See also Monk v. Kornegay, 224 N.C. 194, 29 S.E.2d 754. The practical construction placed upon a written instrument by the parties thereto before the controversy arose is ordinarily given great weight by the courts in arriving at the true meaning and intent of the language employed in the contract. Banks v. Mineral Corp. 202 N.C. 408, 163 S.E. 108. "A conveyance of land must be in writing and comply with certain formalities, and its principal function is to evidence the transfer of a particular interest in land.
Its occurrence is, therefore, similar to that of its parent mineral, feldspar. Banks v. Mineral Corp., 202 N.C. 408, 163 S.E. 108, deals with feldspar mining on a factual situation which, in principle, is not distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case Justice Brogden, speaking for the Court, said (loc. cit. p. 410):
It is an established principle of law that when rights to the minerals in land have been by deed or reservation severed from the surface rights, two distinct estates are created, and that the estate in the mineral interests, being part of the realty, is subject to the ordinary rules of law governing the title to real property. The presumption that one in possession of the surface has also possession of the minerals does not apply when these rights have been segregated. Davis v. Land Bank, 219 N.C. 248, 13 S.E.2d 417; Vance v. Pritchard, 213 N.C. 552, 197 S.E. 182; Banks v. Mineral Corp., 202 N.C. 408, 163 S.E. 108; Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 249. Plaintiff's entry into possession of the land, in 1925, having been under a deed purporting to convey the land by definite lines and boundaries, and without reservation or exception, his deed constituted colorable title to the entire interest and estate in the land, in accord with the maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. 25 C. J. S., 20. The question then presented and sharply controverted was whether plaintiff's acts of ownership and occupancy of the minerals and mineral rights were sufficient to constitute adverse possession as defined in the law for the statutory period, so as thereby to vest in him a good title.
Hill v. Nelms, supra; Burgess Co. v. Blake, supra. The court will adopt that construction of one's title under deed which the party himself has placed on it. Sargent v. Trustees, 252 Ky. 57, 66 S.W.2d 5; Banks v. Tenn. Min. Prod. Co., 202 N.C. 408, 163 S.E. 108; Foster v. Foster, 153 Va. 636, 151 S.E. 157; Pelt v. Dockery, 176 Ark. 418, 3 S.W.2d 62; Swink v. Dallas, Tex.Com.App., 36 S.W.2d 222. The words "give and bequeath" are equivalent to "devise." In re Burbank's Will, 69 Iowa 378, 28 N.W. 648; Bulfer v. Willigrod, 71 Iowa 620, 33 N.W. 136; Stone v. North, 41 Me. 265; In re Barrett's Will, 111 Iowa 570, 82 N.W. 998.