Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2559-14T2
07-18-2016
RUGNAB WAHADI BANGURA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LERINA FLORENCE BANGURA, n/k/a LERINA MEHEUX, Defendant-Respondent.
Rugnab Wahadi Bangura, appellant pro se. Beverly A. Plutnick, attorney for respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Sabatino and Accurso. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-856-08. Rugnab Wahadi Bangura, appellant pro se. Beverly A. Plutnick, attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Rugnab Wahadi Bangura and defendant Lerina Meheux were divorced in 2009 following a twenty-year marriage and three-day trial. Their eldest child was already emancipated at the time the judgment was entered, but their daughter was still in middle school and living with her mother, defendant in this matter. The dual judgment of divorce established plaintiff's child support obligation based on plaintiff's income of $128,696 and defendant's income of $42,605. A decision on the parties' respective contributions for their daughter's anticipated college expenses, however, was deferred in the judgment to "the appropriate time" when "the factors to be utilized for determination with regard to contribution to college expenses will be examined."
In August 2013, plaintiff filed a motion to emancipate their daughter, who was then a freshman at Kean University, residing on campus. Judge Natali subsequently presided over a two-day plenary hearing addressing emancipation, college expenses, child support and attorneys' fees. Both parties testified, each represented by counsel, as did their daughter. The central issue was plaintiff's contention that the daughter should be emancipated and he relieved of any responsibility for her college expenses on account of her alienation and refusal to include him in her college selection process. In an exceedingly thorough and thoughtful written opinion, Judge Natali largely rejected plaintiff's claims of alienation. Applying the Newburgh factors, the judge concluded both parties had the obligation and ability to contribute to the cost of their daughter's college education. The judge determined plaintiff's income to be $146,568. He found defendant earned $66,326 in 2012 and was on track to earn $78,000 in 2013. Although finding plaintiff's share of college costs based on the ratio of the parties' incomes would be sixty-five percent, Judge Natali determined fifty-five percent would represent a more equitable contribution in light of facts and the parties' circumstances. Defendant was ordered to contribute thirty-five percent to those costs and the remaining ten percent was assigned to their daughter. The judge also established a child support obligation for plaintiff of $175 per week and denied both parties' request for counsel fees. Judge Natali entered an order memorializing his rulings on April 30, 2014.
Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982).
Both parties have remarried. Plaintiff and his wife have a new baby. The judge noted plaintiff also contributes to his step-daughter's college expenses. --------
Plaintiff did not appeal from that order. When plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of the April 30, 2014 order, defendant moved for its enforcement. Plaintiff cross-moved for reconsideration and modification of the order and sought an ability to pay hearing. Judge Silva entered an order on the motions on August 22, 2014, finding plaintiff in violation of litigant's rights for his willful refusal to comply with the April 30, 2014 order. In her order of August 22, 2014, the judge directed plaintiff to reimburse defendant $9946.18 representing his fifty-five percent share of the total defendant paid to Kean for their daughter's 2013-14 academic year within thirty days and directed him to pay his portion of the 2014-15 year within the required time. The judge also entered judgment for the $250 plaintiff had been previously ordered to pay and awarded defendant fees of $890 on the motion. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and modification of the April 30, 2014 order was denied as untimely as was his motion for an ability to pay hearing. Plaintiff did not appeal from the order.
When plaintiff failed to comply with the terms of the August 22, 2014 order, defendant moved for enforcement of both it and the April 30, 2014 order, as well as for sanctions and a wage execution. Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion, and Judge Silva entered an order on December 5, 2014, finding him in violation of litigant's rights and entering a combined judgment against him in the sum of $15,538.84, representing the $9946.18 he was ordered to pay for the 2013-14 school year, $4452.66 for his fifty-five percent share of costs for the fall 2014-15 term, the $250 previously ordered reduced to judgment and the $890 in fees previously ordered for the prior enforcement motion. The judge denied defendant's request for fees on the motion because no certification of services was provided and entered a wage execution.
Plaintiff has filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 5, 2014 order. His brief, however, does not address any error in the entry of that order. Instead, plaintiff's brief is given over entirely to errors he alleges Judge Natali made in assessing the proofs at the plenary hearing, resulting in the order of April 30, 2014. He also complains his procedural due process rights were violated by the August 22, 2014 order because the court made rulings on the conflicting certifications of the parties. Finally, he contends there has been a "pattern of bias" against him throughout the divorce and the post-judgment proceedings in which the various judges presiding over those proceedings have granted defendant relief "from mainly testimonial evidence unsupported by competent and credible evidence over tangible and credible evidence" he has provided.
Defendant, in her brief, counters that plaintiff's appeal must be limited to the December 5, 2014 order, the only one included in his notice of appeal. She argues plaintiff's due process claims are without merit as he participated in the plenary hearing and was afforded notice and a fair opportunity to be heard at each step in the proceedings leading up to this appeal. Plaintiff has filed a reply brief in which he argues that "[a]ppellant's motion for relief from judgment under Rule 4:50-1 was timely filed as required by Rule 4:50-2."
The law governing this appeal is well established. Rule 2:4-1(a) requires an appeal from a final judgment to be filed within forty-five days after its entry. Rule 2:4-4(a) permits a maximum thirty-day extension of time, but only if the notice of appeal was actually filed within the time as extended. See Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 540-41 (2011). No further extension is permitted, and we are without jurisdiction to hear an appeal brought beyond the date permitted by Rule 2:4-4(a). In re Hill, 241 N.J. Super. 367, 372 (App. Div. 1990). There is no question but that a post-judgment order of the family part modifying a support order is a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Adams v. Adams, 53 N.J. Super. 424, 428-29 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 30 N.J. 151 (1959).
Applying these principles makes clear that plaintiff's attempt to appeal from the orders of April 30, 2014 and August 22, 2014 is untimely, and we are without jurisdiction to consider his contentions. Further, because the issues plaintiff complains of were fully tried at the plenary hearing where both parties were represented by counsel, "the parties were given fair opportunity to be heard thereon, and they were carefully and thoughtfully considered by the trial judge, who made explicit factual findings," the only avenue of relief from those findings was by way of a timely appeal; a Rule 4:50 motion would not have been an adequate substitute even had plaintiff filed such a motion, which he did not. See Calcaterra v. Calcaterra, 206 N.J. Super. 398, 403 (App. Div. 1986).
Because plaintiff asserts no error in the calculations underpinning the December 5, 2014 order, and we deem his allegations of bias on the part of the several judges who have presided over the divorce and many post-judgment applications as without any support in the record and utterly without merit, see Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), we affirm.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION