Bank of Anderson v. Home Insurance Company of New York

18 Citing cases

  1. Bryson v. National Travelers Casualty Company of Des Moines, Iowa

    206 Cal. 475 (Cal. 1929)   Cited 6 times

    In short, there having been no breach of any obligation on his part to be performed by said insured, said notices were ineffective to suspend or forfeit for nonpayment of premium his said insurance contract, and we hold that the findings of the court below, to the effect that at the time of his death said policy was in full force and effect, have abundant support in the evidence. As authority for the holding we here make, see Knarston v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., 124 Cal. 74 [56 P. 773]; Bank ofAnderson v. Home Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App. 208 [ 111 P. 507]; Knarston v. Manhattan L. Ins. Co., 140 Cal. 57 [ 73 P. 740]; Faris v. American Nat. Assur. Co., 44 Cal.App. 48 [ 185 P. 1035]; Frank Co. v. New Amsterdam C. Co., 175 Cal. 293 [ 165 P. 927]. The judgment is affirmed.

  2. Baker v. Union Assurance Society of London, Ltd.

    264 P. 132 (Mont. 1928)   Cited 9 times

    Still, as above pointed out, he did much more than to merely write policies and collect premiums, and in the absence of a showing of limitations upon his authority we think he must be held to have possessed the powers of a general agent of defendant at Denton. ( Bank of Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App. 208, 111 P. 507; 26 C.J. 287; Continental Ins. Co. v. Ruckman, 127 Ill. 364, 11 Am. St. Rep. 121, 20 N.E. 77; Manning v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 176 Mo. App. 678, 159 S.W. 750.) As such agent, Grant knew before he wrote the policy that the [6] insured property was mortgaged to Harris and that proceedings were pending to foreclose the mortgage.

  3. Shultz Steel Co. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity

    187 Cal.App.3d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that a broker's misrepresentation as to the scope of an insurance policy cannot be imputed to the insurer

    In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809 [169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 620 P.2d 141], the court focused on the right of the insured to obtain the benefits of his insurance contract. In Bank of Anderson v. Home Ins. Co. (1910) 14 Cal.App. 208, 213 [ 111 P. 507], a business loan occurred, and a fire insurance policy was issued by the insurer's agent to the borrower and made payable to the lender. The policy stipulated that it would be void should the insured obtain a second policy, and it further provided that the insurer's agent could not waive the insurer's rights under the first policy clause except by proper endorsement of the policy.

  4. Walker v. Home Indemnity Co.

    145 Cal.App.2d 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)   Cited 10 times
    Finding judgment against insurer not inconsistent with nonsuit as to individual defendant where it was undisputed individual signed policy as agent for insurer

    The company could not at the same time accept the premium payment and declare the policy lapsed, nor could it lapse automatically at that time." In Bank of Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App. 208 [ 111 P. 507], it was said at page 218: "[W]here there is an agency the company is bound as to the third persons dealing with the agent in good faith as to all matters within the scope of his real or apparent authority." [2] The extent of the agent's authority, and whether under the circumstances of this case the agent was authorized to accept the $20, were questions of fact.

  5. Chase v. National Indemnity Co.

    129 Cal.App.2d 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954)   Cited 49 times
    In Chase the court stated: "The reason for denying interest on claims is that where the person liable does not know what sum he owes, he cannot be in default for not paying."

    As stated in Mackintosh v. Agricultural Fire Ins. Co., 150 Cal. 440, at 449 [ 89 P. 102, 119 Am.St.Rep. 234]: "Waivers such as that here made, constituting, as they do, a new contract upon a sufficient consideration, need not be evidenced by a writing, and need not be indorsed on the policy, no matter what limitations or conditions are expressed in the policy, provided always they are made by an agent who would otherwise have authority to make the contract." To the same effect are Golden Gate Motor Transport Co. v. Great American Indem. Co., 6 Cal.2d 439 [ 58 P.2d 374]; Bank of Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App. 208 [ 111 P. 507]; 29 Am.Jur. 625. It seems that Rainier, acting through its general agent, placed its own construction on the territorial limitation provisions and did not consider the trips taken by Chase to be violative thereof.

