Smithson v. Smithson, 37 Neb. 535, 56 N.W. 300, 40 Am.St.Rep. 504; Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 131 Neb. 724, 269 N.W. 818; State v. Westover, 107 Neb. 593, 186 N.W. 998. Such direct challenge may, at the option of the aggrieved party, be made either through a separate suit in equity, Kaufmann v. Drexel, 56 Neb. 229, 76 N.W. 559; Hard v. Hard, 51 Neb. 412, 70 N.W. 1122; Abbott v. Johnston, 93 Neb. 726, 141 N.W. 821; Pavlik v. Burns, 134 Neb. 175, 278 N.W. 149; Smithson v. Smithson, supra; or by a simple motion in the original case, Baldwin v. Burt, 54 Neb. 287, 74 N.W. 594; Howard Stove Furnace Co. v. Rudolf, 128 Neb. 665, 260 N.W. 189; Foster v. Foster, 111 Neb. 414, 196 N.W. 702; Hayes County v. Wileman, 82 Neb. 669, 118 N.W. 478; and that quite irrespective of the expiration of the term at which the challenged judgment was entered, or of the statute, R.S.Neb. 1943, § 25-2001 et seq., limiting the time after entry within which judgments may be attacked after term for certain designated errors or specifications of invalidity. That permissible flexibility of procedure in seeking an adjudication of the nullity of a judgment of a Nebraska court justifies the mention of Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U.S. 80, 25 L.Ed. 407.
They are valid between their parties and are void as against-- or voidable at the suit of-- those purchasers or creditors only who are hindered, delayed or defrauded. German National Bank v. Leonard, 40 Neb. 676, 59 N.W. 107; Baldwin v. Burt, 43 Neb. 245, 61 N.W. 601. Generally, too, prior secured creditors whose liens are of record and remain unimpaired by subsequent statutorily fraudulent conveyances can not complain of the conveyances since their rights can not be affected thereby.
McDONOUGH, Justice (dissenting). I am of the opinion that the restrictive motion to quash service of summons after judgment either will not lie (see Gregg v. Seawell, 85 Okla. 88, 204 P. 908; Dannenburg v. Powers, 182 Okla. 404, 77 P.2d 1142; Baldwin v. Burt, 54 Neb. 287, 74 N.W. 594), or if it may be entertained, then a ruling thereon is not an appealable order. In the latter instance the moving party, before he is entitled to review here of such order, must take the next step and move to set aside the judgment.
"contracts which are valid, except as against those in adverse interest, cannot be assailed by persons not prejudiced thereby." Baldwin v. Burt, 43 Neb. 245, 254 ( 61 N.W. 601). There is, I think, a clear distinction between a contract prohibited by statute, or which is void because against public policy, and a private contract such as is here considered.
"From the time the decree was entered it became the evidence of the facts which it recited, subject, of course, to an attack upon it for want of jurisdiction; but such an attack could only be directed against the decree and not against the evidence upon which it depended for its validity." Baldwin v. Burt, 54 Neb. 287, 74 N.W. 594. We therefore determine that if relief is sought against a judgment after term, the action must be directly against such judgment — either under the statutes, or in a court of equity to enjoin the enforcement thereof.