Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. 37-2008-00053666-CU-FR-NC, William S. Dato, Judge.
O'ROURKE, J.
Simona Bakker appeals from a judgment following a bench trial on her conversion action against Christine Libs in which the trial court awarded Bakker $11,339.17 in damages under Civil Code section 3336. Bakker contends the court misapplied section 3336 and relevant law in reaching its decision on damages. She further contends the court erroneously omitted interest and prevailing party costs in its judgment. We affirm.
Libs was sued individually and as trustee of the Christine A. Libs Trust.
All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We take most of the background facts from the trial court's statement of decision. In December 2005, Libs and Bakker entered into a one-year lease agreement for space under a hay storage facility on Libs's Oceanside ranch. The parties agreed Bakker, a woodworker, could use the space — essentially a metal roof with pole supports and no sides — and that she would construct a woodshop facility using the roof for cover. The parties agreed the shop building would be treated as personal property and that Bakker would have the right to remove it and its contents at the end of the lease.
In late November 2006, Bakker entered into an agreement to sell her woodworking business to Paul and Tammy Rogers, who negotiated a new one-year lease with Libs. Bakker, Libs and the Rogerses understood the Rogerses would essentially replace Bakker as Libs's lessee and the owner of the shop and its contents, and that they would continue to operate the woodworking business in the same location.
Within a few months of taking over, disputes arose between Bakker and the Rogerses concerning the Rodgerses' ability to obtain a city business license, resulting in a lawsuit by Bakker against the Rogers. By March 2007, the Rogerses stopped paying rent, and Libs served a three-day notice to pay rent or quit. Paul Rodgers packed up some of the shop's contents, locked the door and told Libs he was leaving. He also told Libs there had been a small fire in the building involving a compressor motor. He and Libs did not discuss what to do about the woodshop structure or its remaining contents. Using a locksmith, Libs gained access to the building. She boarded up an open window and used lumber in the shop to reinforce portions of a second story loft.
In January 2008, Bakker and the Rogerses settled their lawsuit and rescinded their purchase transaction. Thereafter, Bakker and Libs communicated with one another and engaged in at least one phone call in early February 2008, leaving Bakker with the impression that Libs believed the building belonged to her. However, days later, Libs e-mailed Bakker, informing her she had no interest in buying or otherwise keeping the building.
On April 28, 2008, Bakker sued Libs for conversion and other causes of action. At some point, Bakker requested permission to enter Libs's ranch to inspect the building and inventory its contents, but Libs's attorney in July 2008 advised Bakker that Libs had leased the building to a third party and might not be able to comply.
The matter proceeded to a bench trial, after which the trial court found Libs had converted Bakker's building and its contents. In February 2010, it filed its proposed statement of decision, in which it found there was no value to the converted building in view of evidence that dismantling, reassembling, and bringing the building to current codes was more than its asserted value. Bakker thereafter filed a request for a final statement of decision and for modification of the court's proposed statement of decision. She sought to "add a few material findings of fact to the proposed statement of decision" and also "apply relevant statutory provisions, case law, and other legal authorities that apply to the issue of conversion" and the relevant measure of damages. Specifically, she pointed to evidence she had presented on the question of the building's value and argued she was entitled to damages of $59,000 for the building's undepreciated value, in addition to estimated profits made by Libs in renting the building and prejudgment interest from March 2007. Bakker asserted that to award her zero damages would be contrary to section 3336. Bakker also argued the court should accept her list of valuations for the remaining personal property, and that Libs had accepted those values by failing to object to the list.
In its final statement of decision and judgment, the trial court found Bakker was entitled to damages in the measure of "the reasonable value of the converted property plus interest from the date of the conversion" under section 3336. With regard to the building, the court modified its decision to indicate that value was determined by what a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller. It acknowledged Bakker claimed the building's value was $59,000 at the time of conversion and Libs presented testimony from a general contractor indicating that the cost of dismantling, reassembling, and bringing the building up to current building codes was more than $59,000. In view of this evidence, the court concluded Bakker "presented insufficient evidence to establish that a willing and informed buyer would pay anything for the building." As for the building's contents, the court arrived at a total damage award of $11,339.17. It awarded interest on those damages from the date of the filing of the lawsuit to the date of the judgment.
