The damage to their right to exercise their revocable license was a damage which the law does not recognize as an injury to their property. Walker Ice Co. v. American Steel Wire Co. 185 Mass. 463, 484, 485. Handforth v. Maynard, 154 Mass. 414. Richards v. Gauffret, 145 Mass. 486. Balcom v. McQuesten, 65 N.H. 81. Ottawa Gas-Light Coke Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ill. 598. It follows that all the exceptions, except the one taken to the failure of the judge to charge that "The plaintiffs cannot in any event recover for any ice on the Bryant land," must be overruled; and the exception to such refusal must be sustained.

" Where A. owns a parcel of land covered with water and gives B. a license to cut ice on the water, the land and the ice forming on the water continue to be A's, and if any injury is done to either it is an injury suffered by A. on his property and he alone can sue for it. All that B. has is a dispensation which excuses him from being a trespasser if he cuts ice on A's land. He has no right of property in the ice and therefore has no standing in court to complain that it is injured. The cases of Balcom v. McQuesten, 65 N.H. 81, and Ottawa Gas-Light Coke Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ill. 598, are direct authorities to the effect that a licensee, even while his license is unrevoked, has no right of action for injury to the property in question; and to the same effect see Holford v. Bailey, 13 Q.B. 426, 446; Clark v. Close, 43 Iowa, 92. It may seem hard that the plaintiff who has secured a right to cut ice so far as an oral contract founded on a valuable consideration could give it, and who has gone to the expense of preparing to cut the ice, should have no remedy for the destruction of the ice by the defendant turning hot water into the pond which, for the purposes of this discussion, I assume it had no right to do.