  6. Myers v. Garaventa

    93 Cal.App.2d 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949)   Cited 2 times

    However, it may be said in this case that section 16 of the contract provided that by tender of the amount due, the buyers' defaults were cured, and that evidence of excuses for nonperformance and waiver by defendant was introduced without objection by defendant; and the case was tried apparently on the theory that same was admissible. Also respondents rely upon cases holding that affirmative matters by way of replication are deemed to have been pleaded, and that defendant's answer in this case opened the door for evidence of waiver and permitted the showing of same in order to overcome such affirmative matters. (See 21 Cal.Jur. § 113, pp. 165-166; Bank of Anderson v. Home Insurance Co., 14 Cal.App. 208 [ 111 P. 507]; Code Civ. Proc., § 462) The trial court, in its opinion, stated that in an action to enforce the performance of a contract a plaintiff may, as was done here, allege full performance where, after notice of forfeiture, he had made a tender of full performance which was denied, citing Hind v. Oriental Products Co., Inc., 195 Cal. 655, 670 [ 235 P. 438].

  7. Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.

    92 Cal.App.2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949)   Cited 21 times
    In Eagle Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 92 Cal.App.2d 222 [ 206 P.2d 877], an insurer knew that a certain policy did not provide for certain coverage, and that the insured thought it did.

    In this connection petitioner cites Fidelity etc. Co. v. Fresno Flume etc. Co., 161 Cal. 466 [ 119 P. 646, 37 L.R.A.N.S. 322], a case holding that, where the policy of insurance provided that no condition could be altered by an agent without written consent of the company, a local agent of the company could not effect a waiver unless the company consent thereto in writing. ( Cf., Arnold v. American Insurance Co., 148 Cal. 660, 668 [ 84 P. 182, 25 L.R.A.N.S. 6]; Bank of Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App. 208, 214 [ 111 P. 507]; and Mayfield v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 611 [ 61 P.2d 83], all of which hold that a general agent has the power to effect a waiver notwithstanding a provision to the contrary in the policy.) Since the instant proceeding involves the question of whether knowledge acquired by a general agent is imputable to his principal, the authority cited by petitioner is not controlling.

  8. Brooker v. American Insurance Co.

    16 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941)   Cited 4 times
    In Brooker v. American Ins. Co., 65 Ga. App. 713, 718 (16 S.E.2d 251) it is stated that for such an estoppel to arise there must be two prerequisites; first, the company must have access to the policy; second, there must have been a reliance on the promise of the agent by those to whom the promise was made and for whose benefit it was made.

    26 C. J. 284, 285. An assured has a right to rely on the agent's promise to make the necessary indorsements on the policy, by virtue of which such assured refrains from securing other insurance on the property; and equity will treat as done that which ought to have been done, and not permit the insurer to question it. Bank of Anderson v. Home Insurance Co., 14 Cal.App. 208 ( 111 P. 507). To the same effect see 38 A.L.R. 638, where on authorities cited it is stated that the failure of the agent to make the promised indorsement estops the insurer from claiming a forfeiture on the ground of the absence thereof, for the reason that it is probable the assured was prevented from procuring other insurance by reason of reliance on the agreement and promise of the agent to make the proper indorsement.

  9. Cronin v. Coyle

    6 Cal.App.2d 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935)   Cited 10 times
    In Cronin v. Coyle (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 205 [ 44 P.2d 385], an agent issued an insurance policy to a taxicab company, which policy provided for cancellation if the insured took out a second policy.

    From all this and other evidence in the case it is made to clearly appear that Elgin was the general agent of appellant company for California, authorized to do anything in respect to the soliciting, writing, extending or canceling of liability policies which the company itself might do. ( Bank of Anderson v. Home Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App. 208 [ 111 P. 507].) [4] The powers of an agent for an insurance company are, as a general rule, governed by the general law of agency.

  10. Ruffino v. Queen Ins. Co.

    138 Cal.App. 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934)   Cited 12 times

    The liability of the insurer is not waived by a breach of a provision of the standard form of policy on the part of the insured which is declared to be a prerequisite to the maintenance of a suit upon the contract, when that breach is caused by the fault of the insurance company or its agents. (26 C.J., p. 406, sec. 522; Enfantino v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App. 729 [ 3 P.2d 331]; Bank of Anderson v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 14 Cal.App. 208, 219 [ 111 P. 507].) The insurer may not predicate an absolute denial of liability upon failure of the insured to file sworn proof of loss, which failure is caused by conduct or declarations which amount to a waiver thereof by the insurer.