Bakker appeals from the judgment awarding damages, and from the order denying her request that the court modify its proposed statement of decision.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of Trial Court's Statement of Decision
Though Bakker purports to appeal the trial court's order denying her request for modification of its tentative decision, in her opening brief she does not identify any material issues or ultimate facts left unaddressed by the court's final statement of decision, nor does she address the effect, if any, of her objections on our appellate review.
" '[Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 634 applies when a statement of decision fails to resolve or is ambiguous as to a controverted issue, and the omission or ambiguity is brought to the court's attention. In such a case, "it shall not be inferred on appeal... that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to those facts or on that issue."... However, the trial court is not required to respond point by point to issues posed in a request for a statement of decision. "The court's statement of decision is sufficient if it fairly discloses the court's determination as to the ultimate facts and material issues in the case." ' " (Pannu v. Land Rover North America, Inc. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1314, fn. 12.) The trial court is not required to make an express finding of fact on every factual matter controverted at trial, where the statement of decision sufficiently disposes of all the basic issues in the case. (In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 736–737, fn. 15.) Further, "[t]he main purpose of an objection to a proposed statement of decision is not to reargue the merits, but to bring to the court's attention inconsistencies between the court's ruling and the document that is supposed to embody and explain that ruling." (Heaps v. Heaps (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 286, 292.)
Here, Bakker's objections went to the legal basis for the trial court's decision and did not present deficiencies concerning the court's findings of ultimate facts. We have no basis to conclude the statement of decision did not sufficiently address the ultimate facts and material issues. Accordingly, in assessing Bakker's contentions, we will imply findings to support the judgment where appropriate. (Ibid., quoting In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.)
II. Award of Damages for Conversion of Bakker's Building and Its Contents
Bakker contends the trial court misapplied section 3336 in arriving at the amount of damages for Libs's conversion of her woodworking building and its contents.
A. Measure of Conversion Damages
Section 3336 provides: "The detriment caused by the wrongful conversion of personal property is presumed to be: [¶] First — The value of the property at the time of the conversion, with the interest from that time, or, an amount sufficient to indemnify the party injured for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act complained of and which a proper degree of prudence on his part would not have averted; and [¶] Second — A fair compensation for the time and money properly expended in pursuit of the property."
Section 3336 establishes alternative measures of damage. (Moreno v. Greenwood Auto Center (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 201, 209; Lueter v. State of California (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1302.) "The first alternative is to compensate for the value of the property at the time of conversion with interest from the time of the taking. The second alternative is compensation in a sum equal to the amount of loss legally caused by the conversion and which could have been avoided with a proper degree of prudence." (Moreno, at p. 209.) "As a general rule, the value of the converted property is the appropriate measure of damages, and resort to the alternative occurs only where a determination of damages on the basis of value would be manifestly unjust. [Citation.] Accordingly, a person claiming damages under the alternative provision must plead and prove special circumstances that require a measure of damages other than value." (Lueter, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1302.)
The decision concerning the converted property's value is within the province of the trier of fact. (Wade v. Markwell & Co. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 410, 432.) Competent evidence of value may be had from testimony of the property owner, whether or not that person is generally familiar with such values. (Id. at p. 431; see also Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 908, 921.) "Also, 'testimony as to cost of goods is a circumstance tending to show value.' [Citation.] Such evidence may be taken into consideration, along with other circumstances such as the extent of the use of the property and its condition and depreciation, in order to determine the subsequent value of the property and establish the loss sustained as the result of an unlawful conversion.... The 'amount of compensation... must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, to be ascertained and adjudged after consideration of all the facts and circumstances established by the evidence in the case.' " (Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal.App.2d at pp. 431-432; Schroeder, at p. 921 [trier of fact decides the credit and weight of property owner's testimony regarding value].)
