The United States Supreme Court is the supreme judicial authority with respect to the interpretation of Federal constitutional issues. Barber v. The International Company, 74 Conn. 652, 656 [ 51 A. 857]; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 22 Sup.Ct.Rep. 431 [ 46 L.Ed. 679]. In the Dean Milk Company case, supra, the United States Supreme Court has decided that the local ordinance, which in essence and principle is similar in character to our Section 3238, is repugnant to the provisions of the Federal Constitution. The expression by the Supreme Court is now the prevailing law throughout the land.

"* * * the law to be that in the case of a separation agreement providing for more than the payment of money the courts will not declare that the agreement merged with the subsequent decree or judgment of divorce. McQuillen et al v. Dillon, et al, 2 Cir., 98 F.2d 726; Barber v. International Co. of Mexico, 74 Conn. 652; 51 A. 857; Restatement of the Law, Judgments, Sec. 47 (h); 30 Am. Jur. Judgments Sec. 155, p 905; 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 868, p. 442." (86 A.2d at 53)

The order of confirmation, being final in its nature, as to the particular parties and matters affected by it, could have been appealed from by them. Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 657, 51 A. 857; Links v. Connecticut River Banking Co., 66 Conn. 277, 283, 33 A. 1033. They took no such appeal, but on June 10th, 1929, filed a motion to vacate the order, on what grounds it does not appear. This, after hearing, was denied, but no appeal was taken or attempted. We conclude that the validity of the title to the real estate in question is not impaired by the deficiency in notice of hearing on the appointment of the receiver.

The trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff was guilty of laches in failing to take prompter action to enforce her judgment is also assigned as error. It is true that at common law an action on a judgment may be maintained at any time within twenty years from the date of the judgment. Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 656, 51 A. 857. The court's conclusion of laches, however, was directed primarily at the claim for injunctive relief. A conclusion that a delay of nearly fifteen years in asking for this type of relief constituted laches is not unreasonable, and therefore it is not erroneous. The plaintiff's complaint sought money damages in addition to other forms of relief. The trial court's failure to render a judgment for money damages is assigned as error. Only in this failure do we find error.

We have said that the test for determining whether a judgment is final "lies, not in the nature of the judgment, but in its effect as concluding the rights of some or all of the parties; if such rights are concluded, so that further proceedings after the entry of the order or decree of the court cannot affect them, then the judgment is a final judgment." Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Co. v. Westchester Artistic Works, Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 307, 142 A. 838; Felletter v. Thompson, 133 Conn. 277, 278, 50 A.2d 81. Apt illustrations of the application of the test are orders made in receivership proceedings which, while not determinative of the action as a whole, conclude the rights of parties so that further proceedings in the case cannot affect them. Guarantee Trust Safe Deposit Co. v. Philadelphia, R. N.E. R. Co., 69 Conn. 709, 714, 38 A. 792; Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 657, 51 A. 857; and cf. More v. Western Connecticut Title Mortgage Co., 129 Conn. 464, 467, 29 A.2d 450. The purpose of an order that a husband make payments for the support of his wife pendente lite is to afford her a means of livelihood while she is living apart from him pending the determination of the question whether she has the right to separate maintenance; Harding v. Harding, 144 Ill. 588, 595, 32 N.E. 206; Westerfield v. Westerfield, 36 N.J. Eq. 195, 197; Collins v. Collins, 80 N.Y. 1, 12; as expressed in Johnson v. Johnson, (Tenn.Ch.App.) 49 S.W. 305, 307, such payments are "a fund for the current support of the wife." Even should judgment ultimately be rendered against her, the husband would have no right to be reimbursed.

Sibley v. State, 89 Conn. 682, 685, 96 A. 161. The answer to the issue before us depends upon the construction to be given 6005. The nature of that issue is well illustrated by certain cases wherein we have held the statute not applicable. Thus, in Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 656, 51 A. 857, we held that, although a judgment is a contract of record, and although in one sense it is a contract by specialty and in another it raises an implied contract, yet an action based upon it was not within the statute because the underlying reasons leading to the enactment of the statute had little if any application. In Cromwell v. Savage, 85 Conn. 376, 82 A. 972, we held that, although the statutes provide that a tax shall be a debt, yet the limitation was not applicable because the nature of a tax is so essentially different from a debt in the ordinary sense of the word; and in Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros. Co., 131 Conn. 50, 37 A.2d 693, we reached a similar conclusion as to an assessment of benefits for a public improvement.

