Opinion
Civil Action 21-1520
06-07-2022
JAMES BALDWIN, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, SCI ALBION; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA; and DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, Respondents.
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (the “Petition”) filed in the above-captioned case, ECF No. 1, be dismissed for failure to prosecute. To the extent that one is required, a certificate of appealability should be denied.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner James Baldwin (“Petitioner”) submitted his Petition for filing on October 25, 2021. In this Petition, Petitioner refers to his claim as “a second or subsequent habeas petition[.]” ECF No. 1 at 13. Petitioner did not submit a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) or the attendant payment of filing fee with the Petition. This Court issued a Deficiency Order on October 27, 2021 (the “Initial Order”) ordering the Petitioner (1) to pay the filing fee or move to proceed IFP; and (2) to either consent to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge or to request to proceed before a District Judge. The deadline for Petitioner to cure these deficiencies was November 29, 2021. ECF No. 2. Petitioner responded on November 8, 2021, but he did not pay the required filing fee nor move to proceed IFP. ECF No. 4. Additionally, Petitioner provided a consent form which both consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge and requested a District Judge. ECF No. 3.
On February 1, 2022, this Court issued a second Deficiency Order (the “Second Order”), again ordering Petitioner to correct deficiencies with the filing of his Petition. ECF No. 5. In that Order, Petitioner was advised that failure to comply would result in dismissal for failure to prosecute. Id. at 2. The deadline for Petitioner to cure the above deficiencies was extended to March 3, 2022. Id.
In the Second Order, Petitioner was informed that, to the extent that this Petition was second or successive, this Court would lack jurisdiction unless the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted Petitioner permission to proceed. Without that permission, the Petition would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ECF No. 5 at 2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). In a correspondence submitted to this Court on February 18, 2022, Petitioner stated that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had “denied permission for [his] second or subsequent habeas corpus [petition].” ECF No. 6. A review of the public docket indicates that on December 1, 2021, the Third Circuit denied permission for Petitioner to file a second or successive habeas petition. In re: Baldwin, No. 21-3004 (3d Cir. Dec. 1, 2021), ECF No. 7.
As of this date, Petitioner has not (1) paid the filing fee or properly moved to proceed IFP; or (2) properly consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge or requested to proceed before a District Judge.
B. DISCUSSION
In Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit set forth a six-factor balancing test to assist a court in determining whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The six factors are: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. The Poulis factors are not a “magic formula” which can determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d. Cir. 1984). Moreover, all six of the Poulis factors do not need to weigh in favor of dismissal for a court to dismiss a complaint. See C. T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 696 (3d Cir. 1988). Instead, the court must “properly consider and balance” each factor in light of the present facts. Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868). Application of the Poulis factors is appropriate in the context of habeas cases as well as to civil rights actions. Harlacher v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-0267, 2010 WL 1462494, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 1445552 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010) (applying Poulis to a habeas case).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that the Poulis factors should be evaluated, where possible, to “resolve doubt in favor of a decision on the merits.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 138. While dismissal of a complaint is considered a “last resort,” such an outcome is nevertheless “a sanction rightfully in the district courts' toolbox.” Id. at 132, 138.
The first Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the extent to which the Petitioner is personally responsible for the sanctionable conduct. See Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust, 29 F.3d 863, 873 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[I]n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal.”). Petitioner has received two Deficiency Orders and failed to comply with the clear instructions therein or to provide just cause for his failure to do so by the assigned date. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The second Poulis factor considers whether Petitioner's failure to comply with the Second Order has prejudiced the adverse party. Such prejudice can include “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. Prejudice can also be recognized as “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). This case is in its infancy, and Respondents have not been served. This Court cannot discern prejudice to any party. Therefore, this factor weighs neither for nor against dismissal.
The third Poulis factor asks whether Petitioner has a history of dilatoriness. Petitioner has failed to comply with the instructions and deadlines given in two consecutive Deficiency Orders. ECF Nos. 2 and 5. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fourth Poulis factor considers whether the Petitioner's conduct was willful or in bad faith. According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, willful behavior is “intentional or self-serving.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. Petitioner has failed to comply with two Deficiency Orders. Such failure to follow Court orders appears willful, barring any information which would suggest that the Petitioner is not receiving the orders. Petitioner has corresponded with the Court after the issuance of both Deficiency Orders. ECF Nos. 4 and 6. Therefore, his failure to comply with either order indicates an affirmative choice. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The fifth Poulis factor asks whether there are any available and effective alternatives to dismissal. Petitioner is proceeding pro se, and there is no indication on the record that monetary sanctions would be effective. See, e.g., Brennan v. Clouse, No. 11-146, 2012 WL 876228, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2012) (“Alternative sanctions, such as monetary penalties, are inappropriate as sanctions with indigent pro se parties.”) (citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 1184, 1191 (3d Cir. 2002)). Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The sixth and final Poulis factor requires that the Court consider the potential merit of Petitioner's claims. A claim will be deemed meritorious “when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. However, here, the evidence of record indicates that this case cannot proceed because the Third Circuit has denied permission for Petitioner to bring a second or successive habeas petition. In re: Baldwin, No. 21-3004 (3d Cir. Dec. 1, 2021), ECF No. 7. Therefore, the sixth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
On balance, this Court concludes that five of the six Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. As a result, this Court concludes that, on the present facts, dismissal is appropriate. A certificate of appealability should be denied, because jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000).
C. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition be dismissed due to Petitioner's failure to prosecute. To the extent that a certificate of appealability is required, the same should be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Respectfully submitted,