Opinion
2012-10170, Index No. 16351/10.
04-27-2016
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, etc., respondent, v. Donald COLUCCI, appellant, et al., defendant.
Frederick P. Stern, P.C., Islip, N.Y., for appellant. Bryan Cave LLP, New York, N.Y. (Suzanne M. Berger and Ronald Joshua Bliss of counsel), for respondent.
Frederick P. Stern, P.C., Islip, N.Y., for appellant.
Bryan Cave LLP, New York, N.Y. (Suzanne M. Berger and Ronald Joshua Bliss of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Opinion In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant Donald Colucci appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Farneti, J.), dated September 12, 2012, which denied his motion, inter alia, for leave to interpose a late answer.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
“To extend the time to answer the complaint and to compel the plaintiff to accept an untimely answer as timely, a defendant must provide a reasonable excuse for the delay and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action” (Mannino Dev., Inc. v. Linares, 117 A.D.3d 995, 996, 986 N.Y.S.2d 578 ; see CPLR 3012[d] ; 5015[a][1]; U.S. Bank N.A. v. Sachdev, 128 A.D.3d 807, 9 N.Y.S.3d 337 ; One W. Bank, FSB v. Valdez, 128 A.D.3d 655, 8 N.Y.S.3d 419 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Lafazan, 115 A.D.3d 647, 648, 983 N.Y.S.2d 32 ; Maspeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. McGown, 77 A.D.3d 890, 909 N.Y.S.2d 642 ). “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” (BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Reardon, 132 A.D.3d 790, 791, 18 N.Y.S.3d 664 ; see U.S. Bank N.A. v. Sachdev, 128 A.D.3d at 807–808, 9 N.Y.S.3d 337 ; One W. Bank, FSB v. Valdez, 128 A.D.3d at 655, 8 N.Y.S.3d 419 ; Maspeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. McGown, 77 A.D.3d at 890, 909 N.Y.S.2d 642 ). Although a court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005 ), “a conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated claim of law office failure does not amount to a reasonable excuse” (White v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 44 A.D.3d 651, 843 N.Y.S.2d 168 ; see People's United Bank v. Latini Tuxedo Mgt., LLC, 95 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 944 N.Y.S.2d 909 ; Ogunmoyin v. 1515 Broadway Fee Owner, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 991, 992, 925 N.Y.S.2d 844 ; Matter of ELRAC, Inc. v. Holder, 31 A.D.3d 636, 637, 817 N.Y.S.2d 916 ).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in rejecting the unsubstantiated explanation of the defendant Donald Colucci (hereinafter the defendant) that lawyers he consulted, but apparently did not retain, had advised him not to answer the complaint. A defendant's claim that his attorney “apparently made an erroneous assumption regarding the need to answer the complaint does not constitute a valid excuse” (White v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 44 A.D.3d at 652, 843 N.Y.S.2d 168 ; see Paulus v. Christopher Vacirca, Inc., 128 A.D.3d 116, 119, 6 N.Y.S.3d 572 ; Everything Yogurt v. Toscano, 232 A.D.2d 604, 606, 649 N.Y.S.2d 163 ). At most, the advice, and the defendant's decision to follow it, constituted a “misguided strategy,” not law office failure (OCE Bus. Sys. v. Sopher & Co., 186 A.D.2d 464, 464, 589 N.Y.S.2d 774 ). A second excuse, based on a purported change in law, raised for the first time on appeal, is not properly before this Court (see Millennium BCPBank, N.A. v. Kal–Pak Realty, LLC, 99 A.D.3d 976, 978–979, 953 N.Y.S.2d 132 ).
Since the defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his default, it is not necessary to determine whether he demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Morgan Stanley Mtge. Loan Trust 2006–17XS v. Waldman, 131 A.D.3d 1140, 1141, 16 N.Y.S.3d 331 ; SDF8 CBK, LLC v. 689 St. Marks Ave., Inc., 131 A.D.3d 1037, 1038, 16 N.Y.S.3d 463 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Lafazan, 115 A.D.3d at 648, 983 N.Y.S.2d 32 ; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cervini, 84 A.D.3d 789, 790, 921 N.Y.S.2d 643 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.