Plaintiff also cites several cases from other jurisdictions where courts have found such discretionary clauses null and void due to their granting sole and final discretion to the administrator. Id. at *8, citing Zuckerman v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 3903780 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2012); Landree v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 833 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2011); and McClenahan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (D. Colo. 2009). Plaintiff then cites to Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52724 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010) to highlight several factors that the court there used in determining whether the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied. Plaintiff contends that the first factor considers federal court decisions that have "found discretionary clauses in ERISA contracts to trigger de novo review of adverse benefit determinations where those clauses violate state regulations banning or limiting the use of discretionary clauses."

(iv) Defendant properly mitigated any structural conflict of interest. Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts is deficient in that it does not include any of the facts relied on for its argument that Defendant has an inherent conflict of interest, forcing the Court to “comb the record on behalf of Plaintiff's counsel,” Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *17 n.1 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), aff'd, 440 F. App'x. 66 (3d Cir. 2011), and depriving Defendant of any opportunity to reply. “Nevertheless, the Third Circuit has sanctioned the practice of excusing a party's strict compliance with [Rule 56.1] where a court is willing to draw out the facts from the party's briefing and evidentiary submissions instead.”

Although Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that Defendant assigned greater weight to its independent specialists rather than Plaintiff's treating physicians, Defendant's determination was nevertheless appropriate as "ERISA does not require [defendant] plan administrators to accord special deference to opinions of treating physicians, nor does it impose a heightened burden of explanation on [defendant plan] administrators when they reject a treating physician's opinion." Baker v. The Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *14 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010) (citing Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003)) aff'd, 440 F. App'x 66 (3d Cir. 2011). Considering Defendant analyzed the medical opinions of Plaintiff's treating physicians, credited said opinions with the weight it found appropriate, and relied on said opinions along with the other evidence in the record, the Court finds that Defendant's denial of Plaintiff's LTD benefits claim was based on substantial evidence.

"It is not the Court's responsibility to comb the record on behalf of Plaintiff's counsel." Baker v. The Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-cv-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), aff'd Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 440 F. App'x 66 (3d Cir. 2011); New Jersey Auto. Ins. Plan v. Sciarra, 103 F. Supp. 2d 388, 408 (D.N.J. 1998) (explaining that "it is the responsibility of each party to support its own contentions with a proper basis in the record of the case"). In fact, Gardner offers no argument opposing this claim's dismissal.

Br. at 37); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (stating that the party opposing summary judgment must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial"). "It is not the Court's responsibility to comb the record on behalf of Plaintiff's counsel." Baker v. The Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *2 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count V.

Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) thus puts the onus on the parties, rather than the Court, to find evidence of record supporting their respective arguments. See Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010) ("It is not the Court's responsibility to comb the record on behalf of Plaintiff's counsel."), aff'd, 440 Fed. Appx. 66 (3d Cir. 2011); N.J. Auto. Ins. Plan v. Sciarra, 103 F. Supp. 2d 388, 408 (D.N.J. 1998) ("[I]t is the responsibility of each party to support its own contentions with a proper basis in the record of the case."). "Given the vital purpose that such rules serve, litigants ignore them at their peril."

And "[i]t is not the Court's responsibility to comb the record on behalf of Plaintiff's counsel." Baker v. The Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010). Plaintiff argues that an individual who is off-task more than 15% of the workday is unemployable, but the ALJ did not find that Plaintiff had these types of limitations.

Plaintiff claims Sun Life "shut its eyes" to Dr. Moynihan's APS forms. ERISA does not require administrators to accord special deference to Plaintiff's treating physicians, "nor does it impose a heightened burden of explanation on administrators when they reject a treating physician's opinion." Baker v. The Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *14 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), aff'd sub nom. Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 440 F. App'x 66 (3d Cir. 2011)(citing Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003)); see also Burk v. Broadspire Servs., Inc., 342 F. App'x 732, 737 (3d Cir. 2009)("ERISA does not require that plan administrators give the opinions of treating physicians special weight.")(further citation omitted).

’ " (quoting Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs , 401 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir.2005) )). Through its independent research, the Court discovered Baker v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., Civ. No. 08–cv–6382 (FLW), 2010 WL 2179150 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010), aff'd, 440 Fed.Appx. 66 (3d Cir.2011), a case in which the district court—and the Third Circuit, in an unpublished opinion—suggested that a court need not employ de novo review where (1) a state regulation forbids the reservation of sole discretion to the insurer and (2) the contract at issue vests such discretion in the insurer but nevertheless leaves open the possibility of judicial review. The New Jersey regulation differs somewhat from the Maryland statute, but to the extent that the reasoning in Baker could be applied here, the Court finds that reasoning unpersuasive and declines to extend it. Cf.Adele E. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Civ. No. 2:15–CV–01–DBH, 183 F.Supp.3d 173, 181-82, 2016 WL 1732722, at *6 (D.Me. Apr. 28, 2016) (insurance policy that purported to reserve complete discretion to insurer but that also referenced claimant's right to internal complaint/appeal procedures and external review by state bureau nevertheless violated state statute barring provisions

See Am. Plaza, LLC v. Marbo Cross Shop, LLC, No. 08-5963, 2010 WL 455349, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb.3, 2010). Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) thus puts the onus on the parties, rather than the Court, to find evidence of record supporting their respective arguments. See Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 08-6382, 2010 WL 2179150, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. May 28, 2010) ("It is not the Court's responsibility to comb the record on behalf of Plaintiff's counsel."), aff'd, 440 Fed.Appx. 66 (3d Cir. 2011); N.J. Auto. Ins. Plan v. Sciarra, 103 F.Supp.2d 388, 408 (D.N.J. 1998) ("[I]t is the responsibility of each party to support its own contentions with a proper basis in the record of the case."). "Given the vital purpose that such rules serve, litigants ignore them at their peril."