Bakos v. Bakos

7 Citing cases

  1. Flaherty v. Flaherty

    128 So. 3d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 3 times
    Concluding the prenuptial agreement was the product of duress where the husband gave the wife an edited version of the agreement at the Las Vegas airport, at 11:30 p.m., the night before a destination wedding, and the wife spent the next several hours frantically trying to find a notary and never read the agreement prior to signing it

    The motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement was heard in December 2009. The court heard testimony from the parties, their respective witnesses, and their attorneys and ruled that the former wife signed the prenuptial agreement under duress and declared it voidable, making it subject to the equitable defenses of ratification and laches. See Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257, 1259–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Thereafter, the court denied the motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement because the former “wife's inaction” after being notified by her attorney of the inequity of the agreement operated as a ratification of the agreement. The court also found that the former wife's more than six-year delay in challenging the prenuptial agreement constituted laches.

  2. Bates v. Bates

    No. 3D19-1884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2022)

    These factual circumstances, considered in tandem with the other evidence of record discussed at length in the panel opinion, were more than sufficient to support the decision by the trial court. See Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Ziegler v. Natera, 279 So.3d 1240, 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Hjortaas v. McCabe, 656 So.2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Paris v. Paris, 412 So.2d 952, 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)

  3. Bates v. Bates

    345 So. 3d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)

    These factual circumstances, considered in tandem with the other evidence of record discussed at length in the panel opinion, were more than sufficient to support the decision by the trial court. See Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ; Ziegler v. Natera, 279 So. 3d 1240, 1243 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) ; Hjortaas v. McCabe, 656 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ; Paris v. Paris, 412 So. 2d 952, 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ; Flaherty v. Flaherty, 128 So. 3d 920, 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) ; see also Garcia v. Soto, 337 So. 3d 355, 363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (Artau, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Bueno v. Workman, 20 So. 3d 993, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ) (" Bueno explained that ‘it would be inappropriate’ to ‘employ the tipsy coachman rule where [the] lower court [had] not made factual findings on [the fraud] issue[.]’

  4. Ziegler v. Natera

    279 So. 3d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was the product of duress where the husband "threatened life-altering consequences, by imperiling their shared, long-term plan to begin life anew with their children to the United States"; specifically, the day before the wedding in Venezuela, "the husband threatened to cancel the ceremony if the wife did not sign the agreement, and advised her that a failure to obtain the marriage certificate on the planned date would thwart the couple's imminent plan to emigrate to the United States"

    We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii) c. "We review a trial court's determination of the voidability of an antenuptial agreement for competent, substantial evidence." Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Simzer v. Simzer, 514 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) ). "[T]he findings of the trial court come to this court clothed with a presumption of correctness[,] and will not be disturbed absent a showing that there was no competent evidence to sustain them." Baker v. Baker, 394 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (citations omitted); see also Schreiber v. Schreiber, 795 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ; Snedaker v. Snedaker, 660 So. 2d 1070, 1072-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

  5. O'Malley v. Freeman

    241 So. 3d 204 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that a client's post-coma conversations with his attorney about the client's lawsuit were insufficient to ratify a contingency fee agreement that the client's mother had signed while he was in a coma

    Contingent fee agreements that do not comply with the regulations are "void as against the public interest." Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis , 668 So.2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1995) ; see also Bakos v. Bakos , 950 So.2d 1257, 1259–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (noting that a void contract cannot be ratified). Even if the agreement at issue here was merely voidable, Appellant did not ratify the agreement.

  6. Simon v. Simon

    91 So. 3d 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

    A postnuptial agreement is subject to interpretation like any other contract. See, e.g., Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257, 1259–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). “The trial court's interpretation of a contract is a matter of law subject to a de novo standard of review.” See Chipman v. Chipman, 975 So.2d 603, 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

  7. Chipman v. Chipman

    975 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 22 times

    A postnuptial agreement is subject to interpretation like any other contract. See, e.g., Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257, 1259-60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The trial court's interpretation of a contract is a matter of law subject to a de novo standard of review.