Baker v. Industrial Commission

13 Citing cases

  1. Moore v. Atlanta Transit System

    105 Ga. App. 70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961)   Cited 28 times

    In the following cases, the legislature had adopted a statute liberalizing the evidence rules in workmen's compensation cases but the court did not rely primarily on the statute. Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ohio App. 539 ( 186 N.E. 10); Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249 ( 127 A 850). Additional cases may be cited where the hearsay was admitted but without a showing of necessity.

  2. Foster v. Aladdin Mills, Inc.

    229 S.E.2d 451 (Ga. 1976)   Cited 2 times

    See United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896). Cf. Dow Chemical Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 67 Cal.2d 483 ( 432 P.2d 365) (1967); Baker v. Industrial Comm., 44 Ohio App. 539 ( 186 N.E. 10) (1933); and Derby v. Swift Co., 188 Va. 336 ( 49 S.E.2d 417) (1948); see also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Industrial Comm., 98 Ariz. 97 ( 402 P.2d 414) (1965). This appeal will be transferred to the Court of Appeals for its consideration of the remaining enumerations of error, as they fall within the appellate jurisdiction of that court.

  3. Cody v. S.K.F. Industries, Inc.

    447 Pa. 558 (Pa. 1972)   Cited 43 times
    Expanding law to permit medical testimony regarding the cause of the injury

    In our judgment, therefore, the history thus gleaned which described the inception, the general character of the cause or external source of the condition to be treated, so far as it is pertinent to the purpose of diagnosis and treatment, is within the rule and admissible as substantive evidence. Cf. McCormick on Evidence, 564 (1954); Stewart v. Baltimore Ohio R. Co., 137 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 1942); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 (Ct.App. 1933); Dabbert v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 13 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 792 1870); Ferne v. Chadderton, 375 Pa. 302, 100 A.2d 854 (1953); Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934).' " 62 N.J. Super. 430, 163 A.2d at 179.

  4. Jones v. Goodyear Tire Rubber Co.

    18 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938)   Cited 2 times

    Industrial Commission v. Lathrop, 52 Ohio App. 55, 2 N.E.2d 828. And see the opinion of this court in Kuhn v. Banker, 27 Ohio Law Abs., 148, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242. Although, as to the admissibility of evidence, this cause is ruled by the provisions of Section 1465-90, General Code, as amended (Industrial Commission v. Weaver, 45 Ohio App. 371, 187 N.E. 186, affirmed in Weaver v. Industrial Commission, supra), and although the conclusion hereinbefore reached is based upon a consideration of the entire evidence in the record, including some evidence of questionable competency, we deem it advisable to comment briefly in this opinion on the question of whether evidence which is admissible for one purpose must, under all circumstances, be considered for all purposes, in view of the general statement to that effect in the case of Baker v. Industrial Commission, 44 Ohio App. 539, at page 546 et seq., 186 N.E. 10. After the deceased was first taped, he continued to work for several months following the alleged injury, after which he procured the services of a doctor of his own choosing, for diagnosis and treatment.

  5. Greenfarb v. Arre

    62 N.J. Super. 420 (App. Div. 1960)   Cited 12 times
    In Greenfarb, also a compensation case, in which there were no witnesses to the incident which was found to have proximately brought about his death, testimony was allowed that decedent, while in the throes of the serious heart attack which led to his death months later, had told his treating physician that the onset of his trouble began on the night before his admission to the hospital, when he lifted a large piece of dough weighing about 300 pounds and immediately felt pain and distress in stated areas of his body.

    In our judgment, therefore, the history thus gleaned which described the inception, the general character of the cause or external source of the condition to be treated, so far as it is pertinent to the purpose of diagnosis and treatment, is within the rule and admissible as substantive evidence. Cf. McCormick on Evidence, 564 (1954); Stewart v. Baltimore O.R. Co., 137 F.2d 527, 530 (2 Cir. 1943); Baker v. Industrial Commission, 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 ( Ct. App. 1933); Dabbert v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 13 Ohio Dec. ( Reprint) 792 (1870); Ferne v. Chadderton, 375 Pa. 302, 100 A.2d 854 (1953); Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934). Accordingly, there was no error in receiving in evidence the portions of the history of which complaint is now made.

