However, there are distinguishing differences between the case now being decided and those cases, as shown by the testimony in this case as quoted above and the evidence in the other cases as set forth in the opinion in Hill v. State. In our opinion, the case cited in Hill v. State in which the facts are more like those in the case sub judice is Baker v. State, 52 Ala. App. 150, 290 So.2d 214 (1973), writ denied, 292 Ala. 708, 290 So.2d 217 (1974), as to which case it is stated in Hill v. State at 348 So.2d 855: "We doubt not that a criminal linkage between a seller and one acting at the behest of a buyer of a controlled substance can be shown by circumstantial evidence.
HARWOOD, Justice. Petition of Roosevelt Baker for Certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals to review and revise the judgment and decision of that Court in Baker v. State, 52 Ala. App. 150, 290 So.2d 214. Writ denied.
That statute expressly prohibits the payment of cash as a prize or reward for successfully playing gaming machines. Because all citizens of the State are presumed to know the law, see Sly v. State, 387 So.2d 913 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980); Baker v. State, 52 Ala.App. 150, 290 So.2d 214 (Crim. 1973); and Miller v. State, 39 Ala.App. 584, 105 So.2d 711 (1958), Wade knew or should have known, at the time of Deputy Self's investigation into the Joker's Wild Arcade, that any cash payout as a result of playing the gaming machines would violate Alabama's antigambling statutes. We, therefore, reject Wade's argument that he has been denied due process of law by retroactive application of Alabama's antigambling, seizure, and forfeiture statutes.
[Citation omitted.] In Baker v. State, 52 Ala. App. 150, 290 So.2d 214, cert. denied, 292 Ala. 708, 290 So.2d 217 (1974), we observed: "`Any word or act contributing to the commission of a felony, intended and calculated to incite or encourage its accomplishment, whether the one so contributing is present or not, brings the accused, under such circumstances, within the influence of the cited statute.
Hill v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 348 So.2d 848, cert. den., Ala., 348 So.2d 857 (1977). In Baker v. State, 52 Ala. App. 150, 290 So.2d 214, cert. den., 292 Ala. 708, 290 So.2d 217 (1974), we observed: "Any word or act contributing to the commission of a felony, intended and calculated to incite or encourage its accomplishment, whether the one so contributing is present or not, brings the accused, under such circumstances, within the influence of the cited statute."
One who aids or abets another in the commission of a felony must be indicted, tried and punished as a principal. §§ 13-1-133 and 13-9-1, Code of Alabama 1975; Reynolds v. State, 274 Ala. 171, 146 So. 85; Ferguson v. State, 134 Ala. 63, 32 So. 760; Baker v. State, 52 Ala. App. 150, 290 So.2d 214; Conley v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 354 So.2d 1172. The court fully instructed the jury on the law of one who aids or abets another in the commission of a felony, and correctly submitted to the jury the question as to Willodean Grace's guilt in the crime.
We doubt not that a criminal linkage between a seller and one acting at the behest of a buyer of a controlled substance can be shown by circumstantial evidence. We so held in Baker v. State, 52 Ala. App. 150, 290 So.2d 214, writ denied, 292 Ala. 708, 290 So.2d 217. In Baker, the evidence for the State was that while the undercover agent and his informer discussed the subject of marijuana at defendant's home, defendant went to "his Cadillac parked outside . . . opened the front door of the parked vehicle . . . appeared to be getting something off the seat of the automobile" and thereafter had "what appeared to be Manila envelopes in his hand, of the same size of the envelopes containing the marijuana sold by another to the agent.