Furthermore, the open and obvious doctrine pertains to the element of duty in a negligence action. Ballog v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 112429, ¶ 20, 366 Ill.Dec. 597, 980 N.E.2d 690.¶ 33 Pursuant to that doctrine, a party which owns or controls land is not required to foresee or protect against injury where the potentially dangerous condition is open and obvious. Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 16, 386 Ill.Dec. 765, 21 N.E.3d 684. An open and obvious danger does not automatically eliminate a legal duty on the defendant's part, however.
"Absent a legal duty of care owed to the plaintiff, the defendant cannot be found negligent." Ballog v. City of Chicago, 980 N.E.2d 690, 695, 366 Ill.Dec. 597 (1st Dist. 2012). As to the duty of care, McGregor argues that "[i]t is academic that Defendant owed a duty to provide Plaintiff with a safe workplace."
"[T]he touchstone to determine the existence of a duty is 'to ask whether a plaintiff and a defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.'" Vesely v. Armslist LLC, 762 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); see also Ballog v. City of Chicago, 980 N.E.2d 690, 695 (1st Dist. 2012) ("A duty of care arises when the law imposes 'upon defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of plaintiff.'") (citation omitted). "The existence of a duty is a matter for the court to decide."
Here, the trial court had not only the opinion of the federal court, containing its factual findings, but it also had all of the documents that the federal court used in making those factual findings. Thus, we do not find that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of certain factual findings that were relevant to the claims before it. Regardless, we review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Ballog v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL App (1st) 112429, ¶ 18, 980 N.E.2d 690. ¶ 14 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits demonstrate that as a matter of law, the moving party is entitled to judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010).
Prostran, 811 N.E.2d at 368. Neither Ballog v. City of Chicago, 980 N.E.2d 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), nor Pageloff v. Gaumer, 849 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), supports a contrary result. In Ballog, the Illinois Appellate Court noted that the plaintiff on appeal did not "advocate that the 'physical nature' of the gap in the street surface was disputed by the parties below," and therefore found no factual dispute as to the condition's nature.
Rather, the open and obvious nature of the condition "depends on the objective knowledge of a reasonable person, not the plaintiff's subjective knowledge." Ballog v. City of Chicago, 980 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). And because the placement of the candy box posed a risk that a reasonable person could appreciate and avoid, it was an open-and-obvious danger.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants owed no duty to protect or warn Passarella of the moving spotter truck and trailer. The Court need not address the issues of proximate cause and contributory negligence by Passarella as Passarella failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants owed him a duty, Ballog v. City of Chicago, 980 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ill. App. 2012) (noting "[a]bsent a legal duty of care owed to the plaintiff, the defendant cannot be found negligent."). Passarella also argues that Defendants "failed to follow the OSHA mandates and train Herbert Estrada" and that the purported failures caused the contact between Passarella and Defendants' vehicle.
The purpose of summary judgment is not to answer a question of fact, but to determine whether one exists. Ballog v. City of Chicago , 2012 IL App (1st) 112429, ¶ 18, 366 Ill.Dec. 597, 980 N.E.2d 690. Although a drastic means of disposing of litigation, summary judgment is, nonetheless, an appropriate measure to efficiently dispose of a suit when the moving party's right to the judgment is clear and free from doubt.
The purpose of summary judgment is not to answer a question of fact but to determine whether one exists. Ballog v. City of Chicago , 2012 IL App (1st) 112429, ¶ 18, 366 Ill.Dec. 597, 980 N.E.2d 690. The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ( Pavlik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 323 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1063, 257 Ill.Dec. 381, 753 N.E.2d 1007 (2001) ) and must construe the material strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmovant ( Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. , 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995) ).
Id. ¶ 3. ¶ 21 Many appellate court cases have likewise applied the open-and-obvious rule to negligence actions. Winters v. MIMG LII Arbors at Eastland, LLC , 2018 IL App (4th) 170669, 425 Ill.Dec. 727, 115 N.E.3d 282 (pile of snow was an open and obvious condition that precluded liability of landlord and landscaping company in a negligence action); Crosson v. Ruzich , 2018 IL App (5th) 170235, 424 Ill.Dec. 1005, 110 N.E.3d 355 (homeowner was not liable for home-health-care worker's injuries when worker fell off homeowner's porch that had no railing, when the porch was an open-and-obvious danger and worker had accessed the porch several times previously); Farrell v. Farrell , 2016 IL App (3d) 160220, 410 Ill.Dec. 1024, 72 N.E.3d 410 (summary judgment for homeowner in a negligence action where a dirt bike ridden by plaintiff was open and obvious danger); Ballog v. City of Chicago , 2012 IL App (1st) 112429, ¶ 20, 366 Ill.Dec. 597, 980 N.E.2d 690 ("[t]he open and obvious doctrine addresses the essential element of any duty in a negligence cause of action" (citing Choate , 2012 IL 112948, 366 Ill.Dec. 258, 980 N.E.2d 58 )).