Opinion
CIVIL 1:20-CV-1438
04-18-2022
RAMIK BANKS, Plaintiff, v. DR. TROTTA, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Wilson)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION\
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction
This is a prisoner civil rights case filed by the pro se plaintiff, Ramik Banks, a state inmate. In his complaint, Banks brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that several correctional defendants-including a prison dentist, Dr. Trotta, Vanessa Nicola, a grievance processing official, Deputy Superintendent John Rivello, and the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, John Wetzel-violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Banks contends that he was denied or delayed dental care in the prison at SCI Mahanoy during a six-month period between August 2019 and February 2020.
Fairly construed, Banks' amended complaint, the operative pleading in this case, advances the following claims against these correctional defendants: (1) an Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claims against Dr. Trotta; (2) a parallel state claim under Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania's Constitution, alleging medical deliberate indifference by Dr. Trotta; and (3) a failure to intervene claim against defendants Nicola, Rivello, and Wetzel based upon their after-the-fact responses to grievances filed by Banks. (Doc. 11, Counts I-III).
The amended complaint also set forth a medical malpractice claim against the corporate prison healthcare provider, Correct Care Solutions. (Doc. 11, Count IV). That claim is not part of the instant summary judgment motion.
Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Dr. Trotta, Ms. Nicola, Deputy Superintendent Rivello, and Secretary Wetzel. (Doc. 21). This motion details the five clinical encounters that Banks had with dental staff during the six-month period when he alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his dental needs. The motion also makes it abundantly clear that Defendants Nicola, Rivello, and Wetzel had no direct involvement in Banks' dental care, and Dr. Trotta's involvement consisted of simply providing Banks the treatment he requested. Given this undisputed treatment history, and the lack of any culpable involvement by the non-medical correctional defendants in Banks' direct care and treatment, the defendants contend that Banks has failed to state a deliberate indifference claim against any of the correctional defendants under either the Pennsylvania or the United States Constitution.
After a review of the pleadings, and the uncontested facts, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment and state constitutional claims against these defendants. Rather, the record reveals that Dr. Trotta provided appropriate medical care to Banks on several occasions. Moreover, the involvement of defendants Nicola, Rivello, and Wetzel after-the-fact in Banks' grievance process simply does not give rise to any civil culpability here. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that this motion for summary judgment be granted.
The background of this Report and Recommendation is taken from the parties' submissions to the extent that they are supported by the record. (Doc. 22).
The undisputed facts as they relate to Banks' dental care between August 2, 2019 and February of 2020 can be simply stated. On August 6, 2019, Banks submitted a sick call request complaining of a “broken tooth” and was seen by dentist Jorge Valdes. (Doc. 22, Exhibit B, 8/6/2019 dental record) At that time, dentist Valdes examined the tooth identified by Banks, observed a superficial chip in the tooth's enamel, noted that the condition was not significant, indicated that Banks' reported pain level at 0/10, and stated that no follow-up was needed. Following some inquiries by Banks, on October 9, 2019, Banks submitted another sick call request and was seen by dentist James Cooper complaining of pain in a lower left tooth. (Id., Exhibit B, 10/9/19 dental record). Banks' lower left tooth was treated by dentist Cooper, who administered local anesthesia to Banks and repaired his lower left tooth. (Id.) While dentist Cooper treated this lower left tooth, which was Banks' pressing dental concern, he also noted that Banks' front tooth was chipped but found that this damage only extended in the enamel part of the tooth, and no follow-up was needed. (Id.) One month later, on November 1, 2019, Banks was seen at the dental clinic for routine screening and made no mention of any concern with his front tooth. (Id., Exhibit B, 11/1/19 dental record). Thus, Banks' dental records reveal that he was seen on multiple occasions between August and December of 2019. During these clinical encounters, dental staff documented an asymptomatic chip in the enamel of one tooth while they actively treated Banks' other immediate dental concerns. Moreover, none of these clinical encounters in any way involved any of the defendants named by Banks in this lawsuit.
