHILDRESS, JUDGE PRESIDING.
Prescott L. Barfield, Covington, LA, James A. Marchand, Covington, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/2nd Appellant, Dr. William T. Barfield.
Charles H. Hollis, Vasilios Manthas, New Orleans, LA, William J. Crain, Covington, LA, Counsel for Defendant/1st Appellant, St. Tammany Physicians Network.
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., WHIPPLE AND DOWNING, JJ.
In this wage dispute, both Dr. William T. Barfield (Appellant/Cross-appellee) and the St. Tammany Physicians Network (Appellee/Cross-appellant, the "Physicians Network") appeal the trial court judgment in favor of Dr. Barfield. Dr. Barfield challenges the quantum of wages awarded in the final judgment as being too low. The Physicians Network challenges the summary judgments on which the final judgment was predicated, rendered in favor of Dr. Barfield on the issue of liability. Concluding that the summary judgment on the issue of liability was improvidently granted, we reverse the summary judgment and, accordingly, the final judgment in Dr. Barfield's favor on the issue of quantum.
PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dr. Barfield is a licensed physician who had been employed by the Physicians Network since 1993, having signed employment contracts in 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002. The dispute at issue involves the 2002 employment contract. Particularly at issue is Section 1.8(c), in the section addressing "Time Devoted to Practice," which states: "It is understood that Physician is not required to take any call whatsoever." At the time the 2002 contract was signed, Dr. Barfield had arrangements with other physicians to handle his call. These arrangements ended for different reasons, however, by the end of December 2003, and Dr. Barfield began taking call, including evenings and weekends for his patients.
"Call" is not specifically defined in the record, but in his deposition, Dr. Barfield said call included "hospital patient rounds, weekends, holidays, seven days a week, 24 hours with the hospital patients." The record also indicates that call also included after-hours phone calls from patients.
In January 2004, Dr. Barfield sent an invoice to the Physicians Network for, among other things, the hours he worked up to that time "assuming call." The president and CEO of the Physicians Network denied payment in pertinent part as follows:
While your employment contract does not require you to take call [Paragraph 1.8(c)], who cares for your patients after hours on call and the arrangement for that coverage is your responsibility. . . . Without further discussion and planning, I will not pay for the hours you submitted.
Despite meetings and discussions, the parties did not resolve the call issue. Dr. Barfield continued to assume call for his patients.
In October 2004, Dr. Barfield filed a petition for damages naming the Physicians Network as defendant, asserting several theories of liability. The Physicians Network filed an answer asserting affirmative defenses and exceptions. In September 2005, Dr. Barfield filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The Physicians Network subsequently filed an opposition to Dr. Barfield's motion together with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The Physicians Network's opposition and cross-motion were supplemented and amended in May 2006.
The cross-motions for summary judgment were heard in April 2006. The trial court issued written reasons in September 2006, and judgment was rendered in December 2006 granting Dr. Barfield's motion for summary judgment and denying the Physicians Network's cross-motion for summary judgment. In written reasons, the trial court stated, "[i]t is the conclusion of this court that because the Network is the employer of Dr. Barfield, and pays him for the services he renders to the patients, that the exclusion of 'call duty' responsibility in the employment contract renders the Network financially responsible for the necessary cost of the 'call duty.'"
The Physicians Network filed a writ with this court seeking review of the trial court's judgment. We denied the writ in April 2007, noting that "[a]dequate remedy exists by review on appeal following the rendition of a final judgment on the merits." Barfield v. St. Tammany Physicians Network, 07 CW 0074 (La.App. 1 Cir. 04/04/07) (unpublished writ action).
Generally, the denial of supervisory writs does not bar a different conclusion or reconsideration of the same issue argued in the writ application when an appeal is taken from a final judgment. Cavalier v. State, ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 08-0561 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/12/08), 994 So.2d 635, 640.
After further discovery, the matter proceeded to trial in April 2008 on the issue of damages. The trial court issued written reasons and rendered judgment in June 2008. The trial court awarded Dr. Barfield $66,538.08 in damages together with costs, expert witness fees, and interest from date of judicial demand.
Dr. Barfield now appeals, asserting in three assignments of error that the trial court's award of damages was below that provided under the terms of the employment contract and that the low award was manifestly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. The Physicians Network also appeals, asserting three assignments of error, as follows:
1. The trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of [Dr. Barfield] because [he] failed to establish that the 2002 contract clearly and unambiguously provided that [Physicians Network] was responsible for providing or paying for on-call coverage for [Dr. Barfield].
2. The trial court erred when it refused to enter summary judgment in favor of [Physicians Network] because the ambiguous language in the contract, as informed by the parties' conduct, demonstrated that [Dr. Barfield] was responsible for ensuring his call schedule was covered.
3. The trial court erred in awarding damages, costs, and expert fees to [Dr. Barfield] following the bench trial on the issue of damages.
DISCUSSION Propriety of Summary Judgment in Favor of Dr. Barfield
We first review the Physicans Network's assignment of error regarding the grant of partial summary judgment in Dr. Barfield's favor on the issue of liability. This summary judgment underpins the subsequent judgment granting him money damages and other relief.
