Baker v. Shettle

14 Citing cases

  1. Robertson v. State, Use, Meyer

    139 A.2d 715 (Md. 1958)   Cited 5 times

    But the existence of the emergency was not admitted, and could be established only by a finding of the jury. Newman v. Stocker, 161 Md. 552, 555; Harner v. Russell, 185 Md. 519, 527; Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 671. See also Notes 79 A.L.R. 1277 and 111 A.L.R. 1019; Restatements, Torts, § 296; Becker v. Beir, 89 N.Y.S.2d 536. There was evidence that the dog was not on the south side of the road, but was alongside or near the boy.

  2. Ristaino v. Flannery

    76 Md. App. 662 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times
    In Ristaino, this Court affirmed the trial court's use of the "acts in emergencies" instruction; it was based on the defendant's testimony "that her car inexplicably skidded on the wet road onto appellants' side of the highway, although her speed was in accordance with the posted limit and that she was otherwise operating her vehicle in a safe manner."

    They assert "that the Defendant in this case contributed to the events which brought about the emergency and under such circumstances an emergency instruction is inappropriate." The Court of Appeals discussed the "sudden emergency" instruction in Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 72 A.2d 30 (1950): It is held by the weight of authority, that if there is evidence in a case legally sufficient to show that an emergency existed, it becomes a question of fact for the jury.

  3. Wilmer v. Rittenhouse

    209 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1953)   Cited 6 times

    The Maryland decisions are in accord with this rule as applied to either party in a suit for negligence. In Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, at page 671, 72 A.2d 30, at page 32, where the defendant driver crossed the center line of the road in order to avoid a car which suddenly appeared in front of him without warning, the court said: "The court, on the facts of the case, was of opinion that the defendant was confronted with an emergency.

  4. Hempfling v. Patterson

    229 F. Supp. 391 (D. Md. 1964)   Cited 2 times

    However, from the standpoint of plaintiffs, the most that could be required of defendant, whether it be upon a last clear chance basis, or upon the obligation of any one observing another in a place of danger to use care, was the use of reasonable care with the facilities then available to him (supra) and in this case, the condition not having been created or caused by the negligence of defendant, the test would be that of a reasonable man in an emergency. Baker v. Shettle, 1950, 194 Md. 666, 671, 72 A.2d 30; A.L.I. Restatement of Torts, section 296. In this connection, as in all cases involving the question of negligence '* * * injuries which could by no reasonable possibility have been foreseen, and which no reasonably prudent person would have apprehended, cannot form the basis for actionable negligence. * * * the test of foreseeability, or reasonable anticipation as it is sometimes called, must be judged by foresight, not in retrospect.'

  5. Lunsford v. Board of Education

    280 Md. 665 (Md. 1977)   Cited 23 times

    This argument, to us, seems lacking in substance. It would appear to be grounded on the rationale of Wilmer v. Rittenhouse, 209 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1953), which adopted the rule of Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 671, 72 A.2d 30, 32 (1950) and Lashley v. Dawson, 162 Md. 549, 564, 160 A. 738, 744 (1932), that one frightened or bewildered as a consequence of the primary negligence of another is not necessarily guilty of contributory negligence. Assuming the validity of the proposition, we fail to see how it could be applicable here.

  6. Virginia Freight v. Montgomery

    260 A.2d 59 (Md. 1969)   Cited 10 times
    In Montgomery, plaintiff's tractor-trailer was southbound at about 4:30 p.m. on a May afternoon, on a two-lane road with traffic proceeding in a single lane in each direction. The highway shoulders, adjacent to each lane, were approximately 6 to 8 feet in width.

    We think the proximate cause of the accident was the extraordinary and quite unforeseeable conduct of Roy. If, as the appellees contend, Mason might have avoided the collision at the last moment by driving off the road to the right, instead of turning to the left, and we think this is only a matter of speculation, his action in swerving to the left at the last moment could hardly be deemed negligent. Cf. Kaline v. Davidson, 146 Md. 220, 224. As we said in Williams v. Dawidowicz, 209 Md. 77, 83, `The only emergency was the one created by Williams, which put Aiudi to a choice of stopping or pulling to the right or left'; citing Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 671, where we said: `* * * what might ordinarily be negligence in a case where no emergency exists, may not be negligence in the case of an emergency. In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the rule which governs in the ordinary case.

  7. Robinson v. Hall

    209 A.2d 917 (Md. 1965)   Cited 1 times

    And there also can be little doubt that one, who by his own wrong has brought about an emergency, cannot invoke the emergency rule. Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666; Warnke v. Essex, 217 Md. 183; 1 Blashfield, Cyc. of Automobile Law and Practice, pp. 547, 552. However, if we lay aside the possibility that the uncontradicted evidence disclosed that an emergency existed, we are unable to conclude that the questions were properly reserved, under Maryland Rule 554 d, for our consideration.

  8. Lehmann v. Johnson

    146 A.2d 886 (Md. 1958)   Cited 33 times

    " Probably the leading case establishing the doctrine that action which might or would ordinarily constitute actionable negligence will not be so considered if taken in response to a sudden emergency created by the act of another or for which the defendant is not responsible, where there is no opportunity for reflection and deliberate choice, is Burhans v. Burhans, 159 Md. 370, 150 A. 795. Other cases reaching a similar result include Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 72 A.2d 30; Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137, 106 A.2d 98; Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500, 112 A.2d 475; Coastal Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82; and Mason v. Triplett, 217 Md. 433, 141 A.2d 708 (a 3-2 decision on the facts there involved). See also Williams v. Dawidowicz, 209 Md. 77, 120 A.2d 399, where one defendant's car pulled out of a line of southbound traffic in the path of a northbound car of the other defendant in which the plaintiff was a passenger and the jury was held to have been properly instructed that the driver of the northbound car, the second defendant, was not liable if he had done all that a reasonable person could have done to avoid the accident.

  9. Warnke v. Essex

    217 Md. 183 (Md. 1958)   Cited 21 times
    Stating that "[t]he mere fact that a person finds himself in a predicament or emergency does not automatically relieve him of the obligation to use ordinary care"

    It is also clear that the question whether the defendant acted reasonably under the stress of the emergency — if in fact an emergency did exist — was also a question for the jury to decide. See Robertson v. State, use of Meyer, 216 Md. 175, 139 A.2d 715 (1958); Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 72 A.2d 30 (1950); Fogle v. Phillips, 191 Md. 114, 60 A.2d 198 (1948); Harner v. Russell, 185 Md. 519, 45 A.2d 273 (1946); and Newman v. Stocker, 161 Md. 552, 157 A. 761 (1932). In Burhans v. Burhans, supra, the defendant swerved her automobile to avoid colliding with a large dog.

  10. Mason v. Triplett

    217 Md. 433 (Md. 1958)   Cited 12 times
    In Mason v. Triplett, 217 Md. 433 (1958), the plaintiff sued for damages sustained as a result of a head-on collision with the defendant.

    Cf. Kaline v. Davidson, 146 Md. 220, 224. As we said in Williams v. Dawidowicz, 209 Md. 77, 83, "The only emergency was the one created by Williams, which put Aiudi to a choice of stopping or pulling to the right or left"; citing Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 671, where we said: "* * * what might ordinarily be negligence in a case where no emergency exists, may not be negligence in the case of an emergency. In such a situation one does not have time to think what is the best thing to do; the emergency occurs so quickly that it would be unjust to apply the rule which governs in the ordinary case.