Baker v. State

58 Citing cases

  1. Byers v. State

    311 Ga. 259 (Ga. 2021)   Cited 13 times
    Concluding that exclusion of testimony was harmless where it was essentially cumulative of other evidence

    Although the Criminal Code does not define "seriously disfiguring" as used in the aggravated battery statute, see OCGA § 16-5-19, that term generally has been construed as meaning "gravely or greatly impairing or injuring the appearance of a member of a victim's body, even if only temporarily." Byrd v. State , 251 Ga. App. 83, 84 (1), 553 S.E.2d 380 (2001) ; see also Baker v. State , 246 Ga. 317, 318 (2), 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980) (construing predecessor statute). "Aggravated battery predicated upon serious disfigurement, whether temporary or permanent, requires proof that the injury inflicted was more than a superficial wound, that is, a scrape, bruise, discoloration, or swelling."

  2. Dunagan v. State

    283 Ga. 501 (Ga. 2008)   Cited 6 times
    In Dunagan v. State, 283 Ga. 501 (661 SE2d 525) (2008), the Supreme Court reversed Division 2 of this court's opinion in Dunagan v. State, 286 Ga. App. 668, 670 (2) (649 SE2d 765) (2007).

    The admission of any relevant evidence is favored, even if its probative value is slight; evidence of questionable or doubtful relevancy or competency should be admitted and its weight left for the jury to determine. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 319 (2) ( 271 SE2d 360) (1980); Howell v. State, 278 Ga. App. 634, 638-639 (3) ( 629 SE2d 398) (2006). What is more, the Court of Appeals has acknowledged that evidence, including Department of Transportation records, that shows a documented history of problems in an intersection is relevant and admissible in a criminal prosecution for the offense of serious injury by vehicle.

  3. Braley v. State

    276 Ga. 47 (Ga. 2002)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that, “[b]y failing to object at trial, Appellant waived his right to complain that the trial court, sua sponte, excused a prospective juror”

    This is particularly true when viewed in light of the facts in this case. See Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 318(2) ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980) (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 ( 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706) (1974)). OCGA § 16-5-40 is also not unconstitutional on the ground that it may serve as the basis for a death sentence when the kidnapping results in the victim's death.

  4. Brannan v. State

    275 Ga. 70 (Ga. 2002)   Cited 39 times
    Holding it race neutral to strike a juror who had previously been charged with a criminal offense

    The trial court did not err by admitting the pants over defense objection. See Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980) (the admission of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the trial court's discretion). After the pants were admitted, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, asserting that the victim's mother silently doubled over in pain when the pants were displayed and that ten jurors looked at her while she reacted.

  5. Pecina v. State

    274 Ga. 416 (Ga. 2001)   Cited 26 times
    Concluding that the odor of alcohol, open beer cans, the driver's physical manifestation of intoxication, and the driver's failure to maintain lane constituted sufficient evidence to convict of DUI

    This Court has not previously addressed this question. But in Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 318 (2) ( 271 S.E.2d 635) (1980), this Court found virtually identical language to be constitutional. Baker decided a challenge to the aggravated battery statute, now found at OCGA § 16-5-24 (a), specifically the language prohibiting maliciously causing bodily harm to another "by seriously disfiguring his or her body."

  6. Hudson v. State

    273 Ga. 124 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 31 times
    Identifying no error where "[t]he prosecutor compared [the defendant] to well-known murderers Charles Manson, David Berkowitz, and Jeffrey Dahmer, noting that they too contended they were not guilty by reason of insanity and were delusional, but were nonetheless held accountable for their actions and found guilty of their crimes" because "[i]t is permissible to use well known cases to illustrate a legal principle"

    [Cit.]."Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 319 (3) ( 271 S.E.2d 635) (1980). Here, the court abused its discretion.

  7. Williams v. State

    272 Ga. 828 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 28 times

    3. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that showed appellant and the victim were together at the murder scene several months before the murder. The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317 (3) ( 217 S.E.2d 360) (1980). The record establishes that the victim called out the name "Ant" during the attack, indicating that he knew his assailant, and that "Ant" was appellant's commonly known nickname.

  8. Foster v. State

    272 Ga. 69 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 13 times

    The trial court allowed this questioning as relevant to the jury's determination of Foster's mental retardation and we find no abuse of the court's discretion. See generally Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317(3) ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980). 8.

  9. Murray v. State

    271 Ga. 504 (Ga. 1999)   Cited 13 times

    The note was mailed to the recipient 3 — 4 weeks before trial, and could be construed as containing veiled threats to the well-being of the recipient/witness. The admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317(3) (271 S.E.2d 360) (1980). Testimony that the note was written while appellant was incarcerated awaiting trial for this crime did not put his character into evidence, since evidence that a defendant has been incarcerated in connection with the crime for which the defendant is on trial does not place the defendant's character in issue.

  10. Kidwell v. State

    264 Ga. 427 (Ga. 1994)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that the appellant’s trial counsel was not deficient for failing to investigate evidence of other crimes committed by his co-indictees, because his defense theory was that the appellant was not involved in the charged crimes and had no knowledge of any other crimes

    Thus, the evidence of other crimes was relevant to prove that appellants knew of their co-conspirators' capacity and/or propensity to kill Thomas Kidwell and that they procured them to kill him. See Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 319 ( 271 S.E.2d 360) (1980) (evidence is relevant if it renders the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence). The trial court admitted the evidence for that limited purpose and gave ample and appropriate instructions along those lines.