Opinion
Civil 3:96 CV 958 (AVC).
March 17, 2000.
RECOMMENDED RULING ON MOTION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
A motion to enforce a settlement agreement is pending in this case. The motion (Dkt.#40) should be granted. A judgment should enter enforcing the settlement agreement between the parties. The court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are set forth hereafter. Any party may timely seek review thereof; failure to do so may bar further review. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B); Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989).
Judgment entered November 12, 1999, dismissing this case "without prejudice" to move within 30 days to re-open if the settlement has not been consummated." Both sides have moved to reopen the judgment. The defendant's motion further seeks entry of "Judgment Upon Settlement." (Dkt. #40). The court understand this to be a motion to enforce a settlement agreement which should be granted.
I.
The plaintiff works as a tax corrections examiner for the State Department of Revenue Services. He brought this lawsuit seeking equitable relief and money damages, alleging that he was denied a promotion, harassed in the workplace, subjected to infliction of emotional distress, and retaliated against, all on account of his race, and in violation of Title VII of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the state and federal constitutions, and state law. A jury was selected, and trial was scheduled to begin before Judge Covello October 4, 1999 at 10:00 a.m.
The contours of plaintiff's claims are described in more detail in Judge Covello's September 23, 1998, ruling on defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #23).
An hour before the start of trial, the lawyers for both sides met with the magistrate judge for a settlement conference. The plaintiff was represented by Laura Lee A. Dorflinger, Esquire, his trial attorney. The defendant was represented by his trial lawyer, Assistant Attorney General Jonathan L. Ensign. Also in attendance on behalf of the defendant was Felicia S. Hoeniger, Esquire, an attorney with the Department of Revenue Services. The three lawyers conferred with the magistrate judge in his chambers. The plaintiff, himself, did not meet with the magistrate, but remained outside chambers, communicating with the court and the lawyers for the state through Attorney Dorflinger. As negotiations progressed, Attorney Dorflinger shuttled between the plaintiff and chambers, communicating the plaintiff's demands and relaying the state's position.
Eventually, an agreement was reached. Through counsel, in the presence of the magistrate judge, shortly before 10:00 a.m., the morning of October 4, 1999, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would be given his sought-after promotion and would be paid $27,000 in return for which he would withdraw not only the pending lawsuit, but all internal grievances which were then pending against his employer. Trial counsel thereupon repaired to Judge Covello's courtroom, where, in the presence of the plaintiff, they reported to Judge Covello that the case had been settled. The judge then discharged the jury.
II.
The plaintiff now takes the position that he never agreed to withdraw the roughly forty grievances that were pending as of October 4, 1999. He and his fiancee, Ms. Loretta Miller, who was with him during the settlement conference and his discussions with counsel, both have testified that withdrawal of these grievances was never discussed with Attorney Dorflinger. The court rejects this testimony and finds that withdrawal of the then-pending grievances was discussed with Attorney Dorflinger. In this regard, Ms. Dorflinger's affidavit states, "I discussed the terms of settlement with the plaintiff in depth and the plaintiff expressly stated to me that he would accept the $27,000 figure as well as the settlement terms requiring him to withdraw his numerous internal grievances with his defendant employer and regarding his promotion into another employment position with his defendant employer." (Dkt. #46; italics added).
Whether the court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement or should conduct an evidentiary hearing depends on the nature of the dispute. Murchison v. Grand Sypress Hotel Corporation, 13 F.2d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994). Although an evidentiary hearing may have been unnecessary in this case, id., citing Kukla v. Nat'l Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1973), a hearing was held nevertheless on March 8, 2000. Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1203 and n. 29 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Attorney Dorflinger represented the plaintiff diligently and effectively at the October 4, 1999, conference. She did not "forget" or "neglect" to mention withdrawal of the grievances during her discussions with the plaintiff. There was no failure of communication, nothing was "lost in the translation." As her affidavit attests, Attorney Dorflinger specifically recalls relating to plaintiff Baldwin the defendant's demand that all then-pending grievances be withdrawn as a condition to the settlement. His own attorney also remembers that plaintiff Baldwin agreed to this condition (Dkt. #46).