Instead, the first time that Banks saw Defendant dentist Karen Trotta for any dental concern was on January 21, 2020. (Id., Exhibit B, 1/21/2020 dental record). During his exam on January 21, 2020, dentist Trotta noted that Banks had a small fracture in the enamel part only of his front tooth and observed that Banks' tooth was asymptomatic. (Id.) Nonetheless, dentist Trotta made plans to repair the tooth. (Id.) That tooth repair took place on February 6, 2020, after a lockdown of the prison had occurred on February 4, 2020. At that time, dentist Trotta repaired the slight fracture in the enamel of this tooth by applying resin filling to the tooth. (Id., Exhibit B., 2/6/2020 dental record). As of February 6, 2020, dentist Trotta also assessed this tooth injury, noting no lip or soft tissue injury and no sharp edge prior to performing this cosmetic dental repair. Dentist Trotta found that the repair was done for pure esthetics and does not meet the criteria of a sick call visit. (Id.) Apparently upset by this characterization of his dental repair, Banks was reportedly extremely uncooperative, belligerent, and rude to staff members, and refused to sign the form documenting this treatment. (Id.) Despite his pique at the time he received this dental care, by the time of his July 14, 2021 deposition in this lawsuit, Banks voiced apparent satisfaction with the dental care he received from Defendant Trotta on February 6, 2020, engaging in the following exchange with defense counsel.
Q: I want to know about when they fixed your tooth, did that stop any of your problems?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. So as far as you're concerned, it was fixed correctly?
A: I mean, I wouldn't say that, but, I mean, I'm cool.
Q: And it didn't cause you anymore problems?
A: Nope. And -- nothing. It's all right. It's cool. I don't want to say nothing.(Id., Exhibit A, Banks Dep., 30:6-17).
As for the remaining defendants named in Banks' complaint, Defendant Vanessa Nicola did not treat Banks for any issue with this tooth. Instead, her involvement in this matter was limited to her role as a grievance officer and her reply to a grievance that Banks submitted after-the fact. Likewise, Banks never spoke with Deputy Superintendent John Rivello concerning his tooth and Deputy Superintendent Rivello's only involvement is that Banks sent a grievance to him. Nor did Banks ever speak with Secretary Wetzel concerning his tooth and Wetzel had no personal involvement in Banks' dental care.
It is against the backdrop of these essentially uncontested facts that we evaluate Banks' Eighth Amendment and related state constitutional claims.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
The defendant has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id., at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Banks' Eighth Amendment Claims Fail as a Matter of Law.
Turning first, to Banks' Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claims, Banks faces an exacting burden in advancing an Eighth Amendment claim against the defendants. To sustain such a claim, he must plead facts that:
[M]eet two requirements: (1) “the deprivation alleged must be objectively, sufficiently serious;” and (2) the “prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (quotations marks and citations omitted). In prison condition cases, “that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety.” Id. “Deliberate indifference” is a subjective standard under Farmer-the prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
These principles apply with particular force to Eighth Amendment claims premised upon inadequate medical care. In the medical context, a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment occurs only when state officials are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care in a prison setting, Banks is required to point to evidence that demonstrates both (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. Such indifference may be evidenced by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed provision of medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or by “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
However, it is also clear that the mere misdiagnosis of a condition or medical need, or even negligent treatment provided for a condition, is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. “Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.” Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). Furthermore, in a prison medical context, deliberate indifference is generally not found when some significant level of medical care has been offered to the inmate. Clark v. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000) (“[C]ourts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care”). Thus, such complaints fail as constitutional claims under § 1983 since “the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference. See e.g., Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (‘[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights.'); Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
Applying this exacting standard, courts have frequently rejected Eighth Amendment claims that are based upon the level of professional care that an inmate received, particularly where it can be shown that significant medical services were provided to the inmate but the prisoner is dissatisfied with the outcome of these services. See e.g., Ham v. Greer, 269 Fed.Appx. 149 (3d Cir. 2008); James v. Dep't of Corrections, 230 Fed.Appx. 195 (3d. Cir. 2007); Gillespie v. Hogan, 182 Fed.Appx. 103 (3d Cir. 2006); Bronson v. White, No. 05-2150, 2007 WL 3033865 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2007); Gindraw, 967 F.Supp. 833. Instead, courts have defined the precise burden which an inmate must sustain in order to advance an Eighth Amendment claim against a healthcare professional premised on allegedly inadequate care, stating that:
The district court [may] properly dis[miss an] Eighth Amendment claim, as it concerned [a care giver], because [the] allegations merely amounted to a disagreement over the proper course of his treatment and thus failed to allege a reckless disregard with respect to his ... care. The standard for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, established by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), and its progeny,
has two prongs: 1) deliberate indifference by prison officials and 2) serious medical needs. “It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate indifference' ” “Nor does mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment support a claim of an eighth amendment violation.” [The inmate] alleged no undue delay in receiving treatment and, as the district court noted, the evidence he presented established that he received timely care.... Although [an inmate plaintiff] may have preferred a different course of treatment, [t]his preference alone cannot establish deliberate indifference as such second-guessing is not the province of the courts.James, 230 Fed.Appx.. at 197-198 (citations omitted).
