Bannister v. State

15 Citing cases

  1. Flint v. State

    288 Ga. 39 (Ga. 2010)   Cited 2 times

    It is well established that a party in a criminal proceeding may make admissions in judicio in pleadings, motions, and briefs. See Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762 (1) (b) ( 415 SE2d 912) (1992). It is mere speculation whether, had Flint filed his petition earlier, the State could have recreated the hearing proceedings through the recollection of the trial judge, the ADA and defense counsel.

  2. Thompson v. State

    277 Ga. 102 (Ga. 2003)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that evidence of venue was sufficient on charges of child molestation when evidence showed the acts took place in a home in Houston County, but evidence was insufficient on charge of sexual battery when evidence showed the act took place in defendant's place of business, and there was no testimony as to where the business was located

    [Cits.]" Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762, 766 (1) (b) ( 415 S.E.2d 912) (1992). See also Froelich v. State, 210 Ga. App. 647, 648, fn. 1 ( 437 S.E.2d 358) (1993).

  3. State v. Wood

    338 Ga. App. 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 3 times

    It has been recognized that a defendant in a criminal proceeding may make judicial admissions in his pleadings, motions, and briefs, and that such admissions bind the defendant. Bannister v. State , 202 Ga.App. 762, 766 (1) (b), 415 S.E.2d 912 (1992) ; see also Froelich v. State , 210 Ga.App. 647, 648 at n. 1, 437 S.E.2d 358 (1993). Wood's admission that the federal government filed an extradition request is binding on him for purposes of resolving his motion to dismiss.

  4. Hernandez v. State

    291 Ga. App. 562 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 20 times
    In Hernandez v. State, 291 Ga.App. 562, 568 & n. 16, 662 S.E.2d 325 (2008), the court followed Morel in reasoning that a defendant's right to inquire into an interpreter's honesty and competency did not include a right of cross-examination.

    (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762, 763 (1) (a) ( 415 SE2d 912) (1992). "The appellate court, in determining the propriety of disclosing the identity of an informant, may consider all relevant evidence contained in pretrial, trial and post-trial proceedings."

  5. McClarity v. State

    234 Ga. App. 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 53 times
    Holding that videotape recording of drug transaction was the key factor weighing against the need to reveal the CI's identity, since the objective evidence diminished the need for the CI to testify

    Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 ( 77 SC 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639) (1956); see Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 164-165 (2) ( 231 S.E.2d 729) (1977); Moore v. State, 187 Ga. App. 387, 388-393 (2) ( 370 S.E.2d 511) (1988). 202 Ga. App. 762, 763-766 (1) (b) ( 415 S.E.2d 912) (1992). Even if the informant had been identified, "defendant's argument concerning whether trial counsel would have called the witness to testify at trial is mere conjecture."

  6. Harvey v. State

    500 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    Moore, supra at 389, citing extensively Thornton, supra."Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762, 763 (1) ( 415 S.E.2d 912) (1992). "In determining if the [confidential informant's] identity should be revealed by the State, the trial court must conduct a two-step hearing.

  7. Grant v. State

    230 Ga. App. 330 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 8 times

    (Citation omitted.) Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762, 763 ( 415 S.E.2d 912) (1992). In determining if the CI's identity should be revealed by the State, the trial court must conduct a two-step hearing.

  8. O'Brien Family v. Glen Falls

    218 Ga. App. 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 22 times
    In O'Brien Family Trust v. Glen Falls Insurance Co., 218 Ga. App. 379, 461 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1995), the appellate court held that where the insurance policy did not provide for the payment defense costs incurred by the insured prior to tendering its defense in the underlying action to the insurer, the policy did not obligate the insurer to pay for such pre-tender defense costs because "[s]uch a construction would render contractual terms necessary to trigger [the insurer's] performance under the policy meaningless."

    As such, it is binding upon the party and estops the party from denying the admission or introducing any evidence to controvert the admission, even if it is untrue.' Green, Ga. Law of Evid. (3rd ed.), Admissions, § 233." Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762, 766 ( 415 S.E.2d 912) (1992). However, "[a]dmissions in judicio apply only to facts in litigation."

  9. Froelich v. State

    437 S.E.2d 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 11 times

    As such, it is binding upon the party and estops the party from denying the admission or introducing any evidence to controvert the admission, even if it is untrue.' Green, Ga. Law of Evid. (3rd ed.), Admissions § 233." Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762, 763 (1b), 766 ( 415 S.E.2d 912). The same logic reveals that this direct appeal is not authorized under In re Hall County Grand Jury Proceedings, 175 Ga. App. 349, supra, as the rights of petitioners are not undermined by the absence of appellate review.

  10. Arnold v. McKibbins

    435 S.E.2d 685 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    ontempt is not a "motion made prior to trial" within the meaning of USCR 6.1. Moreover, a trial judge is presumed to know the law, Rowe v. Rowe, 195 Ga. App. 493 (2) ( 393 S.E.2d 750), and would not abuse his discretion by declining to dismiss a motion for failure to comply with the citation provisions of USCR 6.1. Moreover, the record does not establish that the trial judge prejudicially applied an erroneous legal standard. Further, appellant's contention that there was no stipulation to the facts contained in appellee's affidavit accompanying her petition is without merit; assuming arguendo, USCR 6.1 had been applicable, it does not require that facts contained in affidavits be stipulated. Also, appellant by his factual assertion in his brief that "no evidence other than [appellee's] unstipulated allegations of fact accompanied said petition," is an admission in judicio that the petition was accompanied by an affidavit of fact. Weir v. McGill, 203 Ga. App. 431, 432 ( 417 S.E.2d 57); Bannister v. State, 202 Ga. App. 762, 766 ( 415 S.E.2d 912); West v. Nodvin, 196 Ga. App. 825 ( 397 S.E.2d 567). Appellant's other assertions in support of this enumeration likewise are without merit. 2.