Plaintiff's professed non-assent to this term of the agreement conflicts not only with his attorney's sworn representations, but also with the very tenor of the October 4, 1999, settlement discussions. Plaintiff's case was not a strong one. Arguably, he is the state's best witness. But for Mr. Baldwin's willingness to withdraw all pending grievances, there would have been no settlement. The defendant offered $27,000 chiefly to "buy peace" and achieve some respite from the disruption plaintiff had inflicted on the workplace. Thus, the notion that withdrawal of the grievances was not discussed is preposterous.
III.
Plaintiff also argues that there was no "meeting of the minds" regarding the position to which he was to be promoted. This is not true. Extending plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, the most that can be said is that there was a fleeting misunderstanding about the title of the job to which he would be promoted. When plaintiff balked at the position the state reasonably believed he had agreed to, defense counsel promptly acceded to plaintiff's request and offered him the job he claimed he had agreed to. (Plaintiff now points to this good faith accession as bad faith, evidence that there was no agreement, because if there had been, he would have been held to it). Having gotten the job even he agrees he agreed to, the plaintiff now attempts to inject a whole new issue into his case: tenure.
At the October 4, 1999, conference defense counsel reasonably believed that plaintiff wanted to be a Tax Corrections Examiner II and, accordingly, agreed to promote him to that position. Several days later, it was reported to defense counsel that the plaintiff believed the agreement had been to promote him to the position of Revenue Examiner I. On November 2, 1999, yet another conference was held with the magistrate judge, at which time defense counsel acceded to plaintiff's demand that he be promoted to Revenue Examiner I.
Although it was neither agreed to nor discussed at any time prior thereto, when the state acceded to plaintiff's assertion that he had been promised a job as Revenue Examiner I, the plaintiff for the first time raised the question of the applicability of the 120 day probationary period that governs newly-promoted state employees. Not only did the plaintiff want to be promoted to the position of Revenue Examiner I, he wanted to be exempt from the 120 day probationary period. It apparently did not matter that such a working test period is called for in the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff appears to have admitted during his testimony at the March 8, 2000, evidentiary hearing, he is not entirely sure that he can do the job and, therefore, points to this as evidence that the probationary period should not apply to him.
"The plaintiff is a member of the Administrative and Residual Bargaining Unit and his terms and conditions of employment are governed by the Administrative and Residual Bargaining Unit Contract with the State of Connecticut." (Dkt. #44 ¶ 5). "Article 9, Section Two (b) of the Administrative and Residual Bargaining Unit Contract provides a four month working test period for all voluntary promotions." (Id. at ¶ 6).
Neither party to this case can undo the collective bargaining agreement. Both sides know this. They knew it on October 4, 1999. Thus, any promotion which they negotiated was within the context of the collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiff's pessimistic anticipation is not a reason for undoing an agreement that he entered into, but then decided against upon more reflection. The state's accession on November 4, 1999, to plaintiff's demand that he be made a Revenue Examiner I (instead of a Tax Corrections Examiner II as the defense counsel thought plaintiff had wanted to be) is not evidence of the non-existence of a contract as of October 4, 1999. Rather, it is evidence that the state made an extra effort to accomodate the plaintiff by giving him something beyond what he had bargained for and agreed to. That the state acceded to plaintiff's request to be a Revenue Examiner I does not require a further accession to plaintiff's demand that, despite his agreement, he be allowed to pursue his roughly 40 pre-October 4, 1999 grievances.
Nothing in the October 4, 1999, settlement agreement precludes the plaintiff from filing grievances after that date for post October 4, 1999, disputes. In fact, Anne Alling, the Human Resources Administrator for the Department of Revenue Services, testified at the hearing that, since November, 1999, plaintiff has filed six new grievances. Ms. Alling also testified that in her experience, she has never heard of a new promotion not being subject to a 120 day probationary work period.