In short, in the context of the Eighth Amendment, any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment is disavowed by courts since such determinations remain a question of sound professional medical judgment. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)).
Furthermore, it is well settled that an inmate's dissatisfaction or disagreement with a course of medical treatment, standing alone, does not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim. See Taylor v. Norris, 36 Fed.Appx. 228, 229 (8th Cir. 2002) (deliberate indifference claim failed when it boiled down to a disagreement over recommended treatment for hernias and decision not to schedule a doctor's appointment); Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1024-35 (7th Cir. 1996) (inmate's disagreement with selection of medicine and therapy for sickle cell anemia falls well short of demonstrating deliberate indifference); Sherrer v. Stephen, 50 F.3d 496, 497 (8th Cir. 1994) (inmate's “desire for a replacement joint instead of fusion surgery is merely a disagreement with the course of medical treatment and does not state a constitutional claim”); Kayser v. Caspari, 16 F.3d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1994) (prison provided escalating level of treatment for inmates' ailments over time, and inmate's disagreement with course of medical treatment was insufficient basis for Eighth Amendment violation); Czajka v. Caspari, 995 F.2d 870, 871 (8th Cir. 1993) (inmate's mere disagreement with doctor's informed decision to delay surgery does not establish Eighth Amendment claim); Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1990) (inmate failed to prove deliberate indifference where his complaints represented nothing more than mere disagreement with course of his medical treatment); Lair v. Oglesby, 859 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir. 1988) (disagreement about whether doctor should have prescribed medication does not result in constitutional violation); Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1339 (8th Cir. 1985) (inmate failed to state facts indicating doctor deliberately disregarded his medical problem; inmate's disagreement as to proper medical treatment does not give rise to Eighth Amendment violation). Therefore, where a dispute in essence entails no more than a disagreement between an inmate and doctors over alternate treatment plans, the inmate's complaint will fail as constitutional claims under § 1983 since “the exercise by a doctor of his professional judgment is never deliberate indifference.” Gindraw, 967 F.Supp. at 836 (citations omitted).
Applying these legal benchmarks, we conclude that Banks' claims against Dr. Trotta, the only medical professional named in his complaint, fail as a matter of law. As to Dr. Trotta, the undisputed record reveals that she saw and treated Banks on two occasions in January and February of 2020. In January, Dr. Trotta documented that Banks had an asymptomatic chipped tooth. Dr. Trotta then promptly scheduled a cosmetic repair of this tooth in February of 2020, performed that repair, and Banks later testified under oath that he was “cool” with the treatment he received from the doctor. Thus, whatever was the source of Banks' overall dissatisfaction with his dental care, he simply has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Trotta, the only care-giver named in his complaint. Therefore this Eighth Amendment claim fails as to Dr. Trotta. See e.g., Caldwell v. Luzerne Cnty. Corr. Facility Management Employees, 732 F.Supp.2d 458, 472 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (finding no deliberate indifference where the inmate's “claims are clearly over a dissatisfaction with the results of treatment rather than a denial of treatment itself”). This is particularly so when an inmate has received a substantial amount of medical care. See Stuart v. Lisiak, 645 Fed.Appx. 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation when it was “clear from the complaint that [the inmate] received substantial medical care”); see also Ham, 269 Fed.Appx. 149; James, 230 Fed.Appx. 195; Gillespie, 182 Fed.Appx. 103; Bronson, 2007 WL 3033865; Gindraw, 967 F.Supp. 833.
