Opinion
C. A. 3:21-3750-MGL-SVH
03-15-2022
Peter Barclay, Plaintiff, v. Capital Chrysler, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brought this action alleging Defendant violated his rights related to a car loan. The case has been referred to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Local Civ. R. 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.). This matter comes before the court on the responses of the parties to the court's order to show cause as to whether it has subject matter jurisdiction in this case.
Defendant removed the case from state court on October 16, 2021, arguing Plaintiff included a claim for pain and suffering as provided under ‘federal procedural rule.'” [ECF No. 1 at 2]. A review of the complaint reveals Plaintiff listed a claim for pain and suffering “As per Federal procedural rule for the State of South Carolina.” [ECF No. 1-1 at 6 (emphasis added)]. On February 22, 2022, the undersigned ordered the parties to provide argument as to whether this court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
The undersigned notes that “pain and suffering” is not a claim or cause of action under either federal or state law. Rather, it is a type of injury for which damages may sometimes be awarded.
In lieu of arguments, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint to remove federal issues. [ECF No. 28]. The court interprets the filing as a motion to voluntarily dismiss all federal claims and grants the motion. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County.
I. Authority to Remand
There is a split of authority as to whether a magistrate judge has the authority to remand a matter to state court. At least one court in this district has addressed the issue in a published opinion and held that a magistrate judge did not have such authority. See Long v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 783 F.Supp. 249, 250 (D.S.C. 1992). Many federal circuit courts, addressing this matter in published opinions, have reached a similar result, holding that an order to remand is dispositive. See Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 264-66 (2d Cir. 2008); Vogel v. U.S. Office Prods. Co., 258 F.3d 509, 514-17 (6th Cir. 2001); In re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1998). In light of the unsettled state of the law within this district as to whether remands are considered dispositive, a report and recommendation has been prepared in this case. See Jonas v. Unisun Ins. Co., No. 00-1217, 2000 WL 1350648, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 20, 2000) (noting that the Fourth Circuit “has not addressed whether a magistrate judge may issue an order of remand”).
II. Analysis
It is permissible for a plaintiff to dismiss his federal claims or amend the complaint to remove federal claims and seek remand. See 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 107.14(3)(b)(ii) (3rd ed. 2013). Plaintiff has made clear that his intention is to pursue only state law claims. [ECF No. 28]. Although the court retains supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims that form part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims, “[a]s a practical matter . . . many district judges will exercise their discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute and dismiss the remaining claims.” 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 107.14(3)(b)(ii) (3rd ed. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction “if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”); United States ex rel. Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 375 F.Supp.2d 626, 647 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (“[T]he strong federal custom . . . has been to dismiss those claims in order to permit state courts to decide their own law, as is their prerogative.”); see also AJP Group, Inc. v. Holmes, C/A No. 4:13-611-RBH, 2013 WL 3148416, at *2 (D.S.C. June 18, 2013) (“Given that Plaintiffs Complaint states no federal cause of action, the Court finds that the case should be remanded.”); Morris v. Joe Gibson Automotive, Inc., C/A No. 7:08-1739-HMH, 2008 WL 2705000 (D.S.C. July 9, 2008) (granting the plaintiffs motion to amend to remove the sole federal claim, and granting the plaintiffs motion to remand).
The undersigned recommends the district judge decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and instead to remand this case.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).