Opinion
File No. 44610
V. P. Dooley, Attorney for the Plaintiff.
A. F. Mignone, Attorney for the Defendant.
Petition for annulment of marriage. Heard ex parte on the cross complaint. The power and jurisdiction of the Court over marriage is purely statutory and must be strictly construed. The purpose of section 5188 of the General Statutes is to confer jurisdiction upon the Court to declare a marriage void when it is in fact void. The Court has no such discretion in the instant case where it appears from the laws of the State of New York where the marriage took place that the marriage was not void but voidable. The Court finding that there was in fact a marriage covenant, voluntarily entered into by the parties followed by cohabitation in this State denied the petition. The facts briefly recapitulated according to the claims of the petitioner are that the defendant, Anna Iannone Barbaro, and the plaintiff, Ralph Barbaro, intermarried at Brewster, New York, on April 3rd, 1933. The said Anna Iannone Barbaro was at the time a minor of the age of seventeen, born January 25th, 1916. The claim of the said Anna Barbaro is that on the Saturday preceding the Monday on which she was married, she had gone on an automobile ride with the said Ralph Barbaro from New Haven to New York. After seeing a show in New York at 2:00 A. M. they arrived back in New Haven about 6:00 A. M. Sunday morning. The said Anna Barbaro was considerably frightened and afraid to return to her mother's home at that hour. She went to the home of Ralph Barbaro's mother where she remained all day Sunday. Monday morning, she returned to her work and being notified that her mother refused to take her back, believing she had no other alternative, and at the insistence of said Ralph Barbaro, started with him and another couple for New York. She claims further that along the way, she asked to turn back, that she was still considerably frightened, that they arrived in Brewster, New York, and were married there. The claim of said Anna Barbaro is that in the frightened state she was in, she did not appreciate what she was doing at the time of the marriage ceremony. They returned to New Haven and for a period of a couple of weeks lived in a furnished room and then she went to live with her mother where she has been since. She admits that during this period she had relations but claimed that she submitted under force and duress. She further claims that at no time did she have any love or affection for the said Ralph Barbaro.
MEMORANDUM FILED MARCH 12, 1935.
The power and jurisdiction of this court over marriage contracts is purely statutory and must be strictly construed. Section 5188 of the General Statutes provides that "whenever for any cause any marriage shall be void", this court may, upon complaint, "pass a decree declaring such marriage void". This statute confers jurisdiction upon this court to declare a marriage void when for any reason it is in fact void. The purpose of this statute is to afford the parties a decree declaratory of their marriage status. It would make no difference where the marriage took place or was contracted. But in this case, from the complaint, and the laws of the State of New York, where the marriage was contracted, it appears that the marriage of the defendant to the plaintiff, was not void, but voidable in the discretion of the court of that State. This court had no such discretion.
The case of Davis vs. Davis, 119 Conn. 194 has no application to the instant case. In that case the court held as a matter of fact and law there was no marriage contract at all. Here there was in fact a marriage covenant, voluntarily entered into by the parties, followed by cohabitation in this State.
It appears that the parties are not now living together, and have not for approximately two years. It also appears that both are apparently desirous of severing their marital relations. The court therefore deems it proper to suggest that if the parties do not resume their marital relations, the law will in due and a comparatively short time afford one or the other proper redress.