(Emphasis added.) Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wn.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573, 577 (1967). See also Gossett v. Simonson, 243 Or. 16, 411 P.2d 277, 280 (1966), where the court stated that

She relies on Rice v. Garl, 2 Wn.2d 403, 98 P.2d 301 (1940); Carmin v. Port of Seattle, 10 Wn.2d 139, 116 P.2d 338 (1941). But even aside from the holding of Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wn.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573, 577 (1967), that "the applicability of a recognized exception to the general rule becomes a question of fact", a close inspection of the cases relied upon by appellant indicates that the threshold consideration for application of the exception is unsatisfied. If the place of employment, as here, is relatively fixed then travel to and from work is not within the scope of employment and the exception is inapplicable. Rice, supra, 98 P.2d at 304; accord, Carmin, supra, 116 P.2d at 344. The mere possibility that Cajka might be called upon to commute to this job at any hour does not alter the conclusion.

The rule in Washington is that a worker, under ordinary circumstances, is not in the course of employment while going to or from the employer's place of business. Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Department of Labor Indus., 77 Wn.2d 763, 466 P.2d 151 (1970); Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wn.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573 (1967); Superior Asphalt Concrete Co. v. Department of Labor Indus., supra.[1, 2] However, this court has said that the exception to the rule is that a worker is in the course of employment while going to or from work in a vehicle furnished by the employer as an incident to the employment pursuant to custom or contractual obligation, either express or implied. Aloha Lumber Corp. v. Department of Labor Indus., supra; Superior Asphalt Concrete Co., supra; Pearson v. Aluminum Co. of America, 23 Wn.2d 403, 161 P.2d 169 (1945). Furthermore, where there is an obligation to furnish transportation, it does not matter whether the employer performs the obligation by supplying its own vehicles or reimbursing employees for the use of their own vehicles.

He was traveling to the convention headquarters where he was attending meetings as a part of his employment. Loos v. Boston Shoe Co., 123 Cal.App.2d 564, 266 P.2d 884 (1954); Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wn.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573 (1967); Elder v. Cisco Constr. Co., 52 Wn.2d 241, 324 P.2d 1082 (1958); but see Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal.3d 956, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188, 471 P.2d 988 (1970) where employer held liable for injuries suffered by plaintiff when hit by employee returning from work; and by analogy, Northern Corp. v. Saari, 409 P.2d 845 (Alaska 1966) holding that in a workmen's compensation case the death of an employee killed in an accident while returning to camp after visiting a nearby air-base arose out of and in the course of his employment. In addition, Equitable seeks to narrow the scope of respondeat superior to those situations where the master has exercised control over the activities of employees.

¶ 18 The Colorado version of the going-and-coming rule provides that "an employee traveling from ... work to his home or other personal destination, after completing his day's work, cannot ordinarily be regarded as acting in the scope of his employment so as to charge the employer for the employee's negligence in the operation of the [employee's] car." Beeson , 43 Colo. App. at 507, 608 P.2d at 371 (quoting Balise v. Underwood , 71 Wash.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573, 577 (1967) ). ¶ 19 The rule has several exceptions, including when "the employee was engaged in an[ ] act connected to his work or [was] furthering [the employer's] interests" at the time of the injury-causing conduct.

Comparison of the former and current versions of the statute shows that the current version substitutes the phrase "the prosecuting agency" for "the prosecuting attorney or attorney general" in the former statute.City of Seattle v. Williams, 101 Wn.2d 445, 452-53, 680 P.2d 1051 (1984); see also Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wn.2d 331, 339-40, 428 P.2d 573 (1967). ¶2 Here, John Coppin did not make a jury demand until the morning of his trial.

Colorado follows the general rule that "an employee traveling from his place at work to his home or other personal destination, after completing his day's work, cannot ordinarily be regarded as acting within the scope of his employment so as to charge the employer for the employee's negligence in the operation of the latter's own car." Beeson v. Kelran Constructors, Inc., 43 Colo. App. 505, 608 P.2d 369, 371 (1979), cert. denied, March 24, 1980, quoting Balise v. Underwood, 428 P.2d 573, 577 (1967); see also Varsity Contractors and Home Ins. Co. v. Baca, 709 P.2d 55, 56 (Colo.App. 1985) (same principle followed in workmen's compensation context). Colorado courts have also recognized, however, that "the rule has many exceptions."

Under this principle, "a workman is not, under ordinary circumstances, in the course of employment while going to or from his employer's place of business." See id.; see also Balise v. Underwood, 428 P.2d 573, 576 (Wash. 1967) ("As a general rule, an employee traveling from the place of work to his home or other personal destination, after completing his day's work, cannot ordinarily be regarded as acting in the scope of his employment so as to charge the employer for the employee's negligence in the operation of the latter's own car."); Kaye v. Lowe's HIW, Inc., 242 P.3d 27, 34 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) ("Washington's 'going and coming' doctrine provides that an employee is not, under ordinary circumstances, acting within the scope of employment when traveling to or from work, thus protecting employers from vicarious liability in such circumstances.").

[¶ 16] Courts have universally acknowledged that, as a general rule, an employee is not within the scope of employment while commuting to and from work. See, e.g., Logan v. Phillips, 891 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Mo.Ct.App. 1995); Mosko v. Raytheon Co., 416 Mass. 395, 622 N.E.2d 1066, 1068 (1993); Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934, 935 (Utah 1989); Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wash.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573, 576-77 (1967); see also Ware v. Doane, 227 F.Supp.2d 169, 175 (D.Me.2002) (applying Maine law); see generally Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Employer's Liability far Negligence of Employee in Driving His or Her Own, Automobile, 27 A.L.R.5th 174 (1995 Supp. 2006). This rule is often called the "going and coming rule," e.g., Kornton v. Conrad, Inc., 119 Nev. 123, 67 P.3d 316, 317 (2003), a name also used for the related rule in workers' compensation law,Fournier v. Aetna, Inc., 2006 ME 71, ¶ 6, 899 A.2d 787, 789. This rule is consistent with the RESTATEMENT because while commuting an employee ordinarily is not subject to his employer's control and does not act with a purpose to serve the employer.

The mere fact that an employee is remunerated or paid by employers for time traveling to and from work does not place that employee within the "scope-of-employment" rule in a negligence case. State v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 1974, 111 Ariz. 130, 524 P.2d 951, 954; Heide v. T.C.I., Incorporated, 1973, 264 Or. 535, 506 P.2d 486, 489-491; Balise v. Underwood, 1967, 71 Wn.2d 331, 428 P.2d 573, 577. Contra, Luth v. Rogers and Babler Constr. Co., Alaska 1973, 507 P.2d 761. While we must concede that not all courts have seen eye-to-eye on this point, we are comfortable with our conclusion that the mere payment of travel remuneration without more, as in this case, does not bring an employee within the scope-of-employment rule so as to render the employer liable in the context of a negligence action. This rule we find to be consonant with the prior rulings of this court on the question and consonant as well with the concept of liability based on fault.