Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-001804-MR
03-07-2014
CHARLES BALLARD; AND MYRTLE BALLARD APPELLANTS v. PLEASIE J. TRIPLETT; AND HENRY W. TRIPLETT APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Robert Stivers Manchester, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Scott M. Webster London, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-01208
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: STUMBO, TAYLOR, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES. TAYLOR, JUDGE: Charles Ballard and Myrtle Ballard (collectively referred to as appellants) bring this appeal from an August 14, 2012, Judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court upon a jury verdict setting aside a deed of conveyance upon finding that the grantor lacked mental capacity to execute same. We affirm.
On October 2, 2009, Henry K. Triplett executed a deed conveying certain real property located in Laurel County to appellants. The record reveals that Myrtle Ballard was Henry's niece. Some seventeen days thereafter, on October 19, 2009, Henry passed away after a prolonged battle with cancer.
On October 27, 2009, Henry's nephews, Pleasie J. Triplett and Henry W. Triplett, (collectively referred to as appellees) filed an action seeking to set aside the deed upon grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, lack of consideration, undue influence, and lack of mental capacity. Appellees asserted that Henry was of unsound mind and physically frail at the time he executed the October 2, 2009, deed.
A jury trial ensued, and at the close of evidence, the circuit court rendered a directed verdict upon appellees' claims of fraud, misrepresentation, and lack of consideration. The court, however, denied the motion for directed verdict upon the claims of undue influence and mental incapacity. Thus, the jury was instructed upon the claims of undue influence by appellees and lack of mental capacity by Henry to execute the October 2, 2009, deed. By unanimous verdict, the jury found that Henry was of unsound mind at the time he executed the October 2, 2009, deed, whereupon the circuit court set aside the October 2, 2009, deed by judgment entered August 14, 2012. Appellees filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied by the circuit court. This appeal follows.
Appellants raise on issue in this appeal. Appellants contend the circuit court erred by failing to direct a verdict in their favor on appellees' claim that Henry lacked sufficient mental capacity to execute the October 2, 2009, deed conveying his real property to them. Appellants assert that appellees "failed to produce any evidence to show that Henry had a lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the deed. [Appellees'] witnesses had limited access to Henry and rarely saw him." Appellants' brief at 11.
A directed verdict is proper when drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party a reasonable juror could only conclude that the moving party was entitled to a verdict. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 50.01; Lee v. Tucker, 365 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963). For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we believe the circuit court properly denied appellants' motion for a directed verdict.
A deed will be invalidated due to mental incapacity of the grantor if the grantor lacks "sufficient [mentality] to comprehend what he is doing and to understand the nature of his acts and to appreciate and weigh the consequences." Newman v. Hall, 278 Ky. 88, 128 S.W.2d 201, 206 (1939). At trial, appellees introduced testimony that Henry suffered from confusion, memory impairment, and physical weakness during the last year of his life. Witnesses testified at trial that Henry was having difficulty conversing with people and suffered from increased mental confusion in the days prior to execution of the deed. Additionally, a witness testified that Henry had been prescribed the pain medications, oxycontin and Hydrocodone prior to his execution of the deed.
Considering this evidence as a whole, we think sufficient evidence existed to create a factual issue for resolution by the jury upon whether Henry possessed the requisite mental capacity to execute the October 2, 2009, deed. See Mix v. Smith, 387 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1965). It is clear that appellees introduced evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Henry lacked the requisite mental capacity to comprehend and understand his actions and the consequences thereof. In short, we believe the evidence at trial was conflicting upon Henry's mental capacity and that directing a verdict for appellants would have been improper. The case was properly submitted to the jury.
For the foregoing reasons, the Judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: Robert Stivers
Manchester, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: Scott M. Webster
London, Kentucky