Although the Criminal Code does not define "seriously disfiguring" as used in the aggravated battery statute, see OCGA § 16-5-19, that term generally has been construed as meaning "gravely or greatly impairing or injuring the appearance of a member of a victim's body, even if only temporarily." Byrd v. State , 251 Ga. App. 83, 84 (1), 553 S.E.2d 380 (2001) ; see also Baker v. State , 246 Ga. 317, 318 (2), 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980) (construing predecessor statute). "Aggravated battery predicated upon serious disfigurement, whether temporary or permanent, requires proof that the injury inflicted was more than a superficial wound, that is, a scrape, bruise, discoloration, or swelling."
The admission of any relevant evidence is favored, even if its probative value is slight; evidence of questionable or doubtful relevancy or competency should be admitted and its weight left for the jury to determine. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 319 (2) ( 271 SE2d 360) (1980); Howell v. State, 278 Ga. App. 634, 638-639 (3) ( 629 SE2d 398) (2006). What is more, the Court of Appeals has acknowledged that evidence, including Department of Transportation records, that shows a documented history of problems in an intersection is relevant and admissible in a criminal prosecution for the offense of serious injury by vehicle.
This is particularly true when viewed in light of the facts in this case. See Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 318(2) ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 ( 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706) (1974)). OCGA § 16-5-40 is also not unconstitutional on the ground that it may serve as the basis for a death sentence when the kidnapping results in the victim's death.
The trial court did not err by admitting the pants over defense objection. See Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980) (the admission of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the trial court's discretion). After the pants were admitted, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, asserting that the victim's mother silently doubled over in pain when the pants were displayed and that ten jurors looked at her while she reacted.
This Court has not previously addressed this question. But in Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 318 (2) ( 271 S.E.2d 635) (1980), this Court found virtually identical language to be constitutional. Baker decided a challenge to the aggravated battery statute, now found at OCGA § 16-5-24 (a), specifically the language prohibiting maliciously causing bodily harm to another "by seriously disfiguring his or her body."
[Cit.]."Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 319 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 635) (1980). Here, the court abused its discretion.
3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that showed appellant and the victim were together at the murder scene several months before the murder. The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317 (3) ( 217 S.E.2d 360) (1980). The record establishes that the victim called out the name "Ant" during the attack, indicating that he knew his assailant, and that "Ant" was appellant's commonly known nickname.
The trial court allowed this questioning as relevant to the jury's determination of Foster's mental retardation and we find no abuse of the court's discretion. See generally Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317(3) ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980). 8.
The note was mailed to the recipient 3 — 4 weeks before trial, and could be construed as containing veiled threats to the well-being of the recipient/witness. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317(3) (271 S.E.2d 360) (1980). Testimony that the note was written while appellant was incarcerated awaiting trial for this crime did not put his character into evidence, since evidence that a defendant has been incarcerated in connection with the crime for which the defendant is on trial does not place the defendant's character in issue.
Thus, the evidence of other crimes was relevant to prove that appellants knew of their co-conspirators' capacity and/or propensity to kill Thomas Kidwell and that they procured them to kill him. See Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 319 ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980) (evidence is relevant if it renders the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence). The trial court admitted the evidence for that limited purpose and gave ample and appropriate instructions along those lines.