Whether viewed as a challenge to the denial of the motion for leave to file a late answer or the motion to vacate their default, or both, defendants were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their delay or default (see CPLR 3012[d] ; 5015[a][1]; Kegelman v. Town of Otsego, 203 A.D.3d 82, 84–85, 161 N.Y.S.3d 436 [2021] ; Bank of N.Y. v. Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1229, 143 N.Y.S.3d 708 [2021] ; Christiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Eichler, 94 A.D.3d 1170, 1171, 942 N.Y.S.2d 241 [2012] ). "A determination of reasonable excuse is left to the sound discretion of Supreme Court and will only be disturbed where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion" ( U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Clarkson, 187 A.D.3d 1376, 1377, 134 N.Y.S.3d 500 [2020] [citations omitted]; seeBAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Funk, 154 A.D.3d 1244, 1246, 63 N.Y.S.3d 597 [2017] ; Strumpf v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 125 A.D.3d 1239, 1240, 4 N.Y.S.3d 658 [2015] ).
Nevertheless, we find that Supreme Court properly granted defendants' cross-motion to dismiss this action pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c). The statute provides that, "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not have been dismissed" (CPLR 3215 [c]; see Bank of Am., N.A. v Rahl, 178 A.D.3d 1293, 1293-1294 [3d Dept 2019]). In order to show sufficient cause, a plaintiff is required to "demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay and that the cause of action has merit" (Bank of N.Y. v Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1230 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see HSBC Bank USA N.A. v Rothbeind, 179 A.D.3d 1323, 1324 [3d Dept 2020]). Such showing must further demonstrate that a plaintiff has taken proceedings which "manifest an intent not to abandon the case but to seek a judgment" (CitiMortgage, Inc. v Lottridge, 143 A.D.3d 1093, 1094 [3d Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Citimortgage, Inc. v Kimmerling, 220 A.D.3d 838, 840 [2d Dept 2023]; see generally Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Ford, 183 A.D.3d 1168, 1169 [3d Dept 2020]).
Here, defendant did not seek leave to serve a late answer until approximately 10 months after the expiration of his time to serve an answer, but there is no indication that the failure to serve an answer was willful. Defense counsel instead attributed the delay to defendant's unsuccessful pro se negotiations with plaintiff - of which little detail was given, but which plaintiff also notably failed to deny had occurred - after which defendant promptly sought legal assistance upon receiving plaintiff's motion for a default judgment (compare Bank of N.Y. v Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1229-1230 [3d Dept 2021], and Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Sajdak, 192 A.D.3d 764, 765 [2d Dept 2021], lv dismissed 37 N.Y.3d 1087 [2021], with General Elec. Tech. Servs. Co. v Perez, 156 A.D.2d 781, 783-784 [3d Dept 1989]). Plaintiff further offered no explanation as to how it would be prejudiced by allowing defendant to serve a late answer.
After an unsuccessful settlement conference, Supreme Court (Chauvin, J.) marked the case as administratively abandoned, because plaintiff, who had been assigned the mortgage in 2013, had failed to follow the court's directive and file for an order of reference. Five years later, plaintiff moved to restore the action to the active calendar, which Supreme Court (Nolan Jr., J.) denied, and, on appeal, this Court affirmed in March 2021 (see Bank of N.Y. v Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1231 [3d Dept 2021]). In July 2021, plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action to recover on the mortgage.
CPLR 5015 (a) (1) requires "[a] party seeking to vacate a judgment or order based on default [to] demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense. The reasonableness of the proffered excuse must be assessed based on all relevant factors, including the extent of the delay, whether there has been prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" (Bank of N.Y. v Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1229 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Carrington Mtge. Servs., LLC v Fiore, 206 A.D.3d 1306, 1307 [3d Dept 2022]). "Such a motion is addressed to the court's sound discretion, subject to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion"
Defendant nonetheless posits that he retains standing since he remains obligated on the note. However, he acknowledges that plaintiff executed a waiver of deficiency judgment against him and, therefore, the appealed-from judgment does not impact defendant's existing rights (seeBank of N.Y. v. Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1230–1231, 143 N.Y.S.3d 708 [2021] ; PNC Bank, N.A. v. Lefkowitz, 185 A.D.3d 1069, 1070, 128 N.Y.S.3d 635 [2020] ; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Seema, 169 A.D.3d at 622, 92 N.Y.S.3d 888 ; compareWells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Schubnel, 176 A.D.3d 1353, 1353–1354, 110 N.Y.S.3d 464 [2019] ). During the pendency of this appeal, plaintiff unsuccessfully moved this Court to dismiss the appeal upon the same grounds (2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 60998[U], 2022 WL 278321 [2022] ).
