"If the evidence is all one way, and there is no conflict, the judge may say to the jury that, if they believe the evidence, they may find a certain verdict, but he cannot direct them that they must so find from the evidence." 2 McIntosh: North Carolina Practice and Procedure, sec. 1516, p. 53; Bank v. Noble, 203 N.C. 300, 302, 165 S.E. 722. The trial judge complied with the approved rule of procedure.
Ropps v. Barker et al., 4 Pick. 239 (Mass. 1826); Weir v. Luz, 137 N.J.L. 361, 58 A.2d 550 (1948); Landis v. Dayton, Wright, 659 (Ohio, circa 1834); Blum v. Pate, 20 Cal. 69 (1862); School Dist. No. 1 in Milton v. Bragdon a., 23 N.H. 507 (1851); Hindrey v. Williams, 9 Colo. 371, 12 P. 436 (1886); Peavey v. Crawford, 192 Ga. 371, 15 S.E.2d 418 (1941); Whitner v. Hamlin, 12 Fla. 18 (1868); and Martin v. Maverick, 1 McCord S.C. 24 (1821).Fox v. Smith, 3 Cowen 23 (N.Y. 1824); Carson v. Miami Coal Co., 194 Ind. 49 141 N.E. 810 (1923); James v. State, 55 Miss. 57 (1877); Thornburgh v. Cole, 27 Kan. 490 (1882); Broadway Bank of Kansas City v. Noble, 203 N.C. 300, 165 S.E. 722 (1932); Baltimore O. R. R. Co. v. Polly, Woods Co., 14 Grattan's Reports (55 Va.) 447 (1858); Watchtower Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 99 S.W.2d 693 (1936); Weatherhead v. Burau, 238 Minn. 134, 55 N.W.2d 703 (1952); Rigg v. Cook, 9 Ill. 336 (1847); Peart v. Chicago, M. St. Paul Railway Co., 5 S.D. 337, 58 N.W. 806 (1894); and District of Columbia v. Humphries, 11 App. D.C. 68 (1897). It is clear that the only jury verdict which is valid is one announced in open court and there affirmed, Coke's Littleton 227b, 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 377, Eastley v. Glenn, 313 Pa. 130, 169 A. 433. If one juror withholds his assent, a verdict will not be permitted to stand, and certainly it follows that there must be an opportunity in open court to ascertain that the verdict is unanimous.
J. A. Smith testified that the mortgages were given to secure a past due indebtedness, and we are not able to find in the record any substantial contradiction of this testimony. Since, in this respect, only one inference could be drawn from the evidence, and that favorable to the contention of the plaintiffs, the instruction given by the trial judge to the effect that if they found the facts to be as all the evidence tended to show they would answer this issue "No," is without error. Bank v. Noble, 203 N.C. 300, 165 S.E. 732; Thomas v. Morris, 190 N.C. 244, 129 S.E. 623. 3 and 4. We cannot find any fact or circumstance that would have a tendency to contradict the plaintiff's evidence to the effect that they had no notice of a claim adverse to them, or facts or circumstances from which such notice might be inferred such as would start the running of the statute.
Speas v. Bank, 188 N.C. 524, 125 S.E. 398. Where all the evidence offered by the defendant rebuts the prima facie case made by the evidence offered by the plaintiff, and there is no controversy between the parties as to the facts shown by the evidence, the defendant is entitled to an instruction of the court to the jury that if the jury shall find the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show, they should answer the issue involving the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff, in the negative. McIntosh Prac. Pro., p. 632; Bank v. Noble, 203 N.C. 300, 165 S.E. 722; Somersette v. Stanaland, 202 N.C. 685, 163 S.E. 804; Reinhardt v. Ins. Co., 201 N.C. 785, 161 S.E. 528. This principle is not in conflict with the right to trial by jury of controverted issues of fact but affords parties to the action the protection of the law, when there is no controverted issue of fact. In the instant case, the address of the sendee as shown by the telegram delivered by the sender to the defendant at Monroe, and received by the defendant at Lexington, showed that the plaintiff, Noah Hobbs, and the person in whose care the telegram was to be delivered, J. S. Deal, both lived on Rural Free Delivery Route No. 5, out of Lexington. All the evidence at the trial showed that defendant's manager at Lexington did not know Mr. Hobbs or Mr. Deal, and did not know where either of them lived on Route No. 5.
`A verdict can never be directed in favor of a plaintiff when there is any evidence from which the jury may find contrary to the plaintiff's contention, or where there is evidence which will justify an inference contrary to such contention.'" Bank v. Noble, 203 N.C. 300 (302). The well established principle in this jurisdiction is thus stated in Corporation Commission v. Trust Co., 193 N.C. 696 (699): "A deposit for a specific purpose is made when money or property is delivered to a bank to be applied to a designated object, or for a purpose which is particularly defined, as, for example, the payment by the bank of a specified debt. It is neither general nor wholly special. It partakes of the nature of a special deposit to the extent that the title remains in the depositor, and does not pass to the bank.