In fact, in return for the promise of a promotion and $27,000, the plaintiff promised to settle this case and withdraw all grievances pending as of October 4, 1999. That agreement was struck prior to the discharge of the jury on the morning of trial. The court, as well as the state, relied on the plaintiff's promise. It is not too much to expect the plaintiff to abide by his word. The parties to contracts, and the public, have a right to expect that contractual obligations will be honored, even where it is easier to pretend those obligations do not exist.
IV.
"`An agreement to compromise and settle a claim, oral or written, may be enforced as any other contract.' The threshold determination is `whether as a matter of law such an agreement was reached between the parties.'" Allen v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 1985 WL 3048 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), citing Fustok v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 852, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). "Trial courts possess the inherent authority to enforce a settlement agreement and to enter judgment based on an agreement without a plenary hearing." Petty v. Timken, 849 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1988). Accord, Meetings Expositions, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 490 F.2d 714, 717 (2d Cir. 1974) ("district court had not only the power but the duty to enforce a settlement agreement which it had approved.")
The agreement to settle this case is not unfair. It is the product of arm's length negotiations in which plaintiff was competently represented by a diligent and effective attorney, who was fully prepared to try the case if necessary. The plaintiff settled the case because, at the time, he believed it was in his best interest to do so. That it no longer suits him to be bound by the promises he made through his then-lawyer does not alter the fact that he is still bound by them.
Plaintiff does not even appear to argue that the settlement is unfair. He instead seems to argue that the grievances were entirely separate from his lawsuit and, therefore, could not have been part of the settlement, and also that there was not a simultaneous meeting of the minds with regard to job title. There is no merit to either one of these contentions.
Plaintiff Baldwin's position is no better than that of the Title VII plaintiff in Petty v. Timken Corp., supra, where the court made the following observations:
It is undisputed that Timken made an offer of settlement, that the offer was communicated to Petty by his counsel, that Petty agreed to accept the settlement after conference with his attorney, and that Petty reaffirmed his acceptance in open court. Clearly, a settlement did exist. * * * *
When a litigant voluntarily accepts an offer of settlement, either directly or indirectly through the duly authorized actions of his attorney, the integrity of the settlement cannot be attacked on the basis of inadequate representation by the litigant's attorney. * * * *
Unless the resulting settlement is substantially unfair, judicial economy commands that a party be held to the terms of a voluntary agreement.
We certainly can see no basis for finding Petty's settlement with Timken unfair. Indeed, beyond a general claim that he sought a recovery in excess of one million dollars — a most unrealistic expectation in a Title VII case where relief is primarily equitable in nature — appellant offers little argument against the essential fairness of the settlement. At most, Petty appears to have had second thoughts about the level of his recovery. That does not, however, establish unfairness or justify setting aside an otherwise valid agreement. * * * *
A litigant who enters the judicial process through the agency of freely chosen counsel always assumes a certain risk that the result achieved will not be satisfactory. Defeated expectations do not, therefore, entitle the litigant to repudiate commitments made to opposing parties or to the court.849 F.2d at 133 (citations omitted). The plaintiff in this case made a deal, and then "got `cold feet.'" But this is "a condition for which the law provides no warming remedy." Reich v. Best Built Homes, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 47, 49 (W.D.N.Y. 1995), citing Glass v. Rock Island Refining Corp., 788 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1986) ("A party to a settlement cannot avoid the agreement merely because he subsequently believes the settlement insufficient.").
V.
A judgment should enter on the settlement agreement, which is as follows: effective October 4, 1999, the plaintiff is promoted to the position of Revenue Examiner I; the defendant shall pay the plaintiff $27,000; all grievances pending as of October 4, 1999 are withdrawn.
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 17th day of March, 2000.