A trial court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." La.C.C.P. art. 966B. Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Lacrouts v. Succession of Longo, 04-1938 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05), 923 So.2d 717, 719.
"Summary judgment is a proper procedural method of determining the meaning of a contract when no factual issue is raised." Id. "Summary judgment is rarely appropriate," however, "where a question remains as to the meaning of or intent behind certain provisions of a contract." Id.
Here, the contract provision at issue provides that, "[i]t is understood that [Dr. Barfield] is not required to take any call whatsoever," but the contract is silent concerning the parties' responsibilities if Dr. Barfield took call. Accordingly, Dr. Barfield cannot rely on this contract provision, standing alone, for his right to receive payment for his "call" services. And no other contract provision clearly entitles Dr. Barfield to the recovery he seeks. Legal and factual issues remain, therefore, regarding Dr. Barfield's right to recover payment under the contract for the "call" work he provided. Perhaps he can make a claim for unjust enrichment pursuant to La.C.C. art. 2298 or for other grounds as alleged in his petition. Dr. Barfield, however, fails to demonstrate that no material questions of fact exist regarding any of these theories such that he would be entitled to summary judgment.
Louisiana Civil Code art. 2298, entitled "Enrichment without cause; compensation," provides as follows:
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense of another person is bound to compensate that person. The term "without cause" is used in this context to exclude cases in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the law. The remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.
The amount of compensation due is measured by the extent to which one has been enriched or the other has been impoverished, whichever is less.
The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is measured as of the time the suit is brought or, according to the circumstances, as of the time the judgment is rendered.
Accordingly, we conclude that questions of material fact exist that should have precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Barfield, including, but not limited to, which party could or did bill patients for Dr. Barfield's call and whether the Physicians Network might, therefore, be unjustly enriched by Dr. Barfield's taking call he was not contractually obligated to take.
The Physicians Network's first assignment of error has merit. We therefore will reverse the December 1, 2006 entry of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Barfield on the issue of liability. Accordingly, we will also reverse and vacate the June 6, 2008 judgment in favor of Dr. Barfield on the issues of damages, as this judgment is dependent on the prior finding of liability. We pretermit discussion of all other assignments of error without comment on their efficacy.
Even so, we note that the Physicians Network appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Notwithstanding the concurring opinion, "[a]n appeal does not lie from the court's refusal to render any judgment on the pleading or summary judgment." La.C.C.P. art. 968. A court of appeal does not have appellate jurisdiction to consider the denial of a motion for summary judgment. Hood v. Cotter, 08-0215 (La. 12/2/08), ___ So.2d ___, ___. An appellate court may, however, choose to review the interlocutory ruling under its supervisory jurisdiction. Id. Even though the same ambiguity lies at the heart of both motions for summary judgment in this case, we decline to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction in this regard. See Id.
We will remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the summary judgment of December 1, 2006 in favor of Dr. Barfield on the issue of liability. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the final judgment of June 6, 2008 judgment in favor of Dr. Barfield on the issues of damages. We remand for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed equally to Dr. William T. Barfield and the St. Tammany Physicians Network.
JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 1, 2006 REVERSED; JUDGMENT OF JUNE 6, 2008 REVERSED AND VACATED; REMANDED
WHIPPLE, J., concurring.
Because neither party showed entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability, I concur in the reversal of the summary judgment on the issue of liability and of the final money judgment in favor of Dr. Barfield.
However, I write separately to note my disagreement with the concept that the denial of summary judgment is never reviewable on appeal.
While the Supreme Court in Hood v. Cotter, 08-0237 (La. 12/2/08), ___ So.2d ___, ___, noted therein that the court of appeal did not have appellate jurisdiction to consider the trial court's denial of one party's motion for summary judgment, the procedural posture of Hood is readily distinguishable from the instant case, thereby warranting the conclusion reached therein. Specifically, Hood was before the appellate courts on appeal of the granting of summary judgment in favor of the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board finding that the defendant doctor was not covered by the Medical Malpractice Act, LSA-R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq.; Hood, ___ So.2d at ___. Contrary to the procedural posture of the present case, no final judgment on the merits of the suit had been rendered in Hood. Accordingly, the appellate court lacked appellate jurisdiction to consider the trial court's simultaneous denial of the motion for summary judgment of the doctor's insurer on the issues of insurance coverage. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 968 ("An appeal does not lie from the court's refusal to render any judgment on the pleading or summary judgment."). See Hood, ___ So.2d at ___.
However, as with other interlocutory rulings, this court has held in some instances, the denial of a motion for summary judgment may be reviewed, and such review is not prohibited or proscribed when an appeal is taken from a final judgment and the matter at issue in the interlocutory ruling is raised on appeal. See Johnson v. State, Department of Social Services, 2005-1597 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/9/06), 943 So.2d 374, 377 n. 8, writ denied, 2006-2866 (La. 2/2/07), 948 So.2d 1085, and Dean v. Griffin Crane and Steel, Inc., 2005-1226 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/5/06), 935 So.2d 186, 189 n. 3, writ denied, 2006-1334 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 387. See also LSA-C.C.P. art. 968, Official Revision Comment — 1960, comment (d).
Nonetheless, as stated above, because I find that neither party showed entitlement to summary judgment, I concur in the result reached herein.