Opinion
C. A. 6:22-cv-02073-JD-KFM
08-19-2022
William Baker, Plaintiff, v. Doctor Smith, Warden Wallace, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, while a state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
Based upon correspondence received from the plaintiff (doc. 10), it appears that he is no longer incarcerated.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on June 30, 2022 (doc. 1). On July 29, 2022, the undersigned issued an order informing the plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal as drafted and providing him with time to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in the order (doc. 12). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his claims be dismissed (id. at 7). The plaintiff filed a reply to the order indicating that he wished to stand on his complaint because it did state a claim for relief and clarified that he was seeking relief based upon municipal liability (doc. 18), but did not submit an amended complaint. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the instant matter be dismissed.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff brings this action seeking damages regarding events that occurred while he was a prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and located at Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”) (doc. 1).
The plaintiff alleges violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (id. at 4). The plaintiff contends that on September 30, 2021, while climbing into his bed (the third bunk high), he fell (id. at 5-7, 8). He contends that Warden Wallace knew that the beds were three high and that having the bunks three high violated the plaintiff's rights (id. at 5, 8). After his fall, the plaintiff went to medical where Dr. Smith only ordered one x-ray of his hand, gave him some “pills”, and sent him back to his cell, which the plaintiff contends was medical malpractice (id. at 5-8).
For injuries, the plaintiff alleges that his hand has healed but it hurts to make a fist or hold anything (id. at 8). The plaintiff also alleges that his shoulder and neck hurt (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, when the case was filed, the plaintiff was a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and sought “redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
The Eighth Amendment expressly prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment regarding the conditions of his confinement, a prisoner must prove that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
The plaintiff's assertion that his rights were violated when he was forced to stay in a cell on the top bunk without a ladder is subject to summary dismissal. Indeed, several courts have found that being assigned to and having to climb into a top bunk without a ladder or assistive device does not pose “an objectively serious deprivation of a basic human need” as required to state a deliberate indifference claim. See Lewis v. Zook, C/A No. 1:17-cv-00582 (CHM/JFA), 2018 WL 2656501 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2018), appeal dismissed C/A No. 18-6790 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2018) (collecting cases finding that failing to provide a ladder to access a top bunk does not state a deliberate indifference claim) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, although the plaintiff alleges that he fell while climbing into the bunk on September 30, 2021, he has failed to allege that the defendants were aware of and deliberately indifferent to any substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff in assigning him to a top bunk, and his general allegation that his age made the bunk dangerous or that the Warden knew the bunks were dangerous in general fails to meet the plausibility standard. See Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (finding that the plausibility standard requires more than “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))).
Additionally, to the extent the plaintiff intends to assert a claim (as outlined above) against Warden Wallace in his supervisory capacity, the plaintiff's claim is subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff has not alleged how Warden Wallace was responsible for his assignment to a top bunk - beyond conclusorily asserting that Warden Wallace should have known about the alleged unsafe condition (doc. 1 at 5). Even presuming Warden Wallace knew about the alleged unsafe bunks, the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Warden Wallace knew of a risk of a constitutionally cognizable harm to the plaintiff in his bunk assignment or that the plaintiff informed Warden Wallace prior to his fall that he should not be assigned to a top bunk. Indeed, the plaintiff has failed to allege an affirmative causal link between inaction by Warden Wallace and the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Instead, the plaintiff's claim rests on a fall from his bunk - which could occur whenever he climbed into a bunk no matter its height. As such, the plaintiff's claim against Warden Wallace, even if in his supervisory capacity, is subject to summary dismissal as presented. See Ford v. Stirling, C/A No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C/A No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010).
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim
The plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Smith did not appropriately treat his injured hand after he fell from the top bunk (doc. 1 at 7, 8). Not “every claim by a prisoner [alleging] that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the [Constitution].” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). The government is required to provide medical care for incarcerated individuals. Id. at 103. However, to establish deliberate indifference, the treatment “must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
In order to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege a serious medical need as well as that the defendant “knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed.” DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-11 (4th Cir. 2017)). A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851-52 (citation omitted). “It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
Here, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs. The plaintiff's allegations make clear that he was provided treatment by Dr. Smith for his hand, including at least one x-ray and medicine - he just disagrees with the course of treatment offered by Dr. Smith (doc. 1 at 5, 6, 7, 8). However, the plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled to the treatment of his choice. See Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 621 Fed.Appx. 732, 733 (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (noting that “mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief” under § 1983 (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975))). Moreover, the plaintiff describes Dr. Smith's actions as medical malpractice (doc. 1 at 5) - which is not actionable under § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (noting that mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment). As such, the plaintiff's medical indifference claim also fails to state a claim for relief as presented.
Municipal Liability
To the extent the plaintiff's reply to this court's July 29, 2022, order can be construed as asserting a claim for municipal liability, his claim also fails (see doc. 18). As an initial matter, municipalities and other local governing bodies are considered “persons” and may be sued under Section 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, here, the plaintiff has not sought relief against a municipality or other governing body - instead asserting municipal liability with respect to Warden Wallace. As such his Monell claim fails because he has not named an appropriate defendant.
Further, even presuming the plaintiff had named a municipality or other governing body as a defendant in this action, his claim still fails because a county or city cannot be held liable pursuant to respondeat superior principles. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. “[N]ot every deprivation of a constitutional right will lead to municipal liability. Only in cases where the municipality causes the deprivation ‘through an official policy or custom' will liability attach.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999)). As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated:
A policy or custom for which a municipality may be held liable can arise in four ways: (1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”Id. (quoting Carter, 164 F.3d at 217). Additionally, under Monell, municipal liability arises “only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in furtherance of some municipal policy or custom.” Walker v. Prince George's Cnty., Md., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here however, as outlined above, the plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a constitutionally offensive action by the defendants based upon his assignment to a top bunk. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654-55 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that when a plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against individual officers, claims based upon supervisory and/or Monell liability also fail). In light of the foregoing, even construing the plaintiff's complaint as raising a Monell claim and seeking relief against an applicable municipality or local governing body, the plaintiff's claim is subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued July 29, 2022, the undersigned provided the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to timely file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment (doc. 12). The plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint within the time provided - instead asserting that his original complaint did state a claim for relief (see doc. 18). Accordingly, in addition to the reasons discussed herein, this action should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without further leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, C/A No. 201620 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the following page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).