Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-0236-N.
July 7, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
A. Nature of the Case : This is a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Parties : Plaintiff Wesley Bankston is currently an inmate of the Lindsey State Jail. Defendant Ray Stewart is the Sheriff of Ellis County, the county in which the events giving rise to Bankston's complaint took place. (Compl. at 3.)
C. Statement of the Case : Bankston alleges in his complaint that he "was locked up for something [he] didn't do." (Comp. at 3.) While he does not allege a specific cause of action, his pro se complaint can be liberally construed as a cause of action for either malicious prosecution or false imprisonment. (Comp. at 3-4, 6.) According to Bankston, he and a friend, Frank Stolytisiak, were driving through Waxahachie, Texas, around midnight on the night of October 5, 2002, when they began to have car trouble. (Comp. at 3-4.) Stolytisiak, the driver and owner of the car, pulled the car over to the side of the road, where he and Bankston began inspecting the car. (Comp. at 4.) After they got back into the car and began to pull away, a Waxahachie police officer pulled up and signaled for them to pull over. (MJQ 1.) The police officer obtained permission from Stolytisiak to search the car, conducted the search, and found a small amount of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. (Comp. at 4; MJQ 1.) Stolytisiak stated that the items belonged to him, and that Bankston had no knowledge of their presence in the car. (MJQ 1-2.) Stolytisiak also later reaffirmed this in a signed and notarized statement. (MJQ 2.) Both men were charged with possession of under a gram of cocaine. (MJQ 2.) Bankston was subsequently held for nearly six months at the Ellis County Jail while he awaited trial, and he made three to four court appearances before the case finally went to trial. (MJQ 2.) According to Bankston, on March 24, 2003, his case was dismissed one hour into the jury trial. (MJQ 2.)
Bankston claims that his confinement in the Ellis County Jail caused him to lose both his freedom and wages for a period of nearly six months, ultimately forcing him to move into a homeless shelter. (MJQ 2.) Bankston seeks $300,000 in damages from Sheriff Stewart. (Comp. at 4.) No process has been issued in this case.
II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING
Bankston is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, plaintiff's complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.
A complaint is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327. It lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes "fantastic or delusional scenarios." Id. at 327-28.
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Smith v. Winter, 782 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1986); Henrise v. Horvath, 94 F. Supp.2d 768, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2000). The standard for determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted is the same whether under § 1915(e)(2)(B), § 1915A(b), or Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or (c). See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312-13 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the standards under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are the same); Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir.) (recognizing the standards are the same under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 12(b)(6)), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 660 (2002); Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (same); Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the standards are the same under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A; Rule 12(b)(6); and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)).
III. SECTION 1983 RELIEF
Bankston seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of action in redressing the "deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). Thus, in order for a government official to be liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he was deprived of a right that is constitutional or otherwise secured under the laws of the United States, and (2) that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of that right while acting under the color of state law. Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004); Grabowski v. Jackson County Public Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1392 (5th Cir. 1995).
"Because Section 1983 imposes liability only upon those who actually cause a deprivation of rights, `personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983'". Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983) (requiring personal involvement in section 1983 claims). Thus, "personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action." Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976)); Hines v. Graham, No. 1:03-CV-152-C, 2004 WL 1254109, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 8, 2004). In addition, a government official may not be held to be vicariously liable for the acts of another under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Horton, 2004 WL 583212, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2004). Accordingly, a supervisory official can only be held liable under § 1983 if (1) "he is personally involved in the action which deprives Plaintiff of his constitutional rights," or (2) "there is [a] direct causal connection between his actions and the constitutional deprivation." Wright v. Reynolds, 703 F. Supp. 583, 588 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Harvey v. Andrist, 754 F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983)).
In the present case, Bankston has not alleged any facts that would indicate that Sheriff Stewart was personally involved in the acts that led to his six-month confinement. In explaining why he chose to name Sheriff Stewart as the sole defendant, Bankston stated that "I don't know if Ray Stewart is the right one but when I went to the law library that was who they said I was to file this against because he's the head." (MJQ 2.) Bankston has made no allegations that Sheriff Stewart engaged in any actions that led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights. He has not alleged that Sheriff Steward was involved in any acts that directly caused such a deprivation, nor has he alleged that a failure to train or supervise his officers led to a deprivation.
While a pro se litigant's pleadings are to be liberally construed, "[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46 (1975)); Bias v. Woods, 2002 WL 1359669, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jun 19, 2002). Therefore, Bankston's pro se status does not excuse him from alleging some personal involvement on the part of Sheriff Stewart in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Because his complaint contains no such allegations, his complaint must be dismissed.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court summarily DISMISS Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).