Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5109-12T4
05-01-2014
BISMALA BAKSH, Plaintiff, v. AKSHAY PATEL, YAMANI NAGESHWARARAO, ARUN SPIRAMINENI, SOUTH PLAINFIELD DAY CARE T/A CIRCLE OF LIFE ADULT CENTER, SELECTIVE INSURANCE CO., and GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., Defendants. BHAGWANTEE SAMAROO, Plaintiff, v. YAMANI NAGESHWARARAO, ARUN SPIRAMINENI, AKSHAY PATEL, SHIMBA LLC, SOUTH PLAINFIELD DAY CARE T/A CIRCLE OF LIFE ADULT DAY CENTER, Defendants. HUIMIN WU and KOU TUNG TENG, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. YAMINI NAGESHWARARAO, ARUN SPIRAMINENI, SHIMBA LLC, and SELECTIVE INSURANCE CO., Defendants, and AKSHAY PATEL, and SOUTH PLAINFIELD DAY CARE T/A CIRLCE OF LIFE ADULT CENTER, Defendants-Respondents.
Richard J. Hollawell argued the cause for appellants (Console & Hollawell, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Hollawell, on the brief). Paul Romano argued the cause for respondent South Plainfield Day Care T/A Circle of Life Adult Center (Howarth & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Jerald J. Howarth and Purnima D. Ramlakhan, on the brief). Respondent Akshay Patel has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-3860-10.
Richard J. Hollawell argued the cause for appellants (Console & Hollawell, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Hollawell, on the brief).
Paul Romano argued the cause for respondent South Plainfield Day Care T/A Circle of Life Adult Center (Howarth & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Jerald J. Howarth and Purnima D. Ramlakhan, on the brief).
Respondent Akshay Patel has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Huimin Wu and Kou Tung Teng appeal from the grant of summary judgment dismissing the seventeenth count of their second amended complaint against defendant South Plainfield Day Care t/a Circle of Life Adult Center (Circle of Life). After careful consideration of the motion record and appropriate legal standards, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Melvin Gelade's March 22, 2013 oral decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A). We add the following comments.
Plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, both sustained serious injuries when they were riding in a van that was involved in an intersectional accident in South Plainfield on April 2, 2010. At the time of the accident, plaintiffs were clients of Circle of Life, an adult daycare center, and its employee, Akshay Patel, was driving the van. The collision occurred when a vehicle operated by defendant Yamini Nageshwararao entered the intersection against the traffic signal.
On March 21, 2011, plaintiffs filed suit against both drivers alleging negligent operation. Plaintiffs also sued Circle of Life, claiming it was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee, Patel. By leave granted, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on September 12, 2012, wherein they asserted, in count seventeen, on the date of plaintiffs' accident, Circle of Life was in violation of numerous provisions of N.J.A.C. 8:43F applicable to adult daycare centers; because of these violations, plaintiffs "should not have been in the care and custody of [d]efendant on April 2, 2010 and they would not have been in the motor vehicle on that date."
Five months later, Circle of Life moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of plaintiffs' claims asserting liability based upon administrative code violations. After hearing argument on March 22, 2013, Judge Gelade granted defendant's motion, finding that plaintiffs made
no allegation that there was anything improper about the van itself, or the driver of the van, or the permit for the van, or anything else that somehow put this van on the road when it shouldn't have been on the road.
. . . .
[T]he violations themselves have absolutely nothing to do with the causing in any way, directly or indirectly, the occurrence itself.
There's no possibility that any rational jury . . . could have found that . . . the violations of the code . . . created [an enhanced] risk of having an accident.
Two months later, plaintiffs settled their case against Nageshwararao, and agreed to dismiss all remaining claims against Circle of Life and Patel on the condition they could pursue their appeal of the dismissal of claims based on administrative code violations. This appeal followed.
We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and apply the same standard governing the trial court. Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010). Pursuant to Rule 4:46, we "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Applying this standard, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court's order dismissing the remaining count of plaintiffs' complaint.
In Reynolds v. Gonzalez, 172 N.J. 266, 284 (2002), the Supreme Court reviewed proximate cause-of-injury principles, explaining the fundamental aspects of the burden of production that a plaintiff bears:
One of the underlying principles of tort law is that "an actor's conduct must not only be tortious in character but it must also be a legal cause of the invasion of another's interest." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 9 [comment] a (1965) . . . . It follows from that principle that the issue of a defendant's liability cannot be presented to the jury simply because there is some evidence of negligence. "There must be evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom showing a proximate causal relation between defendant's negligence, if found by the jury," and the resulting injury. Germann v. Matriss, 55 N.J. 193, 205 (1970).
While plaintiffs correctly assert a violation of a statute or regulation "may be considered by a jury together with all of the evidence in determining issues of negligence[,]" this proposition is "subsumed by the overriding principle that the . . . violation, to be evidential, must be causally related to the happening of the accident[.]" Mattero v. Silverman, 71 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 1961), certif. denied, 36 N.J. 305 (1962). Such linkage was lacking in Mattero where the defendant sought to admit information the plaintiff was not a licensed driver, but merely had his learner's permit, and was driving in violation of a statute requiring those with permits to drive only with licensed drivers. Id. at 6-7. In holding this evidence inadmissible, we noted the lack of any other evidence of the plaintiff's inexperience, id. at 10; it would be "entirely conjectural or speculative" to infer plaintiff's inexperience was the proximate cause of the accident, ibid.; and the jury should have assessed the "plaintiff's contributory negligence solely on the basis of the manner in which he operated his vehicle at the time of the accident." Ibid. As we have stated:
Foreseeability in the proximate cause context relates to remoteness rather than the existence of a duty. . . . The issue of a defendant's liability is not entitled to be presented to a jury simply because there is some evidence of negligence; there must
be evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom showing a proximate causal relationship between defendant's negligence, if found by the jury, and the resulting injury.
[Sanchez v. Indep. Bus Co., Inc., 358 N.J. Super. 74, 84 (App. Div. 2003).]
The linkage found lacking in Mattero is similarly lacking as to plaintiffs' allegations of violations of adult daycare regulations. The record contains no evidence any of the alleged violations was a proximate cause of the accident. Although proximate cause is ordinarily a jury issue, it may be ruled on as a matter of law when reasonable minds could not differ. Fleuhr v. City of Cape May, 159 N.J. 532, 543 (1999) (citation omitted). Accordingly, it was entirely proper for Judge Gelade to conclude plaintiffs' accident and injuries were not a foreseeable consequence of defendant's alleged violations of adult daycare regulations.
Therefore, we agree with Judge Gelade that no reasonable trier of fact could find any alleged administrative code violations were a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs' remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION