Opinion
100989/06.
Decided July 11, 2006.
In November, 2005, the plaintiff was terminated from her position as Technical Project Manager with defendant Deutsche Bank. In March, 2006, the plaintiff commenced this action against Deutsche Bank and her co-employees Lori Bryant-Chin, John Robbins and Philip Gallo. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff's co-employees subjected her to "employment sabotage" and that her employer terminated her "without justification or cause". The defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).
Absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party ( see, Matter of De Petris v. Union Settlement Assn., 86 NY2d 406, 410; Riccardi v. Cunningham, 291 AD2d 547 [2nd Dept. 2002]). "This State neither recognizes a tort of wrongful discharge nor requires good faith in an at-will employment relationship" ( Matter of De Petris v. Union Settlement Assn., 86 NY2d 406, 410, supra; see, Paisley v. Coin Device Corp., 5 AD3d 748 [2nd Dept. 2004]). In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff does not dispute that she was an employee at will, but instead contends that she has sufficiently plead a cognizable cause of action for wrongful interference with an employee relationship against her former employer. However, the Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff cannot circumvent the employee at-will rule by casting the cause of action in terms of tortious interference with employment ( see, Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 73 NY2d 183, 189; Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 303-304; see also, Negron v. JP Morgan Chase/Chase Manhattan Bank, 14 AD3d 673 [2nd Dept. 2005]). Thus, the complaint as asserted against Deutsche Bank must be dismissed.
Additionally, the complaint as asserted against the individual defendants for tortious interference with employment must also be dismissed. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the facts pleaded are presumed true and accorded every favorable inference ( see, Leon v. Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88; Palazzolo v. Herrick, Feinstein, LLP, 298 AD2d 372 [2nd Dept. 2002]). Where, as here, the allegations concern an at-will employee, the plaintiff has the high burden of asserting that the defendants used wrongful means, such as fraud, misrepresentation or threats to effect the termination of employment ( see, Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Aatlas Commerce Inc., 283 AD2d 801, 803 [3rd Dept. 2001]). Here, the complaint merely alleges in conclusory fashion that the individual defendants participated in "employment sabotage" and fails to support these conclusions with factual information. Hence, the plaintiff has not adequately set forth wrongful conduct on the part of the individual defendants that states a cause of action for tortious interference with employment ( see, Lockhead Martin Cop. v. Aatlas Commerce Inc., 283 AD2d 801, 804, supra).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) is granted and the complaint is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.