Davis v. Lovick 226 N.C. 252, 255, 37 S.E.2d 680, 681-82 (1946). See also Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945) Mauney v. Norvell, 179 N.C. 628, 103 S.E. 372 (1920). Like Judge Clark, we are troubled by the equities of this rule.
In Shorter v. Shelton, 183 Va. 819, 33 S.E.2d 643, an oral lease "that she should occupy the room as long as she wanted to" was held to be an estate at will of both parties which either could terminate at his option. Cases of similar import are Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65, and Wildseheutz v. Lee (Tex. Civ. App.), 281 S.W. 1105. The record shows that defendant was notified by registered mail that plaintiffs demanded possession of the farm on or before March 1, 1953.
This statute has been repeatedly interpreted as applying to a lease for an indefinite term or for one which may last beyond the three-year period to which a parol lease is limited. Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65; Love v. Edmonston, 23 N.C. 152; Wright v. Allred, ante, 113. The invalidity of the rental contract leaves the defendants in the position of tenants at will, whose occupancy may be terminated instanter by demand for possession.
Appeal dismissed. Cited: Simonds v. Carson, 182 N.C. 83; Hotel Co. v. Griffin, 182 N.C. 540; Pickens v. Whitten, 182 N.C. 779, 781; S. v. Hutchins, 185 N.C. 696; Drafts v. Summey, 198 N.C. 70; S. v. Fleming, 204 N.C. 42; Rental Co. v. Justice, 212 N.C. 525; Summerell v. Sales Corp., 218 N.C. 454; Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 212; Stephenson v. Watson, 226 N.C. 743; Electric Co. v. Motor Lines, 229 N.C. 91; Clements v. Booth, 244 N.C. 476; Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 338. (262)
Dicta in two North Carolina cases have suggested that our Supreme Court would follow the majority rule. See Ingram v. Corbit, 177 N.C. 319, 99 S.E. 18 (1919) (Clark, C.J.); Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945). At least one authority appears to have been misled by these dicta.
Plaintiffs contend that the above language does not create a lease for a term of years, but, at most, creates a tenancy at will. In support of this contention, plaintiffs rely upon Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65 (1945) (cases cited therein) where the Court held that when one "enters into possession of premises . . . under an agreement which is for an indefinite and uncertain term (citation omitted), or for so long as the tenant may wish to occupy the premises (citation omitted), he becomes a tenant at will." They argue that, in the instant case, the duration of the term was indefinite and uncertain in that clause two of the lease, as set forth above, allows the lease to last "for so long as parties of the second part so desire.
Every lease must contain some definite provision enabling the parties and the courts to determine when the lease will end. Barbee v. Lamb, 225 N.C. 211, 34 S.E.2d 65; Sappenfield v. Goodman, 215 N.C. 417, 2 S.E.2d 13; Rental Co. v. Justice, 212 N.C. 523, 193 S.E. 817. In this case, the rental agreement would end if Crutchfield bought the house, but there is no indication when it would end if he did not. Under the contention of defendants, if Crutchfield never bought the house, he could claim the right to rent it for his entire life. Construing the agreement as a whole, it is obvious that Stout did not intend to grant Crutchfield a life estate in the property or the right to occupy it for any definite term. He reserved the right to sell and was attempting to do so when he executed the agreement.