Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Corp.

7 Citing cases

  1. State v. Christensen

    9 S.E.2d 555 (S.C. 1940)   Cited 6 times

    A.O. Christensen was convicted of housebreaking with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, to wit, a trespass, and he appeals. Messrs. W.W. Elliott and W. Brantley Harvey, for appellant, cite: Trespass: 85 S.C. 273; 67 S.E., 300. Rightto make forcible entry to levy under distress warrant: 190 S.C. 245; 2 S.E., 2d 737; 58 S.C. 145; 36 S.E., 499. Hon. Randolph Murdaugh, Solicitor, for the State.

  2. Galloway v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.

    106 F.2d 466 (4th Cir. 1939)   Cited 13 times
    In Galloway v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 4 Cir., 106 F.2d 466, 468, the court said: "Punitive damages are awarded for the purpose of punishing a tort feasor for such an exhibition of recklessness or negligence as evidences malice or the conscious disregard of the rights of others."

    "We think it should have been left to the jury to determine whether the entry was made in a lawful way, whether defendants were trespassers, and whether there was such a breach of the peace as the law contemplates in cases of this nature." Both the last mentioned cases were cases of forcible entry, under the statute which now appears as section 885 of Volume I of the Civil Code of South Carolina. The latest case on this subject, Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Corporation, 190 S.C. 245, 2 S.E.2d 737, 739, was decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina May 3, 1939. Therein, with citations of numerous authorities the Court said: "As a general rule, it may be stated that, to render an entry forcible under the Statute of Forcible Entry and Detainer, Code 1932, § 885 et seq., it must be accompanied with circumstances tending to excite terror in the occupant, and to prevent him from maintaining his rights. An entry which has no other force than such as is implied in any trespass is not within the statute.

  3. Morris v. Mortg. Contracting Servs.

    Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-2272-BHH (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2020)

    First, Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendant MCS "used force by initially breaking into the home and, with a strong hand, replaced the locks on the home preventing reentry for Plaintiffs without force" is insufficient to state a plausible claim under S.C. Code ¶ 15-67-410, as "[a]n entry which has no force other than such as is implied in every trespass is not within the statute." Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Corp., 190 S.C. 245, 2 S.E.2d 737, 739 (1939); see also Parker v. Shecut, 349 S.C. 226, 229, 562 S.C.2d 620, 622 (2002). Plaintiffs do not allege that they were at the home at the time of the alleged incident, or, as previously explained, that they had legal possession of the property at the time of the incident, and the Court finds Plaintiffs' claim as pleaded in the proposed amended complaint insufficient.

  4. Colonial Oil Co. v. American Oil Co.

    43 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.S.C. 1942)   Cited 4 times

    Counsel rely on the case of State v. Mays, 24 S.C. 190, in contending that the plaintiff herein should have established its rights in the premises by judicial decree before instituting this action for trespass and that there can be no trespass upon an equitable right. The case of State v. Mays did not involve a year to year tenancy, and the plaintiff in this action is claiming the violation of legal rights as a tenant from year to year. Counsel for defendant cite several South Carolina cases holding that a landlord may peaceably dispossess a tenancy at will after expiration of the term, such as Pure Oil Company of the Carolinas v. Strom, 172 S.C. 77, 172 S.E. 780; Sharp v. Kinsman, 18 S.C. 108; Rush v. Aiken Mfg. Co., 58 S.C. 145, 36 S.E. 497, 79 Am.St.Rep. 836, and Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Corp., 190 S.C. 245, 2 S.E.2d 737. That contention is correct, but in the case at bar there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could find that the plaintiff was not a tenant at will and was a tenant from year to year, whose estate could not be terminated, without reasonable notice looking to the end of the calendar year, until Dec. 31, 1940.