" 'Whatever the proper measure of damages may be, in a given case, the recovery therefore is still subject to the fundamental rule that damages which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent, or merely possible cannot serve as a legal basis for recovery.' " (Lueter v. State of California, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1302.) Yet, once a plaintiff has proved the cause and existence of damage, recovery will not be denied because the damages are difficult of ascertainment. (Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 920-921.) " 'Liability cannot be evaded because damages cannot be measured with exactness.' " (Id. at p. 921.)
B. Bakker Has Not Demonstrated Error in the Trial Court's Finding of Zero Value in the Building at the Time of Conversion
Bakker argues she presented testimony under two methods of determining the building's value: an "opinion of a buyer" valuation method and a cost of materials and labor valuation method. With respect to the first method, Bakker points out that Paul Rogers, who had agreed at one point to purchase the building, opined it was worth at least $59,000. Bakker further maintains her evidence showed the building was worth $63,787.10 under the second, cost of materials and labor, valuation method. She argues the court did not apply a cost method under which extent of use and depreciation would be admissible, and it erred by allowing deductions for the estimated cost of disassembling, removing, and reassembling the building.
In the record before us, the only trial testimony concerning the building's alleged value is from Paul Rogers, who acknowledged he had estimated the building's value to be $59,000 based on an amount Bakker told him she had spent on materials to construct it. The record also contains documentary exhibits that Bakker claims demonstrate that the cost of materials to build the building was $42,787.10. On appeal, Bakker maintains her "labor construction costs" were between $20,000 and $25,000. The latter assertion as to cost of labor, however, is unaccompanied by any record citation. We disregard facts unaccompanied by record citations. (McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 947 ["Statements of fact that are not supported by references to the record are disregarded by the reviewing court"].) Further, Bakker's receipts for materials are from a 2005-2006 time frame. The trial court was entitled to give little weight to Bakker's testimony (if any) and evidence concerning construction costs, as those would not reflect the value of the building at the time of conversion, which, as we explain more fully below, occurred in April 2008, well after the structure was built.
But the clerk's transcript reveals that this was not the sole evidence pertaining to the structure's value. Bakker has provided us with an incomplete appellate record. Based on the minute orders appearing in the clerk's transcript on appeal, trial proceedings took place on December 2, 2009, and December 3, 2009, during which the court heard Bakker's testimony, heard Libs testify in her defense and on cross-examination, and apparently considered the testimony of other witnesses. Bakker did not designate those proceedings for the reporter's transcript on appeal. Significantly, the record omits the trial testimony of Libs's expert general contractor, Joe Vosmik, on whose opinion the trial court relied in finding the structure had zero value. Thus, unlike Myers v. Stephens (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 104, on which Bakker relies, in which the parties agreed the home in question was worth $250 (id. at pp. 116-117), the trial court in this case determined the structure's value from conflicting evidence.
The reporter's transcript of the parties' closing arguments suggests that expert Vosmik, a general contractor, testified one could not obtain a building permit for the existing structure, which suffered from building code violations and fire hazards, and that it would cost $25,000 to bring the building up to code. The trial court stated that its trial notes reflected Vosmik testified that the value of the wood making up the structure was between $6,000 and $10,000, and the cost of disassembling the structure was $24,000, "which would be part of the cost that anybody who was buying it would have to incur in order to make it usable."
Bakker does not discuss or challenge Vosmik's qualifications or testimony, and she has not presented any meaningful analysis demonstrating how the court erred by relying on a valuation method that took into account the cost of removing the structure and reassembling it in accordance with building codes upon another property. Rather, she states that when the value of converted property is determined by what a willing and informed buyer would pay, "there is no depreciation, nor credit allowed for cost of removal, repairs and related expenses that the defendant might incur to correct any problems." This assertion is not accompanied by authority.
Also unaccompanied by authority is Bakker's assertion that the court caused "self-enrichment" to Libs and "gross injustice" to her by "totally ignoring the profit the defendant made by renting the subject building to third parties for almost three years." Bakker does not demonstrate that she was entitled to any rental proceeds as "an amount sufficient to indemnify [her] for the loss which is the natural, reasonable and proximate result of the wrongful act... " (§ 3336; cf. Myer v. Stephens, supra, 233 Cal.App.2d at pp. 117-118 [trial court did not err in arriving at a damages figure of $3,040 for a converted house based on the plaintiff's testimony concerning the cost of moving and renovating the home and its resale value, resulting in anticipated lost profits that were within the range of those amounts].) Nor is there evidence in the record to support any contention that Bakker was poised or authorized to rent the building.
As we have explained, the trial court was entitled to rely on all facts and circumstances in determining the converted structure's value as of April 2008, and it alone assessed the weight and credibility of the witnesses, an evaluation to which we must defer. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631; see Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1065.) The present case involves a structure that had been placed upon leased land. We infer the trial court concluded — apparently in part based on Vosmik's testimony — that any use of that structure, and consequently its value, depended on its removal to another location. Consequently, the court reasonably took into account Vosmik's testimony concerning the expenses of disassembling and relocating the structure, including the cost of ensuring it met applicable building codes.
The fact Bakker presented Paul Rogers's opinion of value does not compel reversal. Given the conflicting evidence on the question of valuation, our task on appeal would normally be to decide whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that the building had zero value. (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 500-501.) This review "begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the trial court's factual determinations" whether express or implied. (Id. at p. 501.) Even if Rogers's opinion of value was competent evidence, it was countered by other evidence from which the court reasonably inferred that a willing buyer would find no value to the structure whose use required removal and reassembly at a cost exceeding the salvage value of its parts.
In view of the incomplete record, we rely on the principle that Bakker as the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error by an adequate record, and in the absence of a contrary showing in the record, this court will draw all presumptions in favor of the trial court's action. (Bennett v. McCall (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 122, 127.) " '[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were presented.' " (Ibid.) Based on the status of the record, we are unable to disturb the trial court's factual finding. Nor have we been presented with authority persuading us that the court erred as a matter of law in relying on Libs's expert's opinion to reach a decision on the structure's value. Bakker has not met her burden of demonstrating prejudicial error requiring reversal.
C. Value of the Building's Contents
With regard to the building's contents, the trial court arrived at total damages of $11,339.17. It accepted Bakker's estimates for items left in the workshop (lumber and new furniture), awarded 85 percent of the new value of some unused equipment (a roll-up door and pocket-hole drill), and applied a 50 percent discount factor to used items (exhaust fans, racks, electrical materials, a dust collector, work benches and a pallet jack). Bakker contends the court erred by substituting her evidence regarding the value of those items for its own, by "randomly reducing the value of various items" and failing to determine value as of the date of conversion. She argues the only competent evidence of each converted item's value was her list, showing a $13,880.43 combined value.
The trial court found in its statement of decision that as to the roll-up door and pocket-hole drill, of which Bakker sought full value, "a modest discount would be necessary were these items to be sold at this point...." We do not read the italicized portion of the statement of decision to refer to the date of the statement of decision, but to the date of conversion referenced earlier by the court in its order. Additionally, the trial court's finding is supported by the testimony of Paul Rogers, who stated he had purchased a large roll up door from a company that had installed the door in the structure, and that he had also left behind a pocket hole drill, whose value he estimated at $1300. It is apparent from Rogers's testimony that the roll up door was not unused, as he stated it was "practically new" and it had already been installed in the structure. Rogers did not testify that the pocket drill was brand new, but even if he did, the court reasonably could infer that Rogers stated the drill's value as of the date he abandoned the structure in mid-March 2007. The value of these items at the time of conversion in April 2008 is a matter left to the trier of fact's discretion (Wade v. Markwell & Co., supra, 118 Cal.App.2d at pp. 431-432) and the court was entitled to give little weight to Bakker's assertion they were worth their full purchase value. Under the facts and circumstances, we cannot say it erred in awarding 85 percent of the new value of these items. Even were we to apply Bakker's proffered measure of value: the "price at which [the] goods would have been sold for [in April 2008] if the same had been placed upon the shelves and upon the counters of merchants dealing in such goods, whether new or secondhand... and offered as such to the public at retail" (Kirstein v. Bekins Van & Storage Co. (1915) 27 Cal.App. 586, 590), we would uphold the court's valuation decision as supported by the evidence and within its broad discretion.
