Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0044-12T1
06-02-2014
JANE BANSAL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASHWANI BANSAL, Defendant-Respondent.
Jane Bansal, appellant pro se. Ashwani Bansal, respondent pro se.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Lihotz.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hunterdon County, Docket No. FM-10-315-04.
Jane Bansal, appellant pro se.
Ashwani Bansal, respondent pro se. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, Jane Bansal, appeals from portions of a July 20, 2012 Family Part order, which denied her request: to enter default against defendant Ashwani Bansal; to hold defendant in contempt for filing a fraudulent case information statement and vexious motions; and seeking various enforcement requests of prior orders regarding the equitable distribution provision contained in the parties' June 10, 2005 final judgment of divorce (JOD). In four multi-part arguments, plaintiff maintains "massive legal abuse" and errors had occurred "over the past nine years," culminating in the motion judge's erroneous determination set forth in the July 20, 2012 order.
We have considered plaintiff's arguments in light of the record and applicable law. We conclude her challenges to prior orders are untimely or have been previously adjudicated by this court. Regarding her attack on the order under review, we conclude her claims lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add these brief comments.
On appeal, plaintiff recites the lengthy litigation history, which includes separate actions in the Law and Chancery Divisions, along with three consolidated appeals and a request for certification, and seeks new consideration of prior claims of error. We further note, plaintiff withdrew her appeal of a September 23, 2011 order.
See Bansal v. Bansal, No. A-0242-06, A-0430-06, A-0598-06 (App. Div. October 22, 2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 517 (2009).
In her merits brief, she offers no legal basis to support our current review of these matters decided long ago. Citing Rule 4:50-1(f), plaintiff merely provides pejorative diatribe, rejecting past decisions, which she frequently characterizes as "fraudulent" and "error-ridden" (plaintiff's points 1, 2 and 3). We reject her contentions.
A motion to vacate or modify a judgment "should be granted sparingly[.]" Fineberg v. Fineberg, 309 N.J. Super 205, 215 (App. Div. 1998) (citations omitted). "The trial court's determination under the rule warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (citations omitted). See also Fineberg, supra, 309 N.J. Super at 215. An abuse of discretion arises when the court's decision is "'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). "[B]ecause of the importance that we attach to the finality of judgments, relief under Rule 4:50-1(f) is available only when 'truly exceptional circumstances are present.'" Guillaume, supra, 209 N.J. at 484 (quoting Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 (1994)).
Plaintiff seeks review of the prior orders by the Law, Chancery, and Appellate Divisions. To the extent past Law and Chancery Division orders were appealed and resolved by this court, we may not again review issues that were previously addressed. As to the other orders, we note they were all final determinations. If plaintiff believed they were factually deficient or legally incorrect, a timely appeal should have been filed. Her failure to do so precludes our consideration.
Plaintiff even includes claims of error in pendente lite orders, which by operation of law merged into the JOD, foreclosing review. Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8, 12 (App. Div. 1995) (citing Bauza v. Bauza, 201 N.J. Super. 540, 542-43 (App. Div. 1985)).
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Plaintiff had ample opportunity to be heard and the litigation must end. To the extent plaintiff fashions new claims seeking to set aside these decisions, the time to do so has long expired and she fails to offer exceptional circumstances to justify our current review. R. 2:4-2 (requiring an appeal as of right to be filed within forty-five days of entry of a final judgment). Consequently, we examine only plaintiff's arguments regarding the July 20, 2012 order.
Plaintiff argues the motion judge erroneously ignored the accuracy and efficacy of schedules she created showing she received only 42.64% of the equitably distributed marital assets, rather than the 50% to which she was entitled. She sought $151,756.46 in what she believed was unpaid equitable distribution, substantially based on her mantra that the JOD and subsequent orders denying her application to revisit equitable distribution were unfair. The judge determined he previously considered in detail and rejected this assertion in his May 11, 2012 order. The judge noted plaintiff failed to include corroborating documentation for her assertions and also misinterpreted guiding legal principles addressing distribution of accretions to equitably distributed assets. We find no legal error.
Plaintiff also demands payment of claimed alimony arrearages; however, the judge considered the records provided by the Probation Division and found all amounts due were satisfied and no arrearages remained outstanding. Although plaintiff provides legal arguments supporting the court's obligation to enforce support orders, we discern no factual basis to allow a finding that ordered support was unpaid.
"'[T]he enforcement, collection, modification and extinguishment of unpaid arrearages in alimony and child support payments are matters addressed to the sound discretion of the court.'" In re Rogiers, 396 N.J. Super. 317, 327 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Mastropole v. Mastropole, 181 N.J. Super. 130, 141 (App. Div. 1981)). We will not disturb the court's order, if consistent with the law, "unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice." Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315-16 (App. Div. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has the burden to prove her claims. Defendant's support payments were at all times made through the Probation Division and plaintiff presented no explanation or evidence supporting her calculations of outstanding arrearages. We reject the bald assertions the Probation Division's records were wrong and the motion judge abused his discretion by denying her request for production of defendant's cancelled checks verifying his payments.
In summary, plaintiff's attempt to "correct" provisions of the nine-year old JOD and orders entered thereafter, based on her claimed entitlement to relief under Rule 4:50-1, is legally unsustainable. Further, we reject as unfounded plaintiff's claims of "an oppressive miscarriage of justice." We discern no errors justifying interference with the legal conclusions and exercised discretion by the motion judge in entering the July 20, 2012 post-judgment order.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION