Ballard v. Soun

36 Citing cases

  1. Williams v. State

    363 Ga. App. 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    And the failure to make a meritless objection is not evidence of ineffective assistance. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 255 (6) (i), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015). (3) Failing to Object to Statements Regarding Redacted Video.

  2. Maddox v. State

    313 Ga. 172 (Ga. 2022)

    In non-death penalty cases, "[a] trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a severance." Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 255 (8), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) ; see also OCGA § 17-8-4 (a). The three factors a trial court should consider when determining whether to grant or deny a motion to sever are

  3. Shepard v. State

    300 Ga. 167 (Ga. 2016)   Cited 14 times
    Offering to talk to the district attorney while making clear that only the district attorney can determine charges and plea deals not a hope of benefit

    -------- As for Shepard's remaining claim of ineffective assistance, the record shows that, when his convictions for two counts of theft by taking were admitted into evidence, the trial court did give a proper instruction concerning their limited use. See Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 253 (6) (e), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015). And the court later repeated that limiting instruction during its charge to the jury after explaining the essential elements of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

  4. Jones v. The State

    902 S.E.2d 599 (Ga. 2024)

    Appellant’s DNA was also on the condom police recovered from the trashcan. See Ballard v. State, 297 Ga. 248, 248-249 & n.1, 255, 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, relying, in part, on evidence that defendant’s DNA was on a water bottle in the hotel room, which placed the defendant at the crime scene). The jury was not required to accept Appellant’s claim that the killing was an accident and could have concluded based on the evidence recited above that he beat Parke intentionally, causing her death.

  5. Jackson v. State

    317 Ga. 95 (Ga. 2023)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that, "even if [the defendant's] counsel was deficient for failing to stipulate to his convicted-felon status, [the defendant] ha[d] failed to show that there [was] a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different" where the prosecutor did not emphasize the nature of the aggravated assault conviction and where the evidence against the defendant was strong

    Because the evidence against Jackson was strong and the prosecutor did not emphasize the defendant's felony conviction when it was admitted into evidence or during closing argument, see Collins v. State , 312 Ga. 727, 749 (8) (d), 864 S.E.2d 85 (2021), we conclude that even if Jackson's counsel was deficient for failing to stipulate to his convicted-felon status, Jackson has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different. See Willis , 315 Ga. at 28-29 (4) (a), 880 S.E.2d 158 (in a murder case, defendant not prejudiced by counsel's failure to stipulate to convicted-felon status, because evidence of guilt was strong and jury's passions were unlikely to be inflamed by prior conviction for possession of cocaine); Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-53 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (same, with past convictions for aggravated assault and burglary with intent to commit aggravated assault); Bentley v. State , 307 Ga. 1, 8 (2), 834 S.E.2d 549 (2019) (same, with past convictions for rape and incest, mentioning that "[t]he names and nature of the earlier convictions were not emphasized by the State"). Accordingly, Jackson's ineffectiveness claim fails.

  6. Willis v. State

    315 Ga. 19 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress on the ground that a search warrant was not supported by probable cause did not constitute deficient performance, because the affidavit showed that the appellant's co-defendant gave a statement to police admitting that he and the appellant were involved in shooting the victim; the statement was "against [the co-defendant's] penal interest and based on his personal knowledge"; and that was enough in itself to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed

    Because such information was unlikely to "inflame the jury's passions" against him, and the evidence against Willis was strong, Willis has not established a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different if his counsel had prevented the exhibit from being introduced in full. See id. at 744-47 (5), 848 S.E.2d 117 (in a murder case, defendant not prejudiced by counsel's failure to stipulate to convicted felon status, because evidence of guilt was strong and jury's passions were unlikely to be inflamed by prior convictions for aggravated robbery and bringing prohibited item into government facility); Moore v. State , 306 Ga. 532, 534–35 (2) (b) & n.2, 832 S.E.2d 384 (2019) (same, with past convictions for possession of marijuana, eluding a police officer, and driving violations); Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-53 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (same, with past convictions for aggravated assault and burglary with intent to commit aggravated assault). So Willis's claim of ineffective assistance on this ground fails.

  7. Ruff v. State

    314 Ga. 386 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 3 times

    "[A] trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a severance in a joint trial." Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 255 (8), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015). See OCGA § 17-8-4 (a).

  8. Talley v. State

    314 Ga. 153 (Ga. 2022)   Cited 13 times

    Thus, even if there had been a request for severance as to Count 12, the trial court would not have been required to bifurcate the trial on that basis. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 251 (4), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (A motion to bifurcate "should be denied where the count charging [unlawful firearm possession] might serve as the underlying felony supporting a felony murder conviction."). Counsel was therefore not deficient for failing to request severance as to Count 12.

  9. Parker v. State

    309 Ga. 736 (Ga. 2020)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the trial court properly denied a motion for mistrial after a witness improperly commented on a defendant’s silence because the comment was made in passing, the court instructed the jury to disregard the comment, and the defendant provided no evidence that the jury disregarded the curative instruction

    This makes it particularly unlikely that the evidence of Parker's prior convictions affected the outcome of the trial as to the offenses other than those specifically predicated on a prior conviction. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-253 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (any error in counsel's failure to stipulate to convicted felon status, based on convictions for aggravated assault and burglary, did not result in prejudice given overwhelming evidence of his guilt); Hill v. State , 290 Ga. 493, 498 (6), 722 S.E.2d 708 (2012) (any error in trial court's refusal to permit defendant to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon, based on conviction for aggravated assault, was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt). The prejudicial impact of the kidnapping and burglary charges included in the documents admitted at trial was low, given that the documents showed that Parker had not been convicted of those crimes.

  10. Chavez v. State

    307 Ga. 804 (Ga. 2020)   Cited 16 times
    Holding there was no prejudice form counsel’s failure to stipulate to first offender status, although the State referenced the prior disposition in its closing argument, where the prior offense was non-violent and the evidence against the defendant was strong

    Chavez has not shown a reasonable probability of a different result had counsel offered to stipulate to his (expired) first-offender status. See Ballard v. State , 297 Ga. 248, 252-253 (6) (a), 773 S.E.2d 254 (2015) (no prejudice shown from trial counsel’s failure to stipulate to defendant’s convicted-felon status given that the prior convictions were not of the nature likely to inflame the jury’s passions and the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was strong). The nature of the prior offenses, and the extent to which the jury heard details of them, makes this case different from a case relied on by Chavez, Starling v. State , 285 Ga. App. 474, 646 S.E.2d 695 (2007).