Opinion
Civil Action 4:20-cv-3870
02-24-2022
CHLOE BAKER, Plaintiff, v. LONE STAR LEGAL AID, Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Charles Eskridge, United States District Judge
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion to dismiss by Defendant Lone Star Legal Aid be denied without prejudice. Dkt 18. The objections by Lone Star to that recommendation are overruled. Dkt 19. The memorandum and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is adopted as the opinion and order of this Court.
Plaintiff Chloe Baker proceeds here pro se, bringing action against Defendant Lone Star Legal Aid as her former employer. She alleges employment discrimination under the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Dkt 1. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Sam Sheldon for full pretrial management pursuant to 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt 3.
Lone Star moved to dismiss all claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt 24. It argues that Baker failed to timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Discovery has continued while this motion was pending. See Dkt 50 at 2; Dkt 45.
Judge Sheldon recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied. Dkt 50 at 6. Lone Star filed objections. Dkt 58.
The district court conducts a de novo review of those conclusions of a magistrate judge to which a party has specifically objected. See 28 USC § 636(b)(1)(C); United States v Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir 1989). To accept any other portions to which there is no objection, the reviewing court need only satisfy itself that no clear error appears on the face of the record. See Guillory v PPG Industries Inc, 434 F.3d 303, 308 (5th Cir 2005), citing Douglass v United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415, 1420 (5th Cir 1996); see also FRCP 72(b) advisory committee note (1983).
A motion for summary judgment may eventually vindicate Lone Star's arguments. But its objections must be overruled at this juncture.
First, Lone Star argues that the ADA claims should be dismissed because Baker didn't allege disability discrimination in her initial EEOC inquiry. Dkt 58 at 1-2; see also Dkt 1-1 at 18-21. In fact, Baker indicated on that form that she doesn't have a disability. Dkt 58 at 1-2; see also Dkt 11 at 18-21. But as noted, Baker is a pro se litigant. “It is well-established that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Taylor v Books A Million Inc, 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir 2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This accords with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states, “Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Baker pleaded that she submitted multiple EEOC claims in February 2019. Dkt 17 at 5; Dkt 26 at 3. And Baker claims to have filed another charge in May 2020, which could potentially cure any deficiency in her previous EEOC filings. It's unclear whether all relevant documents are currently before the Court. But as it stands, the complaint itself contains enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Second, Lone Star argues that all claims should be dismissed because Baker offers insufficient evidence that the attached inquiry form satisfies the requirements of an administrative charge. Lone Star highlights the fact that neither version of the inquiry form Baker attached to her complaints is verified, nor can it be reasonably construed as a request for action. Dkt 58 at 3. Both elements are required to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the ADA and Title VII. See Ernst v Methodist Hospital Systems, 1 F4th 333, 337-38 (5th Cir 2021). But again, it's unclear whether all relevant documents are currently before the Court. Regardless, the complaint itself contains enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face, especially in light of Baker's pro se status. Moreover, the “failure to exhaust administrative remedies” in ADA and Title VII actions “is an affirmative defense.” Bradley v Phillips Petroleum Co, 527 F.Supp.2d 661, 697 n 161 (SD Tex 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The “defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies.” Ibid (quotation marks and citation omitted). This inquiry is thus better left for summary judgment.
The Court has reviewed the pertinent portions of the recommendation by Judge Sheldon de novo. It's correct on the merits. The Court has otherwise reviewed the pleadings, the record, the applicable law, and the recommendation. No clear error appears.
The Memorandum and Recommendation by the Magistrate Judge is ADOPTED as the Memorandum and Order of this Court. Dkt 50.
The objections by Defendant Lone Star Legal Aid are OVERRULED. Dkt 56.
The motion to dismiss by Defendant Lone Star Legal Aid is DENIED. Dkt 24.
SO ORDERED.