"A motion to vacate a dismissal pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27 must be supported by a reasonable excuse for the failure to proceed and a meritorious cause of action" ( BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Funk, 154 A.D.3d 1244, 1245, 63 N.Y.S.3d 597 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see CPLR 5015[a][1] ; Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Desormeau, 152 A.D.3d 1033, 1034–1035, 59 N.Y.S.3d 812 [2017] ). Such a motion "is addressed to the court's sound discretion, subject to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion" ( Hayes v. Village of Middleburgh, 140 A.D.3d 1359, 1362, 34 N.Y.S.3d 659 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accordBank of N.Y. v. Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1229, 143 N.Y.S.3d 708 [2021] ; BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Funk, 154 A.D.3d at 1245, 63 N.Y.S.3d 597 ).
We affirm. First, Supreme Court and the parties primarily addressed defendant's motion as one to vacate a default pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), which requires defendant "to establish a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense" ( Qiang Tu v. Li Shen, 190 A.D.3d 1125, 1126, 139 N.Y.S.3d 711 [2021] ; seeBank of N.Y. v. Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1229, 143 N.Y.S.3d 708 [2021] ). A request for vacatur under CPLR 5015(a)(1) may also be deemed as one pursuant to CPLR 317, however, which does not demand a reasonable excuse for the default and entitles the moving party to vacatur within a year of learning of the entry of a judgment where he or she was not personally served with process, did not receive notice of the action in time to defend and has a meritorious defense (see CPLR 317 ; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 142–143, 501 N.Y.S.2d 8, 492 N.E.2d 116 [1986] ; Gonzalez v. City of New York, 65 A.D.3d 569, 570, 883 N.Y.S.2d 599 [2009] ; Executive Motor Car Inc. v. Allen, 211 A.D.2d 871, 871–872, 621 N.Y.S.2d 212 [1995] ; Pena v. Mittleman, 179 A.D.2d 607, 609–610, 579 N.Y.S.2d 359 [1992] ).
"To prevail on a motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), a [litigant] must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for [his or her] failure to timely answer and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the underlying causes of action" ( Kelly v. Hinkley, 186 A.D.3d 1842, 1843, 131 N.Y.S.3d 426 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; seeGibbs v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 16 N.Y.3d 74, 80, 917 N.Y.S.2d 68, 942 N.E.2d 277 [2010] ; Hayes v. Village of Middleburgh, 140 A.D.3d 1359, 1361–1362, 34 N.Y.S.3d 659 [2016] ). "A motion to vacate a prior judgment or order is addressed to the court's sound discretion, subject to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion" ( Inwald Enters., LLC v. Aloha Energy, 153 A.D.3d 1008, 1010, 61 N.Y.S.3d 358 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accordBank of N.Y. v. Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1229, 143 N.Y.S.3d 708 [2021] ). "[L]aw office failure should not be excused where a default results not from an isolated, inadvertent mistake, but from repeated neglect" ( McCue v. Trifera, LLC, 173 A.D.3d 1416, 1418–1419, 104 N.Y.S.3d 351 [2019] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
We affirm. First, Supreme Court and the parties primarily addressed defendant's motion as one to vacate a default pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), which requires defendant "to establish a reasonable excuse for the default and the existence of a meritorious defense" (Qiang Tu v Li Shen, 190 A.D.3d 1125, 1126 [2021]; see Bank of N.Y. v Richards, 192 A.D.3d 1228, 1229 [2021]). A request for vacatur under CPLR 5015 (a) (1) may also be deemed as one pursuant to CPLR 317, however, which does not demand a reasonable excuse for the default and entitles the moving party to vacatur within a year of learning of the entry of a judgment where he or she was not personally served with process, did not receive notice of the action in time to defend and has a meritorious defense (see CPLR 317; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 142-143 [1986]; Gonzalez v City of New York, 65 A.D.3d 569, 570 [2009]; Executive Motor Car v Allen, 211 A.D.2d 871, 871-872 [1995]; Pena v Mittleman, 179 A.D.2d 607, 609-610 [1992]).