The defendants appeal. [1-3] "As there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant driver moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident" (Oliinyk v. Yusupov, 218 A.D.3d 602, 603, 192 N.Y.S.3d 614; see Ballentine v. Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 994, 114 N.Y.S.3d 696). "[G]enerally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause" (Soto v. Colletta, 225 A.D.3d 819, 820, 207 N.Y.S.3d 615 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Galloway v. Lux Credit Consultants, LLC, 224 A.D.3d 891, 891, 206 N.Y.S.3d 164).

"As there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant driver moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident" (Oliinyk v Yusupov, 218 A.D.3d 602, 603; see Ballentine v Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 994). "[G]enerally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause" (Soto v Colletta, 225 A.D.3d 819, 820 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Galloway v Lux Credit Consultants, LLC, 224 A.D.3d 891, 891).

(Ballentine v. Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 114 N.Y.S.3d 696 [2 Dept., 2020]).

(Ballentine v. Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 114 N.Y.S.3d 696 [2 Dept., 2020]).

Nonetheless, under New York law, "a defendant may obtain summary judgment by demonstrating the plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident and an absence of evidence on the defendant's negligence." Reyes v. United States, 19-CV-5325 (KHP), 2021 WL 1639370, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2021); see also Ballentine v. Perrone, 114 N.Y.S.3d 696, 697-98 (2d Dep't 2020); Wolf v. Cruickshank, 41 N.Y.S.3d 754, 755 (2d Dep't 2016). The incident occurred in New York State, and the parties' briefs apply New York law.

"Even though the driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield, he or she still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection" (Park v. Giunta, 217 A.D.3d 661, 662, 191 N.Y.S.3d 85; see Tornabene v. Seickel, 186 A.D.3d 645, 646, 129 N.Y.S.3d 110). [4] Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff's failure to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the defendant exercised reasonable care to avoid the collision with the plaintiff's vehicle (see Ballentine v. Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 994, 114 N.Y.S.3d 696; M.M.T. v. Relyea, 177 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 114 N.Y.S.3d 385). The transcripts of the de- position testimony submitted by the defendant in support of her motion failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff's vehicle was already in the intersection before the defendant’s vehicle approached the intersection and whether the defendant could have taken measures to avoid the accident (see Tornabene v. Seickel, 186 A.D.3d at 646, 129 N.Y.S.3d 110; M.M.T. v. Relyea, 177 A.D.3d at 1014, 114 N.Y.S.3d 385).

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff's failure to yield the right-of-way was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the defendant exercised reasonable care to avoid the collision with the plaintiff's vehicle (see Ballentine v Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 994; M.M.T. v Relyea, 177 A.D.3d 1013, 1014). The transcripts of the deposition testimony submitted by the defendant in support of her motion failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff's vehicle was already in the intersection before the defendant's vehicle approached the intersection and whether the defendant could have taken measures to avoid the accident (see Tornabene v Seickel, 186 A.D.3d at 646; M.M.T. v Relyea, 177 A.D.3d at 1014).

As there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant driver moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident (see Oliinyk v Yusupov, 218 A.D.3d 602, 603; Ballentine v Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 994). "'[A] person riding a bicycle on a roadway is entitled to all of the rights and bears all of the responsibilities of a driver of a motor vehicle'" (Oliinyk v Yusupov, 218 A.D.3d at 603, quoting Palma v Sherman, 55 A.D.3d 891, 891; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231). "In general, a motorist is required to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for bicyclists, to sound the vehicle's horn when a reasonably prudent person would do so in order to warn a bicyclist of danger, and to operate the vehicle with reasonable care to avoid colliding with anyone on the road" (Palma v Sherman, 55 A.D.3d at 891; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146).

The moving defendants therefore failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether Bartolomei exercised reasonable care under the conditions presented, including, among other things, whether he should have stopped or at least lowered the rate of speed of his vehicle before attempting to pass the stopped vehicle, regardless of whether he had the right-of-way as compared to Rashid (see Miller v County of Suffolk, 163 A.D.3d 954, 956-957; Kadashev v Medina, 134 A.D.3d 767, 767-768; Canales v Arichabala, 123 A.D.3d 869, 870; Espiritu v Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789; cf. Moreno v Gomez, 58 A.D.3d 611, 612). To the extent the moving defendants assert that Bartolomei exercised reasonable care simply because he was traveling at or under the speed limit, their contention is without merit (see e.g. Ballentine v Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 993-995). Since the moving defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, we need not consider the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Swinton v Kamiyama, 147 A.D.3d 803, 804).

"Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231, a person riding a bicycle upon a roadway shall be granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle. A bicyclist is required to use reasonable care for his or her own safety, to keep a reasonably vigilant lookout for vehicles, and to avoid placing himself or herself into a dangerous position" ( Sturm v. Chaudhary, 210 A.D.3d 927, 927, 176 N.Y.S.3d 798 ; seePalma v. Sherman, 55 A.D.3d 891, 891, 867 N.Y.S.2d 111 ). Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146(a), motorists must "exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist, pedestrian, or domestic animal" on the roadway and to "give warning by sounding the horn when necessary" (seeBallentine v. Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 994, 114 N.Y.S.3d 696 ; Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789, 982 N.Y.S.2d 155 ). A motorist also has a "common-law duty to see that which he [or she] should have seen through the proper use of his [or her] senses" ( Lieb v. Jacobson, 202 A.D.3d 1072, 1073, 163 N.Y.S.3d 586 ; seeKruter v. United Parcel Serv. Gen. Servs. Co., 210 A.D.3d 671, 672, 177 N.Y.S.3d 692 ). Here, the defendant, who submitted the transcripts of his and the plaintiff's deposition testimony, failed to establish, prima facie, that his conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident.