Opinion
No. 2:01 cv 554
May 3, 2002
ORDER
This Order disposes of the four motions to dismiss presently pending in this action. On March 5, 2002, Barajas, by way of her attorney, moved for an extension of the deadline in which to respond to the motions pending at that time. (See Dkt. Entry #39.) The next day, Magistrate Judge Rodovich allowed Barajas an additional fifteen days (until March 20, 2002) in which to respond. (See Dkt. Entry #40.) On the due date, Barajas again sought an extension; this time she requested five days. (See Dkt. Entry #43.) Yet again, Magistrate Judge Rodovich granted the request. (See Dkt. Entry #44.) As of May 1, 2002, the records of the Clerk indicate Barajas has neither responded, nor filed a request for another extension. In order to promote "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of this action, see FED.R.CIV.P. 1, the court will rule on the aforementioned motions without the benefit of a response.
Party Date Filed Docket Entry # FED.R.CIV.P.
Lake County December 17, 2001 26 12(b)(6)
Lake County Probation Department January 18, 2002 33 12(b)(6)
Lake County Superior Court — Adult Division Probation Department February 19, 2002 37 12(b)(1),(5),(6)
Lake County April 15, 2002 45 12(b)(6)
The "need-to-know" facts that gave rise to this action are fairly simple. "On November 29, 1999, at approximately 6:50 p.m., Plaintiff Tonya Barajas was at her residence . . . and was visited by Chief Probation Officer Clarence Harris of the Lake Superior Court — Adult Division Probation Department." (First Amd. Compl. at ¶ 16.) "At this time and place, Defendant Harris required a urine sample from the Plaintiff, and insisted on following the Plaintiff into the bathroom and observing her while she attempted to urinate." (Id. at ¶ 17.) "After Plaintiff left the bathroom, Chief Probation Officer Clarence Harris forcibly grabbed Plaintiff, Tonya Barajas, and forcefully kissed her on the mouth without her permission or consent." (Id. at ¶ 18.) As a result, Barajas filed this civil action, seeking redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Indiana tort law. On January 8, 2002, she filed a First Amended Complaint. She is currently proceeding against three defendants: Harris (in his individual and official capacities); Lake County (Ind.); and the Lake Superior Court — Adult Division Probation Department ("Court's Probation Department").
At the time, Barajas was a probationer assigned to Harris' office.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit trial courts "to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). "[A]ll that's required to state a claim in a complaint filed in federal court is a short statement, in plain (that is, ordinary, nonlegalistic) English, of the legal claim." Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999). District courts "are obliged to allow the case to proceed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitled it to relief." Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM General Corporation, No. 01-2164, slip op. at 14 (7th Cir. Mar. 15, 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting in part); accord Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 122 S.Ct. 1300 (Mar. 18, 2002); Pokuta v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 191 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 1999). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must "accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff[']s favor." Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65 F.3d 1339, 1343 (7th Cir. 1995)). The court need not accept, however, "conclusory statements of law or unsupported conclusions of fact." First Insurance Funding Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co., No. 01-2855, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. Mar. 28, 2002) (quoting McLeod v. Arrow Marine Transp., Inc., 258 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2001). Lastly, the court may dismiss the whole complaint or any portion thereof, as circumstances warrant. Cf. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 1992); Enis v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank Trust Co. of Illinois, 795 F.2d 39, 40 (7th Cir. 1986).
In construing Barajas' First Amended Complaint, the court can only conceive of one theory upon which she is proceeding against Lake County. Barajas alleges that when Harris engaged in the course of conduct that gave rise to Barajas' injuries, he was exercising authority as an officer of Lake County. (See First Amd. Compl. at ¶ 7 ("At all time relevant hereto, the Defendants . . . acted under the scope of their authority and under color of law . . . of the County of Lake.").) Lake County moves to dismiss. In support of dismissal, Lake County asserts that a Chief Probation Officer is an official of the State of Indiana and not Lake County. Thus, Lake County maintains that Barajas can not recover from Lake County for injuries she allegedly suffered at the hands of Harris. Case law supports Lake County's position.
