Baker v. Home Depot

Full title: BRADLEY BAKER, Plaintiff, v. THE HOME DEPOT Defendant

Court: United States District Court, W.D. New York

Date published: Jan 26, 2005

03-CV-6258 (T) (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2005)

Opinion

03-CV-6258 (T).

January 26, 2005

DECISION ORDER

MICHAEL TELESCA, Senior District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bradley T. Baker ("plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, brings this action against The Home Depot ("defendant"), alleging that it discriminated against him in his employment on the basis of his religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Specifically, plaintiff asserts that defendant terminated his employment because he refused to compromise his religious belief that an individual should not work on Sundays, which he considers the Sabbath. Defendant now moves for summary judgment in its favor, arguing: (1) plaintiff does not have a bona fide religious belief as defined by Title VII; (2) it made reasonable accommodations for plaintiff's religious beliefs; and (3) plaintiff's insistence upon not working on Sundays was an unreasonable accommodation and would cause undue hardship on defendant. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

In March 2001, defendant hired plaintiff to work as a full-time sales associate in the floor and wall department in its Auburn, Massachusetts store. At that time, he was asked his availability for shift scheduling purposes. He responded by indicating that he was "fully flexible," and expressed no adversity to working on Sundays. As a full-time employee, plaintiff was guaranteed at least 40 hours of work each week and entitled to employment benefits, including health insurance. Plaintiff declined the health insurance benefit the entire time he was employed by defendant.

In August 2001, plaintiff moved to New York State to be closer to his fiancee, who had been offered a job in Rochester. He was able to transfer to one of defendant's Rochester-area stores, located in Henrietta, New York. Subsequent to his original hiring at the Auburn, Massachusetts store, plaintiff came to feel a "responsibility of obeying Gods [sic] word," and believe that "Sabbath is the day that all work ceases." Plaintiff's Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 34). At the time he interviewed with the manager of the Henrietta store, he indicated that his religious beliefs prohibited him from working on Sundays. The manager indicated that he had no problems with plaintiff's demand, but that he would need to speak with the scheduler, Shawn Forness, who was on vacation. Once Mr. Forness returned, he discussed the request with plaintiff, and never scheduled plaintiff to work on a Sunday. This continued until September, 2002, during which time plaintiff was scheduled to work on only one Sunday; a mistake eventually corrected by the scheduler. When plaintiff learned that he was scheduled to work on a Sunday, he informed the scheduler of his religious beliefs, and the scheduler found someone else to work in his place.

However, in September 2002, Colleen Vorndran became the new manager of defendant's Henrietta store and decided that to better serve its customers, she would require defendant's employees to be more flexible about working on weekends. She called plaintiff into her office and asked him why he refused to work on Sundays. He informed her of his belief that he needed to observe his Sabbath by attending religious services, spending time with his family and refraining from working. She offered to schedule him to work a later shift on Sundays so that he would be able to attend his religious services, but he replied that such an arrangement still conflicted with his religious beliefs.

Despite plaintiff's request to never be scheduled to work on a Sunday, he was scheduled to work on Sunday, October 13, 2002. On that day, instead of reporting to work, plaintiff called in and said that he would not report for work because his religious beliefs prevented him from working on Sundays. Two days later he was summoned to Ms. Vorndran's office to discuss his previous absence. He repeated that he refused to work on Sundays. She then offered to change plaintiff's status from a full-time employee to a part-time employee, so that he could designate the days on which he was available to work. Had plaintiff opted to become a part-time employee, he would not have been guaranteed 40 hours of work each week and would be ineligible for full-time benefits, including health insurance. Again, he declined Ms. Vorndran's offer. Nonetheless, he was scheduled to work on Sunday October 20, 2002. Again, he failed to report to work but called the store to inform them that he was not coming because his religious beliefs prevented him from working on Sundays. On October 29, 2002, Ms. Vorndran again summoned him to her office, whereupon she terminated his employment with defendant.

DISCUSSION

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law only where, "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. . . ." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and in making the decision the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Marvel Characters v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2002)). "Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the non-moving party." Id.

Section § 703 (a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") provides that it is unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Nonetheless, if the employer adequately demonstrates that he cannot reasonably accommodate the employee's religious needs without undue hardship on the conduct of his business, he has not violated Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j);Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education, 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985).

A plaintiff asserting a religious discrimination claim under Title VII bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that he: (1) holds a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) informed his employer of this belief; and (3) was disciplined for failing to comply with the employment requirement. Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he offered the plaintiff a reasonable accommodation. Where a reasonable accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends and defendant is not liable under Title VII. However, absent the extension of a reasonable accommodation, an employer may still not be liable if he is able to demonstrate that such a measure would cause him to suffer undue hardship. Id.

Defendant first argues that plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination because he does not have a bona fide religious belief. To support this claim, defendant points to the fact that plaintiff has held previous employment which required him to work on Sundays. Also, when he commenced employment with defendant in Auburn, Massachusetts, prior to his transfer to the Henrietta store, he was not a member of a church. In addition, plaintiff stated in his deposition that he considered Sundays to be "family time." Therefore, according to defendant, plaintiff lacks a bona fide religious belief necessary to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination.

While it is generally true that a party may not avoid summary judgment simply by making bald assertions of fact, plaintiff's affidavit explaining the genesis of his belief about the sacredness of the Sabbath is sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to the validity of that belief. Since the question of the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs is inherently within that individual's unique purview, plaintiff's explanation suffices to establish the first prong of his prima facie case of religious discrimination.

Plaintiff also satisfies the remaining prongs to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination. Neither party disputes that plaintiff informed each person in charge of scheduling that his religious beliefs prohibited him from working on Sundays. Moreover, since plaintiff's employment was terminated as a result of his refusal to work on Sundays, there is no question that he was disciplined for his religious belief. Therefore, I find that plaintiff established a prima facie case of religious discrimination in violation of Title VII.

Defendant next argues that even if plaintiff presents a prima facie case, it did not violate Title VII because it offered plaintiff "reasonable accommodation" for his religious beliefs. Specifically, it extended plaintiff two options: (1) flexible hours on Sundays to allow time for him to attend religious services; or (2) to become a part-time employee, a position in which he could designate days he is unavailable to work.

According to the Code of Federal Regulations, "[o]ne means of providing reasonable accommodation for the religious practices of employees or prospective employees which employers and labor organizations should consider is the creation of a flexible work schedule for individuals requesting accommodation," including "flexible arrival and departure times." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(ii) (2005).

I find as a matter of law that defendant's offer to schedule plaintiff to work in the afternoon or evenings on Sundays, thus allowing him an opportunity to attend his religious services, is a reasonable accommodation as contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Although plaintiff fails to see this as a reasonable accommodation, it is well-settled that "to avoid Title VII liability, the employer need not offer the accommodation the employee prefers." Cosme, 287 F.3d at 158. Since I find that defendant offered plaintiff a reasonable accommodation, further inquiry is unnecessary, and defendant is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. See Id.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I find that defendant offered to make a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's religious beliefs, and therefore did not violate Title VII. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

ALL OF THE ABOVE IS SO ORDERED.