Opinion
No. HHB CV06 4009672
November 3, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Baldwin Estates, LLC, (plaintiff) appeals from a decision of the Southington Planning and Zoning Commission (commission) in which the commission denied an application by the plaintiff for a resubdivision approval. On September 13, 2005, the plaintiff filed an application (application) for the resubdivision of property owned by it located on the east side of West Street and the south side of Hart Street, consisting of 6.9 acres, more or less, in the Town of Southington, Connecticut. (ROR 1.) The resubdivision application would allow for a residential development consisting of single-family and two-family (duplex) homes. The original application created a new cul de sac approximately nine hundred feet in length. This road connected with Hart Street, east of West Street. The commission opened a public hearing on the application on October 18, 2005, which hearing was continued to November 15, 2005, December 6, 2005 and January 17, 2006, when it was closed. (ROR 8, 14, 22, 31.) Prior to the close of the public hearing, the plaintiff submitted revised trials. (ROR 34.) These plans were in response to concerns by commission staff and supporting departments. One of the changes reduced the length of the cul de sac. This allowed for the addition of open space. It also meant that two lots would exit directly onto West Street, rather than the new cul de sac. (Supplemental ROR 1 p. 5.) On January 17, 2006, the commission voted to deny the subdivision by a vote of four in favor and three opposed. (ROR 30.) Notice of the commission's denial was published in the Meriden Record Journal on January 25, 2006. (ROR 32.)
The parties agree that the only difference between a subdivision and a resubdivision is that a resubdivision requires a public hearing as part of the approval process.
The plaintiff has appealed from the decision of the commission, claiming that, in denying the resubdivision application, the commission's action:
(a) was made in violation of the standards and scope of authority granted to the commission under Connecticut General Statutes, Sections 8-26 et seq.;
(b) was made in disregard and in violation of the standards set forth in section 7-01 of the Southington Subdivision Regulations;
(c) was unsupported by the record;
(d) was clearly erroneous and without factual basis in view of the record; and
(e) was arbitrary and capricious and characterized by an abuse of discretion.
The plaintiff claims to be aggrieved by the decision on the commission. The plaintiff is the record owner of the subject property. (Exhibit 1.) As the record owner, the plaintiff is aggrieved by the decision of the commission pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes, Section 8-8(a)(1) and can pursue this appeal pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes, Section 8-8(b).
In reviewing a subdivision application, the commission acts in an administrative capacity and not as a legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial agency. Reed v. Planning Zoning Commission, 208 Conn. 431, 433, 544 A.2d 1213 (1988). The commission, therefore, "has no discretion or choice but to approve a subdivision if it conforms to the regulations adopted for its guidance." Id. "If [the subdivision plan] does not conform as required, the plan may be disapproved." Forest Construction Co. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 669, 675, 236 A.2d 917 (1967). The commission's action is to be sustained if any one of the reasons stated is sufficient to support its decision. See Property Group, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 226 Conn. 684, 697, 628 A.2d 1277 (1993).
"Conclusions reached by the commission must be upheld by the trial court if they are reasonably supported by the record. The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of issues of fact are matters solely within the province of the agency. The question is not whether the trial court would have reached the same conclusion, but whether the record before the agency supports the decision reached." Calandro v. Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 439, 440, 408 A.2d 229 (1979). "The evidence, however, to support any such reason must be substantial . . ." Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency, supra, 540. "This so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judicial review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred . . . [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury . . . [It] is a compromise between opposing theories of broad or de novo review and restricted review or complete abstention. It is broad enough and capable of sufficient flexibility in its application to enable the reviewing court to correct whatever ascertainable abuses may arise in administrative adjudication. On the other hand, it is review of such breadth as is entirely consistent with effective administration . . . [It] imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . and to provide a more restrictive standard of review than standards embodying review of weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous action . . . [I]t is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 541; Property Group, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 226 Conn. 684, 697 (1993) 628 A.2d 1277.
Prior to the vote denying the application, a motion was made to approve the application, which was denied after discussion. The motion to deny the application was originally predicated on the impact of the traffic at an existing intersection adjacent to the proposed development. (Hart and West Streets.) After the motion to deny was seconded, the Town Attorney suggested that the conversations on the failed motion to approve be incorporated into the motion to deny the application. The proponent of the motion to deny the application agreed to this request. The discussion on the motion to approve the application was mainly about the traffic at the nearby intersection. However, one commissioner was concerned about the driveway from the proposed resubdivision onto West Street. (ROR 31 pp 15-22.) On January 31, 2006, the Town Planner advised the plaintiff, by letter, that its application had been denied. The only reasons in the letter given for the denial were the conditions at the existing intersection of Hart and West Streets. (ROR 33.) It is significant to note that the lots which front directly on West Street were created in response to suggestions by the Town Planner that the cul de sac be shortened. The original proposal of a longer cul de sac had all of the new lots fronting on the new proposed street. (Supplemental ROR 1 p. 2.)
The property currently has a house located on it, which has a driveway leading onto West Street. The new proposal would demolish the existing house and two duplexes would be built on the new lots. They would be served by a single common driveway. (Supplemental ROR 1 p. 4.)
In Sowin Associates v. Planning Zoning Commission, 23 Conn.App. 370, 580 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 832 583 A.2d 131 (1990), the appellate court addressed the consideration of offsite traffic concerns when reviewing a subdivision application. The court held: "[B]ecause the plaintiff's land is located in a residential zone and its plan was to use the property for residential purposes, the commission could not weigh offsite traffic concerns, municipal services required by the development, property values, or the general harmony of the district when deciding whether to approve the plaintiff's subdivision application. Id., 375, citing TLC Development, Inc. v. Planning Zoning Commission, 215 Conn. 527, 532-33, 577 A.2d 288 (1990). In Friedman v. Planning Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 262, 266, 608 A.2d 1178 (1992) our Supreme Court clarified its position on offsite traffic concerns, at least with regard to site plans. The court stated that special traffic consequences could be examined "when the applicable zoning regulations permit it."
The Southington Subdivision Regulations do not require a traffic study addressing the impact of the proposed development upon the street system in the area. (Exhibit 2.) As a result it was improper to deny the application based upon traffic concerns at the existing nearby intersection. The driveway onto West Street should not be relied on by the commission as a reason for denial when the written reasons for denial do not include this concern. Where the commission has formally stated the reasons for its decision, the court should not go beyond the official collective statement of the commission. Protect Hamden/North Haven v. Planning and Zoning, 220 Conn. 527, 544 (1991) 600 A.2d 757. The minutes of the discussion by the commission members prior to the vote do not represent the formal, collective decision of the commission. Protect Hamden/North Haven v. Planning and Zoning, supra, 546 n. 15.
Accordingly the plaintiff's appeal is sustained and the decision of the commission denying the application is hereby reversed. CT Page 20418