Barbee v. Lamb

7 Citing cases

  1. Kent v. Humphries

    303 N.C. 675 (N.C. 1981)   Cited 56 times
    Holding when a tenant enters into possession under an invalid lease and tenders rent which is accepted by the landlord, a periodic tenancy is created and the period of the tenancy is determined by the interval between rental payments

    Davis v. Lovick 226 N.C. 252, 255, 37 S.E.2d 680, 681-82 (1946). See also Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945) Mauney v. Norvell, 179 N.C. 628, 103 S.E. 372 (1920). Like Judge Clark, we are troubled by the equities of this rule.

  2. Sage v. Shaul

    159 Neb. 543 (Neb. 1955)   Cited 5 times

    In Shorter v. Shelton, 183 Va. 819, 33 S.E.2d 643, an oral lease "that she should occupy the room as long as she wanted to" was held to be an estate at will of both parties which either could terminate at his option. Cases of similar import are Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65, and Wildseheutz v. Lee (Tex. Civ. App.), 281 S.W. 1105. The record shows that defendant was notified by registered mail that plaintiffs demanded possession of the farm on or before March 1, 1953.

  3. Davis v. Lovick

    226 N.C. 252 (N.C. 1946)   Cited 6 times

    This statute has been repeatedly interpreted as applying to a lease for an indefinite term or for one which may last beyond the three-year period to which a parol lease is limited. Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65; Love v. Edmonston, 23 N.C. 152; Wright v. Allred, ante, 113. The invalidity of the rental contract leaves the defendants in the position of tenants at will, whose occupancy may be terminated instanter by demand for possession.

  4. Barnes v. Saleeby

    177 N.C. 256 (N.C. 1919)   Cited 22 times
    In Barnes v. Saleeby, 177 N.C. 260, upon somewhat similar circumstances this Court held: "The plaintiff's motion to dismiss in this Court should be allowed whenever it appears in the record, as in this case, that no serious assignment of error is made. Blount v. Jones, 175 N.C. 708; Ludwick v. Mining Co., 171 N.C. 61."

    Appeal dismissed. Cited: Simonds v. Carson, 182 N.C. 83; Hotel Co. v. Griffin, 182 N.C. 540; Pickens v. Whitten, 182 N.C. 779, 781; S. v. Hutchins, 185 N.C. 696; Drafts v. Summey, 198 N.C. 70; S. v. Fleming, 204 N.C. 42; Rental Co. v. Justice, 212 N.C. 525; Summerell v. Sales Corp., 218 N.C. 454; Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 212; Stephenson v. Watson, 226 N.C. 743; Electric Co. v. Motor Lines, 229 N.C. 91; Clements v. Booth, 244 N.C. 476; Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 338. (262)

  5. Kent v. Humphries

    50 N.C. App. 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 23 times
    Remanding order to compel discovery with instructions to award attorney's fees

    Dicta in two North Carolina cases have suggested that our Supreme Court would follow the majority rule. See Ingram v. Corbit, 177 N.C. 319, 99 S.E. 18 (1919) (Clark, C.J.); Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945). At least one authority appears to have been misled by these dicta.

  6. Dixon v. Rivers

    245 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 2 times

    Plaintiffs contend that the above language does not create a lease for a term of years, but, at most, creates a tenancy at will. In support of this contention, plaintiffs rely upon Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945) (cases cited therein) where the Court held that when one "enters into possession of premises . . . under an agreement which is for an indefinite and uncertain term (citation omitted), or for so long as the tenant may wish to occupy the premises (citation omitted), he becomes a tenant at will." They argue that, in the instant case, the duration of the term was indefinite and uncertain in that clause two of the lease, as set forth above, allows the lease to last "for so long as parties of the second part so desire.

  7. Stout v. Crutchfield

    21 N.C. App. 387 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 2 times

    Every lease must contain some definite provision enabling the parties and the courts to determine when the lease will end. Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65; Sappenfield v. Goodman, 215 N.C. 417, 2 S.E.2d 13; Rental Co. v. Justice, 212 N.C. 523, 193 S.E. 817. In this case, the rental agreement would end if Crutchfield bought the house, but there is no indication when it would end if he did not. Under the contention of defendants, if Crutchfield never bought the house, he could claim the right to rent it for his entire life. Construing the agreement as a whole, it is obvious that Stout did not intend to grant Crutchfield a life estate in the property or the right to occupy it for any definite term. He reserved the right to sell and was attempting to do so when he executed the agreement.