In the State of Indiana, probation officers are agents of the Department of Probation to which they are assigned, and the departments themselves are arms of the court system. See J.A.W. v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1142, 1150-51 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995), superceded on other grounds sub nom. J.A.W. v. Marion County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 687 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. 1997); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 11-13-1-1(c) (Michie 2001) ("Probation officers shall serve at the pleasure of the appointing court and are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the court."). The various levels of Indiana state courts "are exclusively units of the judicial branch of the state's constitutional system and as such are not units of county government." Id. (citing IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1 (recognizing separation of powers) and art. 7, § 1 (vesting state judicial power in the courts)); accord Woods v. City of Michigan City, 940 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1991). Probation officers are therefore officers of the State of Indiana. Cf. Kujawski v. Bd. of Com'rs. of Bartholomew County, 183 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[P]robation officers such as Officer Parker are answerable to the state courts on professional matters concerning the supervision of those placed under their charge by the courts.").
At the time of the incident that gave rise to this litigation, Barajas was a probationer assigned to the Probation Department of which Harris was the Chief Probation Officer. Harris traveled to Barajas' residence, and she permitted Harris to enter the residence because Harris was one of the persons responsible for supervising Barajas' probation. At all relevant times, Harris was exercising the authority vested in him as an Indiana official. His office and his activities are separate and distinct from the governmental authority of Lake County. Since Barajas was proceeding against Lake County solely under the theory that Harris was acting as a Lake County officer, the court must dismiss her First Amended Complaint as it relates to Lake County.
Next, the Court's Probation Department seeks dismissal on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction (see FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1)), insufficient service of process (see FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(5)), and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (see FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)). Like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction requires the court to accept well-pleaded facts as true, and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the non-moving party. See Capitol Leasing Co. v. F.D.I.C., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993); Sladek v. Bell Sys. Mgmt. Pens. Plan, 880 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 1989). Once it becomes apparent that no subject matter jurisdiction exists, the court must dismiss without further delving into the parties' dispute.
As previously stated, see supra at 4, Departments of Probation are appendages of the court system, which in turn is a branch of state government. "[A] suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); accord Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). As the United States Supreme Court has noted numerous times, the Eleventh Amendment is a limitation upon the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts to entertain claims against the several states or appendages thereof. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999). The proper procedural device is a motion brought pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1). See Raygor v. Regents of University of Minnesota, 122 S.Ct. 999, 1003 (2002); Bornick v. Sondalle, 179 F. Supp.2d 941, 949-50 (E.D.Wis. 2001).
The court must dismiss Barajas' claims against the Court's Probation Department for want of jurisdiction. Harris was acting in his capacity as an officer of the State of Indiana when he engaged in the conduct that allegedly gave rise to Barajas' injuries. Another court in this District reached the identical conclusion in an action brought against the Indiana Parole Board for conduct by its Members. See McCoy v. McBride, 1996 WL 697937, at *3 (N.D.Ind. Nov. 05, 1996) ("The Board is an agency of the State of Indiana, and a division of the Indiana Department of Correction, and the State of Indiana has not consented to be sued. The court thus lacks subject matter jurisdiction over McCoy's claim for damages against the Parole Board." (internal citations omitted)). Since this court has no jurisdiction over claims against the Court's Probation Department, it need not address the alternative grounds for dismissal.
To recapitulate, the court GRANTS Lake County's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Dkt. Entry #45). Lake County's motion to dismiss filed on December 17, 2001 (Dkt. Entry #26) is DENIED AS MOOT. The court GRANTS the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction filed by the Court's Probation Department on February 19, 2002 (Dkt. Entry #37), thereby rendering MOOT its motions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5)-(6). Since Barajas has admitted she is no longer proceeding against the entity she refers to as "Lake County Probation Department," its motion to dismiss (Dkt. Entry #33) is hereby GRANTED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to docket the disposition of this motion as "GRANTED IN PART AND MOOT IN PART."
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Barajas' First Amended Complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as against Lake County, Lake County Probation Department, and the Lake County Superior Court — Adult Division Probation Department.
The Status Conference shall take place, as previously scheduled, on Friday June 10, 2002, at 2:30 p.m., before Magistrate Judge Rodovich.
SO ORDERED.