The failure of Banks' claim against the sole medical defendant named in his complaint, Dr. Trotta, also fatally undermines his allegations against the nonmedical correctional defendants. On this score, there is a necessary corollary to the guiding constitutional principles which control here, limiting the reach of the Eighth Amendment in a prison medical setting. In a case such as this, where the plaintiff's complaint reflects that an inmate received some level of on-going medical care, it is also well established that non-medical correctional staff may not be “considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.” Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993). The rationale for this rule has been aptly explained by the Court of Appeals in the following terms:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . ., a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands. This follows naturally from the division of labor within a prison. Inmate health and safety is promoted by dividing responsibility for various aspects of inmate life among guards, administrators, physicians, and so on. Holding a non-medical prison official liable in a case where a prisoner was under a physician's care would strain this division of labor. Moreover, under such a regime, nonmedical officials could even have a perverse incentive not to delegate treatment responsibility to the very physicians most likely to be able to help prisoners, for fear of vicarious liability. Accordingly, we conclude that, absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d. Cir. 2004). This principle controls here and also defeats any Eighth Amendment claims against these non-medical staff who have appropriately deferred to medical personnel in terms of the acre and treatment afforded to Banks.
Nor can Banks sustain a constitutional claim against these non-medical grievance and supervisory officials by citing his dissatisfaction in their response to his prior grievances. To the extent that Banks' supervisory liability claims rest on the premise that officials did not after-the-fact act favorably upon his past grievances, this claim also fails. An inmate cannot sustain a constitutional tort claim against prison supervisors based solely upon assertions that officials failed to adequately investigate or respond to his past grievances. Inmates do not have a constitutional right to a prison grievance system. Speight v. Sims, 283 Fed.Appx. 880 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he existence of a prison grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on a prisoner”)). Consequently, dissatisfaction with a response to an inmate's grievances does not support a constitutional claim. See Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 Fed.Appx. 924 (3d Cir. 2005) (involvement in post-incident grievance process not a basis for § 1983 liability); Pryor-El v. Kelly, 892 F.Supp. 261, 275 (D. D.C. 1995) (holding that prison officials' failure to comply with grievance procedure is not actionable because prison grievance procedure does not confer any substantive constitutional rights upon prison inmates); see also Cole v. Sobina, No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[M]ere concurrence in a prison administrative appeal process does not implicate a constitutional concern”). As the Court of Appeals observed when disposing of a similar claim by another inmate:
Several named defendants, such as the Secretaries of the Department of Corrections or Superintendents, were named only for their supervisory roles in the prison system. The District Court properly dismissed these defendants and any additional defendants who were sued based on their failure to take corrective action when grievances or investigations were referred to them. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (state's inmate grievance procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause).Pressley v. Beard, 266 Fed.Appx. 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).
Indeed, as to such claims, the Court of Appeals has held that summary dismissal is appropriate “because there is no apparent obligation for prison officials to investigate prison grievances.” Paluch v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dept. Corr., 442 Fed.Appx. 690, 695 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 382 (2d Cir. 1973)). Therefore, these Eighth Amendment claims fail as to all of the individual defendants named in Banks' complaint.
C. Banks' State Constitutional Claims Also Fail.
Finally, in his complaint Banks endeavors to bring damages claims against the defendants based upon Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” Pa. Const., Art. I, §13. These claims fail, however, for at least two reasons.
First, it is well settled that “[t]he Pennsylvania prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is coextensive with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 592, 597 n. 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 743 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008), appeal denied, 602 Pa. 658, 980 A.2d 111 (2009)) (citation omitted). Given the co-extensive character of these two constitutional provisions, our finding that Banks has failed to state and Eighth Amendment claim would apply with equal force to any parallel claim brought under Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Further, to the extent that Banks attempts to advance a damages claim against these correctional defendants premised upon an alleged violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, his complaint encounters a second, insurmountable legal obstacle. The prevailing view in this circuit is that “Pennsylvania does not recognize a private right of action for damages in a suit alleging violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Hamilton v. Spriggle, 965 F.Supp.2d 550, 577 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 207 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore this state law claim affords no relief to Banks and should also be dismissed.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 21), be GRANTED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.