  5. Thurston v. Anderson

    40 A.2d 342 (D.C. 1944)   Cited 12 times

    Its enactment by Congress, the court held, imported into its provisions the interpretation they had previously received in the Massachusetts courts. In re Munro, D.C.N.D.N.Y., 195 F. 817, 197 F. 450; Fults v. Munro, 202 N.Y. 34, 95 N.E. 23, 37 L.R.A., N.S., 600, Ann.Cas.1912d 870; Mastin v. May, 127 Minn. 93, 148 N.W. 893, Ann.Cas.1916C, 493; Shaw v. Hoffman, 25 Mich. 162; Prestage v. Hanley, 259 Mich. 97, 242 N.W. 851; Smith v. Reeder, 21 Or. 541, 28 P. 890, 15 L.R.A. 172; Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Corp., 190 S.C. 245, 2 S.E.2d 737; Southern Ry. Co. v. Lima Wood Coal Co., 156 Va. 829, 159 S.E. 69; see 26 C.J., "Forcible Entry and Detainer", § 59; 36 C.J.S. "Forcible Entry and Detainer", § 17. Harper v. Sallee, 376 Ill. 540, 34 N.E.2d 860, 135 A.L.R. 189.

  6. Bedrosian v. Wong Kok Chung

    33 A.2d 811 (D.C. 1943)   Cited 4 times

    While they may have regarded him as a mere intruder, and there may have been no intent to hold possession against appellant by force, the point was not raised or discussed, and we have not considered it in disposing of the appeal. Code 1940, 11-735; Willis v. Eastern Trust Banking Co., 169 U.S. 295, 18 S.Ct. 347, 42 L.Ed. 752; Commonwealth v. Dudley, 1813, 10 Mass. 403; Saunders v. Robinson, 1842, 5 Metc., Mass., 343; In re Munro, D.C., 195 F. 817; Id., D.C., 197 F. 450; Fults v. Munro, 202 N.Y. 34, 95 N.E. 23, 37 L.R.A., N.S., 600, Ann.Cas. 1912d 870; Smith v. Reeder, 21 Or. 541, 28 P. 890, 15 L.R.A. 172; Prestage v. Hanley, 259 Mich. 97, 242 N.W. 851; Mastin v. May, 127 Minn. 93, 148 N.W. 893, Ann.Cas.1916C, 493; Barbee v. Winnsboro Granite Corporation, 190 S.C. 245, 2 S.E.2d 737. Lehker v. Joyce, 51 App.D.C. 35, 273 F. 763.

  7. Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co.

    198 S.C. 355 (S.C. 1941)   Cited 42 times
    In Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E.2d 869, the cross-examination of a witness concerning sale by his company of slot machines was condemned as error, and it was said that it was manifestly for the purpose of prejudicing the minds of the jury because it is common knowledge that the handling of slot machines, which may be gambling devices, brings public disfavor, and this was an issue foreign to the case, just as the liquor still is in the case at bar.

    against the Mills Novelty Company to recover damages, actual and punitive, for the alleged breaking and entry of the plaintiff's premises by an agent of the defendant, and the removal therefrom of part of plaintiff's property, and the damaging, ransacking and destroying of other property of plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Mr. H.H. Woodward, of Conway, and Mr. John I. Cosgrove,of Charleston, for appellant, cite: As to refusal todirect verdict: 36 A.L.R., 853; 200 S.E., 770; 189 S.C. 224; 82 S.C. 500; 64 S.E., 410; 189 S.C. 487; 1 S.E.2d 508; 191 S.C. 319; 4 S.E.2d 268; 146 S.C. 257; 143 S.E., 820; 38 Cyc., p. 2020; 163 S.C. 204; 161 S.E., 450; 165 S.C. 387; 164 S.E., 17; 124 S.C. 415; 117 S.E., 424; 181 S.C. 501; 188 S.E., 243. As to testimonyto vary terms of written contract: 1 S.E.2d 875; 199 S.E., 698; 188 S.C. 484; 182 S.C. 419; 189 S.E., 660; 137 S.C. 366; 135 S.E., 363; 6 R.C.L., 914. As toerror in submitting punitive damages to jury: 190 S.C. 245; 1 S.E.2d 737. As to error in charge: L.R.A., 1915-E, 199, Vol. 57, L.R.A. (N.S.); 148 S.C. 511; 146 S.E., 534. Mr. E.S.C. Baker, of Conway, for respondent, cites: As to error in admission of testimony: 41 S.C. 153; 19 S.E., 310; 111 S.C. 287; 97 S.E., 831; 141 S.C. 524; 140 S.E., 161; Words Phrases, First Series, Vol. 2, p. 1437; 71 S.W. 799. As to charge: 189 S.C. 376; 1 S.E.2d 238; 148 S.C. 511; 146 S.E., 534; 197 S.C. 171; 14 S.E.2d 895.