Bank of Franklin v. Trotter

1 Citing case

  1. Morgan v. Hood, Comr. of Banks

    189 S.E. 115 (N.C. 1937)   Cited 6 times

    Such authority will not be presumed from his employment, and a judgment by consent of the attorney founded upon a compromise made by him, without such authority, will ordinarily be vacated and set aside on motion of the client made in apt time. See Bank v. Trotter, 207 N.C. 442, 177 S.E. 325; Chavis v. Brown, 174 N.C. 122, 93 S.E. 471; Bank v. McEwen, 160 N.C. 414, 76 S.E. 222; Morris v. Grier, 76 N.C. 410; Moye v. Cogdell, 69 N.C. 93. In the last cited case, it is held that authority to compromise a case, and to consent to a judgment founded on such compromise, cannot be conferred upon an attorney by an agent who was authorized by his principal to employ an attorney.