The relation of parent and child does not arise from virtual adoption. Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 702 ( 69 S.E.2d 278); Foster v. Cheek, 212 Ga. 821, 827 ( 96 S.E.2d 545). It has been held that relationship by virtual adoption of a juror to a party in a damage suit does not render the juror incompetent. Collins v. Griffin, 93 Ga. App. 282, 285 ( 91 S.E.2d 369).

It should be noted that in Churchill the legatee's standing to caveat was based upon a will which was not the subject of the probate proceeding. Conversely, in Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 701 ( 69 S.E.2d 278) (1952), the court said: "Concededly, if these petitioners will not be injured or benefited by the establishment and probate of the alleged copy will, they are therefore strangers to it, and are not proper parties to this litigation." In Baker it was found that the petitioners would not be injured by probate of the will and their petition to intervene was rejected, because they could not benefit by showing that the will was invalid.

A court of equity has no power to grant the special prayer: "That your petitioner be declared by the court to be the child and heir at law of J. J. Collins and Lizzie Collins, both deceased." Rahn v. Hamilton, 144 Ga. 644 (1) ( 87 S.E. 1061); Pair v. Pair, 147 Ga. 754, 758 ( 95 S.E. 295); Burgamy v. Holton, 165 Ga. 384, 391-392 ( 141 S.E. 42); Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464, 465 (1) ( 12 S.E.2d 877); Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 702 ( 69 S.E.2d 278). 2.

Even as a "virtually adopted child" of John U. Strother, the testator, he is not one of the persons enumerated in Code Ann. § 113-107 who can invoke its provisions. See Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654 ( 78 S.E. 30, 44 LRA (NS) 773); Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 702 ( 69 S.E.2d 278); Foster v. Cheek, 212 Ga. 821, 827 ( 96 S.E.2d 545); and Banes v. Derricotte, 215 Ga. 892 (1) ( 114 S.E.2d 12) and the cases there cited. Since neither Rhebe Ducasse Strother nor Joseph A. Strother can, for reasons previously stated, invoke the provisions of Code Ann. § 113-107, it necessarily follows that the charitable trust created by item 10 of the will is unaffected by the provisions of this Code section, though the amount bequeathed or devised for such purpose exceeds one-third of the testator's estate.

" Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654, 658 ( 78 S.E. 30, 44 L.R.A. (NS) 773). "The relief which equity grants in cases of virtual adoption is the equivalent of the benefit the child would have received had the adopter performed his contractual obligation to adopt formally and legally the child involved." Ware v. Martin, 207 Ga. 512 ( 63 S.E.2d 335); Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698 ( 69 S.E.2d 278); Jones v. O'Neal, 194 Ga. 49 ( 20 S.E.2d 585). It therefore becomes necessary to determine what benefit the plaintiff would have received as respects the matters involved in the instant suit had Gordon Dye fulfilled his alleged agreement to legally adopt her. The amended petition alleges that Gordon Dye died in 1932, and therefore the status of the plaintiff with respect to her rights of inheritance must be determined with reference to the adoption statutes in force after the alleged promise to adopt was made and before the death of Gordon Dye, the promisor, occurred.

Held: 1. "A contract by a person to adopt a child of another as his own `is not self-operating; heirship does not grow out of it.'" Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464, 465 (1) ( 12 S.E.2d 877); Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654 ( 78 S.E. 30, 44 L.R.A. (NS) 773); Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 702 (b) ( 69 S.E.2d 278). A contract or agreement that one shall have a child's part of an estate for services to be performed in taking care of another does not make such person an heir. Bunting v. Dobson, 125 Ga. 447 ( 54 S.E. 102).

In the beginning, it is clear from many decisions of this court that, under a virtual adoption, no relationship of parent and child is created, but it is only a court-given name to a status arising from and created by contract where one takes and agrees to legally adopt the child of another but fails to do so. Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698 ( 69 S.E.2d 278), and Rahn v. Hamilton, 144 Ga. 644 ( 87 S.E. 1061). It is also clear that the proceeds of this insurance policy are not and do not become a part of the estate of the deceased employee and do not pass under the laws of inheritance, but do pass directly to the beneficiary under the terms of the policy. Saville v. Lee, 43 Ga. App. 263 ( 158 S.E. 441).

Accord, Winder v. Winder, 218 Ga. 409, 411 ( 128 S.E.2d 56). In short, "virtual adoption is not adoption" ( Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 702 ( 69 S.E.2d 278)) and would not serve to create a parent-child relation between the appellants in this case. Limbaugh v. Woodall, 121 Ga. App. 638, 641 ( 175 S.E.2d 135).

However, that issue was never decided therein and there are no dicta which so indicate. This equitable principle which is sought to be enforced is or has been applied or acknowledged in numerous other States, including New York (e.g., Middleworth v Ordway, 191 N.Y. 404; Robinson v Robinson, 283 Ala. 257; Matter of Lamfrom, 90 Ariz. 363; Chavez v Shea, 185 Col 400; Sheffield v Barry, 153 Fla. 144; Baker v Henderson, 208 Ga. 698; Monahan v Monahan, 14 Ill.2d 449; Matter of Van Cleave, 610 S.W.2d 620 [Mo]; Heien v Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 [Tex]; Whitchurch v Perry, 137 Vt. 464; Wheeling Dollar Sav. Trust Co. v Singer, ___ W Va ___, 250 S.E.2d 369). Even the Federal courts have acknowledged the enforcement of contracts for adoption under the State laws which are applicable (e.g., Kuchenig v California Co., 410 F.2d 222, cert den 396 U.S. 887; Roberts v Roberts, 223 F 775, cert den 239 U.S. 639; Williams v Richardson, 523 F.2d 999; Matter of McConnell, 268 F. Supp. 346, affd sub nom.

Despite its name, virtual adoption does not result in a legal adoption or the creation of a legal parent-child relationship. See Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 702, 69 S.E.2d 278 (1952) (“Virtual adoption is not adoption.”). Indeed, the virtually adopting parent must be dead before the remedy can be invoked, or the legal remedy of statutory adoption would be available, precluding this equitable relief. See OCGA § 23–1–4 (“Equity will not take cognizance of a plain legal right where an adequate and complete remedy is provided by law....”). Virtual adoption is a posthumous “legal fiction, a name given to a status arising from and created by a contract where one takes and agrees to legally adopt the child of another, but fails to do so.” 1 Mary F. Radford, Redfearn on Ga. Wills & Administration § 9:4(B) (7th ed.2008).