Ballew v. State

Full title: RAYMOND BALLEW v. THE STATE

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Date published: Nov 16, 1938

121 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938)

121 S.W.2d 346

Opinion

No. 19926.

Delivered November 16, 1938.

1. — Intoxicating Liquor (Sale in Dry Area) — Charge — "Sale."

In prosecution for unlawful sale of whisky in a dry area, a bill of exception complaining of the court's charge for failure to define the meaning of the term "sale" held to present no error, where court gave defendant's special requested charge defining "sale" as "the transfer of property from one person to another in exchange for money or some other valuable consideration."

2. — Intoxicating Liquor (Sale in Dry Area) — Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction for unlawful sale of whisky in a dry area.

Appeal from the County Court of Hall County. Hon. M. O. Goodpasture, Judge.

Appeal from conviction for the unlawful sale of whisky in a dry area; penalty, fine of $200.

Affirmed.

The opinion states the case.

Mahan Broughton, of Childress, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Attorney, of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, PRESIDING JUDGE. —

The conviction is for the unlawful sale of whisky in a dry area; penalty assessed at a fine of $200.00.

Two young men testified for the State to the effect that on the night of February 20, 1937, they purchased from the appellant at his place of business a half-pint of whisky for which they paid him sixty-four cents; that shortly thereafter while riding in an automobile with some girls they were stopped by two officers. The witnesses were taken to the city hall where the county attorney ascertained from them the name of the person from whom they purchased the whisky, after which they were released. However, the whisky was retained by the officers and introduced in evidence upon the trial.

The appellant did not testify upon the trial and introduced no defensive evidence.

The only bill of exception found in the record is that complaining of the court's charge in failing to define the meaning of the term "sale." However, the court gave a special charge requested by the appellant in which the term "sale" was defined as "the transfer of property from one person to another in exchange for money or some other valuable consideration." Under the circumstances, we think no error is presented by the bill.

Deeming the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, the judgment is affirmed.