Opinion
NO. 09-16-00383-CR
05-16-2018
CAMERON WILLIAM BARELA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 258th District Court Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 24346
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In one issue, Cameron William Barela appeals his class A misdemeanor forgery conviction contending that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conviction. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(b), (c) (West Supp. 2017). Specifically, Barela argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove he intended to harm or defraud anyone, which is an essential element of the offense of forgery. See id. Because the evidence supports the jury's determination that Barela forged a document with the necessary intent to defraud another by representing falsely that he was a full-time employee receiving pay to qualify for a car loan, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
We cite to the current statutes in the Texas Penal Code as any amendments do not affect the outcome of the issue on appeal.
Background
In October 2014, Barela, a licensed peace officer in the State of Texas, went to Z Auto Place in Katy to purchase a car for $15,000. Jorge Ibarra was the sales manager of Z Auto Place that worked with Barela. At the time Barela attempted to buy the car, Ibarra understood that Barela worked for the City of Onalaska Police Department as well as worked other part-time jobs, to which Barela provided documentation supporting those jobs.
Z Auto worked with Rally Motor Credit, located in Salt Lake City, Utah, to finance its car loans to its customers. Craig Leavitt worked for Rally Motor Credit and explained that Z Auto submitted a loan application for Barela to purchase a car, and it was preapproved based on the application and general credit inquiries. Leavitt explained that for a car loan to be finally approved and funded, it is important that the person provide verification of employment. According to Leavitt, Barela indicated that he was employed full-time with the City of Onalaska as a police officer. While Barela was preapproved for the loan, Barela needed documentation supporting his income and other information. Leavitt testified that Barela provided a paystub via email to document his employment and wages: the paystub included Barela's name, last four digits of his social security number, his alleged earnings for a two-week period in September 2014, and a yearly gross income. Leavitt called the City of Onalaska to verify that Barela was a full-time employee, but after speaking with the City Secretary that was in charge of payroll, Leavitt was informed that Barela served as an unpaid reserve police officer for the City of Onalaska. As a result of Leavitt's inquiry regarding Barela's employment status, he forwarded a copy of the forged paystub to the City Secretary and declined Barela's loan.
Upon receipt of the forged paystub, the City Secretary identified Sergeant Joshua Alexander as the person whose actual paystub was used by Barela to create the false document and brought the matter to the attention of the police chief, Ron Gilbert. Chief Gilbert explained that Barela was a reserve police officer who worked for the City which carried his commission, thereby allowing him to maintain his license as a police officer. After speaking with Sergeant Alexander and identifying Alexander's actual paystubs as the ones used by Barela to falsify the paystub provided to Rally Motor Credit, Chief Gilbert contacted the Texas Rangers to investigate the incident. Chief Gilbert released both Barela and Sergeant Alexander from duty with the police department.
Texas Ranger Ryan Clendennen investigated Barela's use of Sergeant Alexander's paystub. As part of Ranger Clendennen's investigation, he interviewed Barela at his residence, who gave a voluntary statement and who was not under arrest at the time. The recording was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. During the interview, Barela—contending that he did not intend to harm or defraud anyone—stated that Sergeant Alexander agreed to allow him to use Alexander's paystub to show Rally Motor Credit that he was a full-time employee of the Onalaska Police Department. Barela explained the various methods he took to achieve the altered paystub that he finally submitted to attempt to document his full-time employment. Barela told Ranger Clendennen that although he knew he was providing false documents, he did not realize what he did was against the law at the time or appreciate the severity of it despite being a licensed peace officer with the State of Texas. Nevertheless, Barela affirmed that he never explained to Z Auto or Rally Motor Credit that he was an unpaid reserve officer with the City of Onalaska.
Barela testified in his own defense. During his testimony in the presence of the jury, he acknowledged that Rally Motor Credit needed proof of his employment in securing the loan. Barela admitted to altering Sergeant Alexander's paystub and submitting it to Z Auto as proof of his employment, along with documentation supporting his part-time employment, but maintained he did so with no intent to harm or defraud anyone. Barela agreed, nonetheless, that he did not want Z Auto or Rally Motor Credit to know that the paystub was that of Sergeant Alexander's and not his because he wanted them to believe that this paystub documented his full-time employment as required to secure the loan. Barela acknowledged that he was being deceptive to Rally Motor Credit by making a false representation to seek approval of the car loan.
The jury found Barela guilty of forgery and the trial court sentenced him to one year in county jail, but suspended the imposition of his sentence and placed Barela on community supervision for two years.
Analysis
In one issue, Barela contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the record allegedly fails to provide sufficient evidence that he acted with intent to defraud or harm another.
In a legal sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard of review applies to cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Although we consider all the evidence presented at trial, we do not substitute our judgment regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence for the trier of fact. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume the jury resolved conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We also determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See id.
A person commits the offense of forgery, "if he forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(b). Barela concedes that he forged the paystub and submitted it to the lender. See id. § 32.21(a)(1)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 2017). Barela maintains, however, that he did not do so with the intent to defraud or harm anyone. "Harm" is defined as "anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected is interested." Id. § 1.07(a)(25) (West Supp. 2017). "Intent to defraud" is not defined within the Penal Code.
Generally, undefined statutory terms are to be understood as ordinary usage allows, and jurors may freely read statutory language to have any meaning which is acceptable in common usage. Clinton v. State, 354 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Other courts of appeals have defined "intent to defraud" as "the intent to cause another to rely upon the falsity of a representation, such that the other person is induced to act or to refrain from acting." Martinez v. State, 6 S.W.3d 674, 678 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.); see also Wingo v. State, 143 S.W.3d 178, 187 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004), aff'd on other grounds, 189 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Moreover, included with the definitions of culpable mental states, a person acts "intentionally" or "with intent" "with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct[.]" Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 2011).
The intent to defraud or harm another may be established by circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of Barela. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). While Barela maintains that his actions were not intended to defraud or harm anyone, Barela admitted, to both Ranger Clendennen and to the jury, to falsifying the paystub for the purpose of obtaining the loan. Specifically, Barela acknowledged that he submitted the forged paystub because he wanted the lender to believe that he was a full-time employee of the police department rather than explaining to them he was an unpaid reserve officer. Given this record, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that Barela, in forging the paystub and submitting it to the lender, intended to defraud the lender into extending credit to Barela based on his alleged full-time employment as a police officer with the City of Onalaska. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We disagree with Barela's contention that actual harm is required to be shown to support his conviction. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21(b); see also Tottenham v. State, 285 S.W.3d 19, 24-25 n.11, 28-29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd) (holding circumstantial evidence supported conviction of constable who presented county judge with falsified training certificates to maintain his position even though the county judge stated that neither he nor the county had been harmed as a result of the constable's actions).
We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Barela's conviction and overrule his sole issue on appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice Submitted on April 26, 2018
Opinion Delivered May 16, 2018
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.