  6. Kwasizur v. Cardillo

    175 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1949)   Cited 15 times

    It is enough that he finds that Kwasizur's injury was not sustained in the course of his employment. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission, 1924, 195 Cal. 174, 231 P. 996; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 1933, 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10; American Furniture Co. v. Graves, 1925, 141 Va. 1, 126 S.E. 213. For discussions of the subject and the "residuum of legal evidence" rule, see Horovitz, Workmen's Compensation 238 et seq. (1944); 1 Wigmore, Evidence Β§ 4c, p. 79 et seq. (3d ed. 1940). The appellant complains that the District Judge reopened the case.

  7. Bober v. Independent Plating Corp.

    28 N.J. 160 (N.J. 1958)   Cited 50 times
    Finding admissible a medical history given by plaintiff to his physician about his working environment respecting chrome dust at work site, since it was relevant to diagnosing cause of plaintiff's allergies

    In our judgment, therefore, the history thus gleaned which described the inception, the general character of the cause or external source of the condition to be treated, so far as it is pertinent to the purpose of diagnosis and treatment, is within the rule and admissible as substantive evidence. Cf. McCormick on Evidence, 564 (1954); Stewart v. Baltimore O.R. Co., 137 F.2d 527, 530 (2 Cir. 1943); Baker v. Industrial Commission,44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10 ( Ct. App. 1933); Dabbert v.Travelers' Ins. Co., 13 Ohio Dec. ( Reprint) 792 (1870); Ferne v. Chadderton, 375 Pa. 302, 100 A.2d 854 (1953); Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 67, 34 P.2d 687 (1934). Accordingly, there was no error in receiving in evidence the portions of the history of which complaint is now made.

  8. Bake v. Industrial Commission

    22 N.E.2d 130 (Ohio 1939)   Cited 9 times

    The court thereupon rendered final judgment for the commission. Finding such judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Appellate District in the case of Baker v. Industrial Commission, 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N.E. 10, the record was certified to this court for review and final determination. Mr. S.S. Stewart and Mr. Walter S. Harlan, for appellant.

  9. State v. Industrial Commission of Ohio

    2003 Ohio 7025 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)

    {ΒΆ 16} Relator's contention, under his third objection, that the affidavit at issue violated various rules of evidence is without merit. See R.C. 4123.10; State ex rel. Roberts v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 1, 4-5 (Industrial Commission properly considered affidavit submitted by employer regardless of whether it strictly complied with evidentiary rules relating to personal knowledge and hearsay; "by virtue of R.C. 4123.10, the commission is vested with the authority to admit and consider materials of a quasi-evidentiary nature"); Baker v. Indus. Comm. (1933), 44 Ohio App. 539, 549 (Industrial Commission has discretion to ascertain truth of claim by what it considers to be reliable evidence, "whether it be hearsay or otherwise"). {ΒΆ 17} Relator further contends that the affidavit was in violation of rules governing notaries public because the investigator was permitted to both draft the statement relator signed and to notarize the affidavit.

  10. Lloyd v. Admr., Bureau of Workmen's Compensation

    120 Ohio App. 221 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963)   Cited 3 times

    The Ohio cases are uniform to the effect that whether there was an injury in the course of and arising out of employment is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds may arrive at only one conclusion, in which latter case, a court may determine such question as a matter of law. See Donlin v. Industrial Commission, 79 Ohio Law Abs., 282; Industrial Commission v. Arnold, 20 Ohio Law Abs., 410; Baker v. Industrial Commission, 44 Ohio App. 539; Industrial Commission v. Ahern, 6 Ohio Law Abs., 500, judgment reversed, 119 Ohio St. 41; and Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 13 Ohio App. 262. The general rule is stated in 100 Corpus Juris Secundum, 869, Workmen's Compensation, Section 611, as follows: