And the failure to make a meritless objection is not evidence of ineffective assistance. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 255 (6) (i), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015). (3) Failing to Object to Statements Regarding Redacted Video.
In non-death penalty cases, "[a] trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a severance." Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 255 (8), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) ; see also OCGA § 17-8-4 (a). The three factors a trial court should consider when determining whether to grant or deny a motion to sever are
-------- As for Shepard's remaining claim of ineffective assistance, the record shows that, when his convictions for two counts of theft by taking were admitted into evidence, the trial court did give a proper instruction concerning their limited use. See Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 253 (6) (e), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015). And the court later repeated that limiting instruction during its charge to the jury after explaining the essential elements of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Appellant’s DNA was also on the condom police recovered from the trashcan. See Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 248-249 & n.1, 255, 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, relying, in part, on evidence that defendant’s DNA was on a water bottle in the hotel room, which placed the defendant at the crime scene). The jury was not required to accept Appellant’s claim that the killing was an accident and could have concluded based on the evidence recited above that he beat Parke intentionally, causing her death.
Because the evidence against Jackson was strong and the prosecutor did not emphasize the defendant's felony conviction when it was admitted into evidence or during closing argument, see Collins v. State , 312 Ga. 727, 749 (8) (d), 864 S.E.2d 85 (2021), we conclude that even if Jackson's counsel was deficient for failing to stipulate to his convicted-felon status, Jackson has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different. See Willis , 315 Ga. at 28-29 (4) (a), 880 S.E.2d 158 (in a murder case, defendant not prejudiced by counsel's failure to stipulate to convicted-felon status, because evidence of guilt was strong and jury's passions were unlikely to be inflamed by prior conviction for possession of cocaine); Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-53 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (same, with past convictions for aggravated assault and burglary with intent to commit aggravated assault); Bentley v. State , 307 Ga. 1, 8 (2), 834 S.E.2d 549 (2019) (same, with past convictions for rape and incest, mentioning that "[t]he names and nature of the earlier convictions were not emphasized by the State"). Accordingly, Jackson's ineffectiveness claim fails.
Because such information was unlikely to "inflame the jury's passions" against him, and the evidence against Willis was strong, Willis has not established a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different if his counsel had prevented the exhibit from being introduced in full. See id. at 744-47 (5), 848 S.E.2d 117 (in a murder case, defendant not prejudiced by counsel's failure to stipulate to convicted felon status, because evidence of guilt was strong and jury's passions were unlikely to be inflamed by prior convictions for aggravated robbery and bringing prohibited item into government facility); Moore v. State , 306 Ga. 532, 534–35 (2) (b) & n.2, 832 S.E.2d 384 (2019) (same, with past convictions for possession of marijuana, eluding a police officer, and driving violations); Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-53 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (same, with past convictions for aggravated assault and burglary with intent to commit aggravated assault). So Willis's claim of ineffective assistance on this ground fails.
"[A] trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a severance in a joint trial." Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 255 (8), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015). See OCGA § 17-8-4 (a).
Thus, even if there had been a request for severance as to Count 12, the trial court would not have been required to bifurcate the trial on that basis. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 251 (4), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (A motion to bifurcate "should be denied where the count charging [unlawful firearm possession] might serve as the underlying felony supporting a felony murder conviction."). Counsel was therefore not deficient for failing to request severance as to Count 12.
This makes it particularly unlikely that the evidence of Parker's prior convictions affected the outcome of the trial as to the offenses other than those specifically predicated on a prior conviction. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-253 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (any error in counsel's failure to stipulate to convicted felon status, based on convictions for aggravated assault and burglary, did not result in prejudice given overwhelming evidence of his guilt); Hill v. State , 290 Ga. 493, 498 (6), 722 S.E.2d 708 (2012) (any error in trial court's refusal to permit defendant to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon, based on conviction for aggravated assault, was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt). The prejudicial impact of the kidnapping and burglary charges included in the documents admitted at trial was low, given that the documents showed that Parker had not been convicted of those crimes.
Chavez has not shown a reasonable probability of a different result had counsel offered to stipulate to his (expired) first-offender status. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-253 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (no prejudice shown from trial counsel’s failure to stipulate to defendant’s convicted-felon status given that the prior convictions were not of the nature likely to inflame the jury’s passions and the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was strong). The nature of the prior offenses, and the extent to which the jury heard details of them, makes this case different from a case relied on by Chavez, Starling v. State , 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007).