We reach the same conclusion as to the other items, to which the court applied a 50 percent discount factor. It found "because all of these items were used during the operation of the woodshop, relying on the new value would be inappropriate." "It is apparent from the record that the [court] in arriving at its verdict considered the use to which the articles had been subjected, their condition, and other circumstances which in its opinion justified its conclusion." (Kirstein, supra, 27 Cal.App. at p. 589.)
II. Interest and Costs
A. Interest from the Date of Conversion
The trial court's statement of decision states that the measure of damages for conversion is "the reasonable value of the converted property plus interest from the date of the conversion." The court then awarded Bakker damages "plus interest at the legal rate (7 percent) from the date of the filing of the lawsuit — April 28, 2008 — to the date of the judgment."
Bakker maintains the judgment is inconsistent with the court's own findings and is not supported by the evidence, section 3336, or case law. Based on the trial court's finding as to when her purchase agreement with Rogers was rescinded and the building and its contents reverted to her, Bakker argues she is entitled to interest as of March 2007.
Bakker's contention as a threshold matter suffers from two fatal flaws. First, she does not discuss the relevant standard of review with any pertinent case authority, and as a result we may treat her contention as forfeited. (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448.) Second, she has arguably waived any sufficiency of the evidence argument by failing to summarize all of the material evidence, including the evidence that is damaging to her case. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; Brockey v. Moore (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 86, 96; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 8:71, p. 8.34.1.) By stating only her own evidence on the issues, i.e., evidence tending to support a conclusion that Libs converted the structure as of mid-March 2007 when she entered it and made improvements to it, Bakker ignores the settled principles of substantial evidence review set forth below.
The contention fails on its merits in any event. For purposes of awarding interest under section 3336, we conclude the date of conversion is ordinarily a question of fact unless the relevant underlying facts are undisputed or where only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, in which case it becomes a question of law that we review de novo. (See e.g., Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 611 [generally date of accrual of a cause of action is subject to determination by the trier of fact when raised in connection with a tort claim, but the question becomes one of law where reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from the evidence].) If the evidence is conflicting, we will uphold the trial court's finding if it is supported by substantial evidence. (See Institoris v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 10, 19.)
Cases discussing the accrual of a conversion cause of action are instructive, as such a cause of action accrues on the date of injury, i.e., the date of the conversion. (See Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1957) 47 Cal.2d 540, 561 [unless delayed discovery or other exceptions apply, statute of limitations for conversion actions begins to run from the date of the conversion]; Strasberg v. Odyssey Group, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 906, 915-916; Naftzger v. American Numismatic Society (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 421, 428.) A conversion cause of action accrues when the possessor of property entrusted by an owner "acts in a manner inconsistent with the owner's interests" (Naftzger, at pp. 428-429) or actually interferes with the plaintiff's ownership or right of possession. (See AmerUS Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, N.A. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 631, 641.) Thus, in Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, the court found a conversion occurred in August 1994, when an ex-husband refused to permit the plaintiff ex-wife to retrieve some of her property, forcing her to enlist the aid of a law enforcement officer to retrieve what she could. (Id. at p. 1434.) According to the Bono court, the "parties' confrontations at that time put plaintiff on notice of the need to protect her property and triggered the running of the statute of limitations as a matter of law." (Ibid.)
Drawing all inferences in the judgment's favor (In re Marriage of Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1133), we infer from the statement of decision that the trial court found the date Libs converted Bakker's property was April 28, 2008. The pertinent question on review is whether there is sufficient evidence in this record from which the court reasonably could determine that to be the date of conversion.
