The opportunity has now arisen for us to reach a decision on that specific issue. Courts all across the country have granted summary judgment to a plaintiff such as Thomas when presented with a similar factual scenario and when the state has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), as South Dakota has.Schwartz v. Disneyland Vista Records, 383 So.2d 1117 (D.C.Fla. 1980), Supreme Court of Florida petition for review denied, 392 So.2d 1378 (1980); Bostwick Banking Company v. Arnold, 227 Ga. 18, 178 S.E.2d 890 (1970); Barden Robeson Corp. v. Ferrusi, 52 A.D.2d 1061, 384 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1976); Farmers Merch. Nat. Bank of Hatton v. Lee, 333 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1983); Mid-America Real Estate Inv. Corp. v. Lund, 353 N.W.2d 286 (N.D. 1984); Marine Midland Bank v. DiMarzo, 57 A.D.2d 733, 395 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1977); and Giacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So.2d 679 (D.C.Fla. 1977). In SDCL 57A-3-403 South Dakota has adopted verbatim the language of U.C.C. § 3-403.

An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity; . . . . This statute is plain and simple and there is no reason to think it to mean anything other than just what it says. Barden Robeson Corp. v. Ferrusi, 384 N.Y.S.2d 596, 52 A.D.2d 1061; 19 UCC Reps. 1170 (1976); Reitman, Weisblatt, Schlichting, Rice, Cooper: 6 Banking Law: Checks, Drafts and Notes § 114.04. See also UCC § 3-403 Official Comment 2 and 3.

The official comment to this provision of the Uniform Commercial Code makes it clear that when, as in this case, the agent signs his name only, such signature "personally obligates the agent and parol evidence is inadmissible under subsection (2)(a) to disestablish his obligation." U.C.C. 3-403, Comment 3, 2 U.L.A. 311 (1977); accord, Norfolk County Trust Co. v. Vichinsky, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 768, 768, 359 N.E.2d 59, 60 (1977); Barden Robeson Corp. v. Ferrusi, 52 A.D.2d 1061, 1062, 384 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (1976). This rule applies even between the immediate parties to the instrument, for "[o]ne who executes . . . [an instrument] in his own name with nothing on the face of the . . . [instrument] showing his agency cannot introduce parol evidence to show that he executed it for a principal, or that the payee knew that he intended to execute it as agent."

As there is no indication on the notes that defendant signed his name in a representative capacity, he is personally obligated, and parol evidence to the contrary is not admissible (UCC 3-403 [a], comment 3; Barden Robeson Corp. v Ferrusi, 52 A.D.2d 1061, 1062 [4th Dept 1976]).

The New York courts have held that a signer who neither indicates his alleged principal nor his alleged capacity cannot avoid liability even as to an immediate party. Tropical Ornamentals, Inc. v. Visconti, 115 App. Div.2d 537, 538-39, 495 N.Y.S.2d 729 (1985); Barden Robeson Corporation v. Ferrusi, 52 App. Div.2d 1061, 1062, 384 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1976). When the face of the instrument does not serve to put the holder on notice of limited liability of the signer, resort to extrinsic proof is impermissible. Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, supra.

In the circumstances, the question of the capacity in which one individual has dealt with another and signed a document may only be resolved by parol evidence. (See Sullivan County Wholesalers v Sullivan County Dorms, 59 A.D.2d 628; Barden Robeson Corp. v Ferrusi, 52 A.D.2d 1061; Citibank Eastern, N.A. v Minbiole, 50 A.D.2d 1052, 1053.) Thus the court is not actually deciding the issue at all.

The individual defendant claims that he signed the note only as a representative of the corporate defendant. Although there is no indication that the signature in question was written in a representative capacity, because this is a suit between immediate parties in which the name of the alleged principal, the corporate defendant, appears on the face of the instrument, parol evidence is admissible to establish that the individual defendant signed only as a representative (Barden Robeson Corp. v Ferrusi, 52 A.D.2d 1061; Citibank Eastern, N.A. v Minbiole, 50 A.D.2d 1052; Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-403, subd [2], par [b]). Accordingly, plaintiff's reliance on the face of the note is misplaced.