However, the father has failed to set forth the mother's financial situation at the time of the order of support as compared to her expenses for the children at the time of the father's application for the downward modification, or a comparison of the children's needs at the time of the order of support and his application for the downward modification (see Matter ofRosenberg v. Rosenberg, 145 A.D.3d at 1015, 42 N.Y.S.3d 855 ; Matter ofRosenthal v. Weiss, 129 A.D.3d 738, 8 N.Y.S.3d 916 ; see generally Matter ofOelsner v. Heppler, 181 A.D.3d at 917, 122 N.Y.S.3d 330 ). His unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations do not provide a basis to establish a substantial change in circumstances (seeBattinelli v. Battinelli, 192 A.D.3d 957, 959, 145 N.Y.S.3d 100 ). Further, while the father alleges, inter alia, that the second eldest child is no longer living at home and is supporting himself with his college fund and earnings, the father also alleges not only that the mother provides the child $25 per week, but that he is providing the child with support with regard to his car expenses.

CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." "A defendant may waive the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance" (Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 957 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see OneWest Bank, FSB v Lara, 192 A.D.3d 695, 697; U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015-1 v John, 189 A.D.3d 1645, 1650).

CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." "A defendant may waive the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance" ( Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 957, 140 N.Y.S.3d 775 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeOneWest Bank, FSB v. Lara, 192 A.D.3d 695, 697, 139 N.Y.S.3d 843 ; U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015–1 v. John, 189 A.D.3d 1645, 1650, 140 N.Y.S.3d 59 ). Here, the defendant waived the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by cross-moving for a declaration that she was not in default and for leave to file a late answer, without seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) as abandoned at that time (seeOneWest Bank, FSB v. Bernstein, 196 A.D.3d 591, 147 N.Y.S.3d 442 ; Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 140 N.Y.S.3d 775 ; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Abrahim, 183 A.D.3d 698, 121 N.Y.S.3d 904 ; Myers v. Slutsky, 139 A.D.2d 709, 710, 527 N.Y.S.2d 464 ).

CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." "A defendant may waive the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance" (Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 957 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see OneWest Bank, FSB v Lara, 192 A.D.3d 695, 697; U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015-1 v John, 189 A.D.3d 1645, 1650).

However, the father has failed to set forth the mother's financial situation at the time of the order of support as compared to her expenses for the children at the time of the father's application for the downward modification, or a comparison of the children's needs at the time of the order of support and his application for the downward modification (see Matter of Rosenberg v Rosenberg, 145 A.D.3d at 1015; Matter of Rosenthal v Weiss, 129 A.D.3d 738; see generally Matter of Oelsner v Heppler, 181 A.D.3d at 917). His unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations do not provide a basis to establish a substantial change in circumstances (see Battinelli v Battinelli, 192 A.D.3d 957, 959). Further, while the father alleges, inter alia, that the second eldest child is no longer living at home and is supporting himself with his college fund and earnings, the father also alleges not only that the mother provides the child $25 per week, but that he is providing the child with support with regard to his car expenses.

CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." "A defendant may waive the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance" (Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 957 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see OneWest Bank, FSB v Lara, 192 A.D.3d 695, 697; U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015-1 v John, 189 A.D.3d 1645, 1650). Here, the defendant waived the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by cross-moving for a declaration that she was not in default and for leave to file a late answer, without seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) as abandoned at that time (see OneWest Bank, FSB v Bernstein, 196 A.D.3d 591; Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Abrahim, 183 A.D.3d 698; Myers v Slutsky, 139 A.D.2d 709, 710).

CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed." "A defendant may waive the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance" (Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 957 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see OneWest Bank, FSB v Lara, 192 A.D.3d 695, 697; U.S. Rof III Legal Tit. Trust 2015-1 v John, 189 A.D.3d 1645, 1650). Here, the defendant waived the right to seek dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by cross-moving for a declaration that she was not in default and for leave to file a late answer, without seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) as abandoned at that time (see OneWest Bank, FSB v Bernstein, 196 A.D.3d 591; Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Abrahim, 183 A.D.3d 698; Myers v Slutsky, 139 A.D.2d 709, 710).

However unlikely this scenario may be at this point, the wife should have access to this information. Supreme Court's determination not to incarcerate the husband for contempt was not an abuse of discretion, as the husband established his defense of inability to comply with the prior maintenance obligations given his poor financial condition (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 114 A.D.3d 4, 17 [2d Dept 2013]; see also Battinelli v Battinelli, 192 A.D.3d 957, 960 [2d Dept 2021]). We have considered the wife's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

The Supreme Court also properly denied the defendants' cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them as abandoned. A defendant may waive the right to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Lichter, 192 A.D.3d 957, 957; OneWest Bank, FSB v Lara, 192 A.D.3d 695, 697). Here, the defendants waived their right to seek dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against them pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by their active participation in the litigation (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Carapella, 218 A.D.3d 631, 633; OneWest Bank, FSB v Lara, 192 A.D.3d at 697).

Under these circumstances, including the lack of any demonstrated prejudice to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to hold the defendant in civil contempt (seeTedesco v. Elio, 211 A.D.3d 1074, 1077, 182 N.Y.S.3d 153 ; Pathak v. Shukla, 164 A.D.3d 687, 689, 81 N.Y.S.3d 549 ; Scialdone v. Stepping Stones Assoc., L.P., 148 A.D.3d 955, 956, 49 N.Y.S.3d 718 ). Since the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the defendant engaged in contemptuous conduct that caused her to be prejudiced, the court also properly denied those branches of her motion which were to impose a sanction upon the defendant and for an award of attorney's fees based upon the same conduct (seeHeffer v. Krebs, 196 A.D.3d 684, 686, 152 N.Y.S.3d 467 ; Battinelli v. Battinelli, 192 A.D.3d 957, 960, 145 N.Y.S.3d 100 ; Vujovic v. Vujovic, 16 A.D.3d 490, 491, 791 N.Y.S.2d 648 ). Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's cross-motion which was for an award of attorney's fees.