The critical issue here concerns the point at which Bakker could establish the necessary element of ownership or a right to possession in the structure, and Libs's wrongful act to convert Bakker's property. (See Spates v. Dameron Hospital Association (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 221-222; Oakdale Village Group v. Fong (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 543.) Indeed, targeting this date was the main focus of the trial court's factual findings, which observed the evidence on that point "is confused and confusing." As of March 2007, Bakker and Rogers were in pending litigation over the failed sale of Bakker's woodworking business, including the structure but not the land, which Libs had leased to Rogers. Libs testified she served Paul Rogers with the three day notice to quit the premises in mid March 2007 as a formality; she sought to work with him "to try to reclaim my land and the use of my area" because she understood he could not fulfill the lease and was prepared to walk away from the woodworking business. Libs testified she did not understand who was supposed to have the building that was left on her property; that she "did not want the building." Libs then used a locksmith to enter the building after Rogers told her about the fire to protect the people and animals on her property and wanted to ensure there were no safety issues.
Paul Rogers testified that after he locked the building, Libs had asked if she could use the building to rent to third parties, but he told her he could not give her such permission due to his pending litigation with Bakker. According to Rogers, he spoke to Libs next in early 2008, at which time she informed him that Bakker had contacted her in reference to their settlement agreement and told her she was supposed to give possession of the building back to Bakker. By that time, Libs had rented the building out to a third person. In late January 2008, Bakker wrote Libs a note stating that at a settlement conference the day before, Rogers offered to return her building back. In early February, Bakker and Libs spoke, leaving Bakker with the impression that Libs was asserting the building belonged to her due to Libs's dispute with Rogers and because it was attached to her land. However, on February 13, 2008, Libs emailed Bakker and offered to meet with her to "come up with a plan for [Bakker] to take 'the building' off my property and into your possession." Libs wrote: "I have absolutely no interest in buying it or getting it 'free' for that matter."
Based on this evidence (and other evidence not before us on this record), the court found Bakker's lawsuit against Rogers had settled in January 2008, with the parties essentially agreeing to rescind their purchase transaction. It found Libs's discussions with Rogers, "in combination with Bakker's lawsuit alleging conversion" (italics added), was the point at which Libs understood the building had transferred back into Bakker's possession, and that her failure to acknowledge Bakker's right to possession of the building and its contents in response to Bakker's lawsuit constituted conversion.
"The foundation for a conversion claim ' "rests upon the unwarranted interference by defendant with the dominion over the property of the plaintiff from which injury to the latter results...." ' [Citation.] Not every failure to deliver property to the rightful owner constitutes a conversion. [Citation.] 'To establish a conversion, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise ownership over them, or to prevent the owner from taking possession of the property.' [Citation.] 'The act of removing personal property from one place to another, without an assertion of ownership or preventing the owner from exercising all rights of ownership in such personal property, is not enough to constitute conversion.' " (Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assn., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 222.) We conclude the evidence recited above supports the trial court's conclusion that by the time Bakker filed suit at the end of April 2008, she had established a right of possession to her building, and Libs had changed her position from one of an intent to relinquish the building to Bakker to one in which she sought to prevent Bakker from taking the building, thus converting it. In sum, sufficient evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that Libs's conversion did not occur until Bakker filed suit on April 28, 2008.
B. Costs
Bakker's entire argument as to costs is as follows: "It is a well known principle of law that the prevailing party is entitled to cost [sic]of litigation. None were awarded by the trial court, nor was plaintiff directed to prepare a 'cost memorandum.' "
The absence of reasoned legal argument and citation to authority allows us to disregard the argument entirely. (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 1448.) Nevertheless, assuming — without deciding — Bakker met the definition of a prevailing party entitled to costs as a matter of right (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1032), her failure to timely file a verified cost memorandum seeking such costs forfeited any entitlement to costs she may have had. (Hydratec, Inc. v. Sundt Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 924, 927-929; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700 [prevailing party claiming costs must serve and file memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service or mailing of the notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, Acting P. J., McINTYRE, J.