Here, as in case of an action on a judgment, statutes of limitation pertaining to contract actions do not apply. See Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 656, 51 A. 857. Accordingly, the Statute of Limitations, 6005, did not apply here, and the court erred in rendering judgment for the defendant on the ground that it constituted a valid defense. This conclusion is in accord with that reached in similar cases in other jurisdictions. Dickinson v. Trenton, 35 N.J. Eq. 416, 418; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 358, 365. It is also fortified by the principle that, as respects public rights, a municipality acting in its delegated governmental capacity is not impliedly within ordinary limitation statutes.

Norton v. Shore Line Electric Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 24, 31, 78 A. 587; O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 59, 63 A. 777. It is also true that a decision which concludes the right of a party to the relief he claims may be a final judgment, although the proceeding in which that decision is reached does not dispose of the entire case but it still remains in court for adjudication of other claims for relief involving the same or other parties. Practice Book, 372; Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co., 66 Conn. 24, 37, 33 A. 533; Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Co. v. Westchester Artistic Works, Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 307, 142 A. 838; Enfield v. Hamilton, 110 Conn. 319, 322, 148 A. 353; Antman v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 117 Conn. 230, 238, 167 A. 715. Thus an appeal lies from an order made in the course of receivership proceedings which determines the right of a party to the relief he claims. Guarantee Trust Safe Deposit Co. v. Philadelphia, R. N.E. R. Co., 69 Conn. 709, 714, 38 A. 792; Barber v. International CO., 74 Conn. 652, 657, 51 A. 857; Raymond v. Gilman, 111 Conn. 605, 611, 151 A. 248. So it lies from an order appointing appraisers in condemnation proceedings. New Milford Water Co. v. Watson, 75 Conn. 237, 242, 52 A. 947; Bristol v. Bristol Water Co., 85 Conn. 663, 670, 84 A. 314; Antman v. Connecticut Light Power Co., supra.

It is expressly admitted that the Nevada Machinery and Electric Company did not present any claim to the receiver nor file any claim in court. Unless the claim were filed within the designated period the district court could not acquire authority to consider and pass upon the claim of the Nevada Machinery and Electric Company. Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 51 A. 857, 92 Am. St. Rep. 246; Leo v. Green (N.J. Eq.), 28 A. 904; Leadville Coal Co. v. McCreery, 144 U.S. 475, 35 L.Ed. 824; Smith v. Jones Lumber Merc. Co. 200 Fed. 647; Tex. P. Ry. v. Johnson, 151 U.S. 81, 28 L.Ed. 81; Franklin Trust Co. v. Northern Co., 42 N.Y. Sup. 211. The situation in the instant case is this: the receiver or trustee appointed by the trial court took into his possession property claimed by appellant; appellant intervened in the receivership proceeding and sought the order of the lower court for the restoration of the property claimed by appellant.

But in certain classes of cases a final judgment may be followed by a further judgment. Ricci v. Naples, 108 Conn. 19, 22, 142 A. 452; Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co., 66 Conn. 24, 37, 33 A. 533; Guarantee Trust Safe Deposit Co. v. Philadelphia, R. N.E. R. Co., 69 Conn. 709, 714, 38 A. 792; New Milford Water Co. v. Watson, 75 Conn. 237, 243, 52 A. 947, 53 id. 57; Bristol v. Bristol Water Co., 85 Conn. 663, 670, 84 A. 314; Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 657, 51 A. 857; Wardell v. Killingly, 96 Conn. 718, 722, 115 A. 539; Norton v. Shore Line Electric Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 24, 31, 78 A. 587; Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust Co. v. Westchester Artistic Works, Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 307, 142 A. 838. If the parties are satisfied with the award as made by the committee and filed with the clerk of the Superior Court, the same may be accepted by the landowner and paid or deposited by the company and no further judicial proceeding is required, although the better practice is to enter a judgment of the court accepting the report of the committee. If, however, either party is dissatisfied with the report as filed, it may, under our rules, file a remonstrance against its acceptance. The grounds of remonstrance are set forth in the rules, which provide that after the filing of a remonstrance, the adverse party shall, in the time specified therein, demur to the remonstrance, or answer to controvert allegations of fact; and the court, after hearing upon the remonstra