Opinion
NO. 4:19-CV-00108-CDL-MSH
12-02-2019
ROGER LEE BAKER, JR., Plaintiff, v. JOHN WILLIAM JOHNSON, JR., et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
In accordance with the Court's previous orders and instructions, Plaintiff Roger Lee Baker, Jr., a prisoner incarcerated at the Coffee Correctional Facility in Nicholls, Georgia, has filed his prison trust fund account information. For the following reasons, the undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 16) but RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED without prejudice and that his remaining pending motions (ECF Nos. 11, 13) be DENIED as moot.
I. Motions to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Section 1915 allows the district courts to authorize the commencement of a civil action without prepayment of the normally-required fees upon a showing that the plaintiff is indigent and financially unable to pay the filing fee. A prisoner seeking to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") under this section must provide the district court with both (1) an affidavit in support of his claim of indigence and (2) a certified copy of his prison "trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." § 1915(a)(2).
In this case, Plaintiff's pauper's affidavit and trust account statement show that he is currently unable to prepay the Court's filing fee. Plaintiff's motions to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 16) are thus GRANTED and Plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee of $0.00. Plaintiff, however, is still obligated to pay the full balance of the filing fee, in installments, as set forth in § 1915(b) and explained below. The Court accordingly requests that the CLERK forward a copy of this ORDER to the business manager of the facility in which Plaintiff is incarcerated so that withdrawals from his account may commence as payment towards the filing fee. The district court's filing fee is not refundable, regardless of the outcome of the case, and must therefore be paid in full even if the Plaintiff's Complaint (or any part thereof) is dismissed prior to service.
A. Directions to Plaintiff's Custodian
It is hereby ORDERED that the warden of the institution wherein Plaintiff is incarcerated, or the sheriff of any county wherein he is held in custody, and any successor custodians, each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this Court twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income credited to Plaintiff's account at said institution until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. In accordance with provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Plaintiff's custodian is hereby authorized to forward payments from the prisoner's account to the Clerk of Court each month until the filing fee is paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. It is further ORDERED that collection of monthly payments from Plaintiff's trust fund account shall continue until the entire $350.00 has been collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit or the granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full filing fee.
B. Plaintiff's Obligations Upon Release
Pursuant to provisions of the PLRA, in the event Plaintiff is hereafter released from the custody of the State of Georgia or any county thereof, he shall remain obligated to pay any balance due on the filing fee in this proceeding until said amount has been paid in full; Plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly payments as required by the PLRA. Collection from Plaintiff of any balance due on the filing fee by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized in the event Plaintiff is released from custody and fails to remit payments. Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal if he has the ability to make monthly payments and fails to do so.
II. Preliminary Screening
A. Standard of Review
In accordance with the PLRA, the district courts are obligated to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Screening is also required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) when the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. When conducting preliminary screening, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159-60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings, like the one in this case, are "held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it "(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court may dismiss claims that are based on "indisputably meritless legal" theories and "claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The factual allegations in a complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and cannot "merely create[] a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (first alteration in original). In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts "to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" supporting a claim. Id. at 556. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003).
B. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff's claims arise from criminal proceedings against him in Talbot County, Georgia. Compl. 8, ECF No. 1. On July 7, 2007, Plaintiff was arrested for murder. Id. at 7. On July 10, 2007, Defendant Johnson, a magistrate judge, "issued a murder arrest warrant against Plaintiff" after GBI Special Agent Sam Bailey informed Defendant Johnson that the murder weapon was Plaintiff's .45 caliber handgun. Id. at 5, 7-8. Plaintiff appears to contend that ballistic testing performed five months after Plaintiff's arrest showed that "the victim were [sic] shot and killed with a .22 caliber" and not Plaintiff's .45 caliber weapon. Compl. 8, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff thus alleges that Agent Bailey (who is not named as a Defendant in this case) committed perjury to obtain the arrest warrant, rendering it void. Id. Plaintiff also suggests that the more recent ballistic testing was not provided to him during his trial and that the arrest warrant is also void because Plaintiff was not given a timely first appearance hearing. Id. at 9. Plaintiff states that he has attempted to challenge the validity of this warrant and his subsequent murder conviction on several occasions over the last six years, but Defendant Peters, a superior court judge, "has fail[ed] to docket Plaintiff['s] motion(s)" despite the "newly discovered evidence" contained in these motions. Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff contends Defendants' actions have violated his constitutional rights, and he seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief as a result. Compl. 6, ECF No. 1; 1st Suppl. Compl. 1, ECF No. 7.
C. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Johnson and Peters—two judges involved in Plaintiff's state court criminal proceedings—responsible for their roles in his arrest, trial, conviction, sentence, and postjudgment challenges. See Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. But "[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages under section 1983 for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." McBrearty v. Koji, 348 F. App'x 437, 439 (11th Cir. 2009). "A judge does not act in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction' when he acts erroneously, maliciously, or in excess of his authority, but instead, only when he acts without subject-matter jurisdiction." Id. In this case, Defendants' allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred entirely during the course of Plaintiff's state court proceedings; there is no suggestion that Defendants acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Thus, Defendants Johnson and Peters are entitled to judicial immunity to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint could be construed as seeking damages.
To the extent Plaintiff's Complaint seeks injunctive relief against Defendants, his claims are likewise barred. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants violated a declaratory decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief against Defendants are therefore also subject to dismissal.
The undersigned notes that to the extent that Plaintiff seeks immediate or speedier release from prison, the appropriate vehicle would be a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
Plaintiff's claims that "the State's warrant, indictment, conviction, and sentence" are void also implicate the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. In this case, Plaintiff is clearly challenging his confinement on the Talbot County conviction. For Plaintiff to prevail on his claims that this confinement is unlawful, the Court would have to agree with Plaintiff's contentions and conclude that his sentence is invalid. Plaintiff's claims are therefore Heck-barred unless he can show that his conviction or sentence was previously invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (affirming dismissal of the prisoner's § 1983 claims based on the alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence); see also, e.g., Curtis v. United States, 479 F. App'x 255, 258 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that prisoner's claims that his "criminal sentences were invalid because there was a lack of jurisdiction," among other things, were Heck-barred); Antonelli v. Foster, 104 F.3d 899, 901 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that Heck would bar claims based on "the invalidity of confinement pursuant to some legal process, whether a warrant, indictment, information, summons, parole revocation, conviction or other judgment"). Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing. Plaintiff's claims for damages are therefore also subject to dismissal on this basis.
Plaintiff may also be attempting to raise a due process claim concerning his alleged failure to receive a timely first appearance hearing. See, e.g., Attach. 2 to Pet. Mandamus 1, ECF No. 11-2. The Supreme Court has held that a suspect arrested without a warrant must generally receive a judicial determination of probable cause to detain the suspect within 48 hours of the arrest. Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). Such claims arise under the Fourth Amendment. Johnson v. Cnty. of Paulding, 780 F. App'x 796, 798 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Even if the Court assumes without deciding that this type of procedural claim would not necessarily be barred by the Heck doctrine, Plaintiff's potential McLaughlin claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.
It should be noted that even if Plaintiff did experience a McLaughlin violation in this case, his subsequent conviction would not be voided. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1974) (noting that the "established rule" is that an "illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction" and thus "a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause"). --------
The limitations period for filing a section 1983 claim is controlled by state law. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985). In Georgia, the proper limitations period for a section 1983 claim is the two-year period prescribed for personal injury claims in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986). Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations period for claims under § 1983, federal law determines the date of accrual. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). Under § 1983, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know he has been injured, and he is or should be aware of who injured him. Id. at 562; Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987).
Applying these principles to the present case, Plaintiff has pleaded that he was arrested without a warrant on July 7, 2007. Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff was thus "entitled to a judicial probable cause determination within 48 hours of his arrest." Johnson, 780 F. App'x at 799. It follows that Plaintiff should have been aware of his potential McLaughlin claim 48 hours after his warrantless arrest, on July 9, 2007. See id. Plaintiff did not bring this claim until June of 2019, and he has asserted no basis by which the applicable statute of limitations should be tolled. Plaintiff's McLaughlin claim is now time-barred, and it should be dismissed without prejudice. See id.; see also Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003) (dismissal appropriate on statute of limitations grounds where plaintiff pointed the court "to no particular reason why the statute of limitations might be tolled in his case" and the court could "discern none from the record").
III. Conclusion
For the following reasons, the undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 16) but RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff also has pending before the Court a motion for default judgment (ECF No. 13) and a motion for a writ of mandamus directing the Court to vacate his state court conviction (ECF No. 11). It is RECOMMENDED that these remaining pending motions be DENIED as moot.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Clay D. Land, Chief United States District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 2nd day of December, 2019.
/s/ Stephen Hyles
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE