Syl. Pt. 3, Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W.Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959).

Mere use of the road by the public will not make the road a public road, even if the public uses the road continuously and adversely for the period of ten years required by W. Va. Code, 17-1-3. Wilson v. Seminole Coal, Inc., 175 W. Va. 518, 519, 336 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1985) (and cases cited therein). In addition to such use, public moneys or labor, duly authorized by a public agency or official empowered to maintain, repair or accept such road, must be expended on it. Wilson v. Seminole Coal, Inc., 175 W. Va. 518, 519, 336 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1985); State ex rel. Riddle v. Department of Highways, 154 W. Va. 722, 725, 179 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1971); State Road Commission v. Oakes, 150 W. Va. 709, 716, 149 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1966); syl. pt. 2, Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959); syl. pt. 1, Monk v. Gillenwater, 141 W. Va. 27, 87 S.E.2d 537 (1955); Derifield v. Maynard, 126 W. Va. 750, 754, 30 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1944). It is clear that sporadic or occasional use of the road by the public will not make the road a public road. Reger v. Wiest, 172 W. Va. 738, 741, 310 S.E.2d 499, 502 (1983). In previous cases this Court has held that isolated and sporadic instances of public maintenance will not suffice to meet the requirements of W. Va. Code, 17-1-3.

This Court has stated that the public expenditures must be authorized by public officials on a regular basis. Wilson v. Seminole Coal, Inc., 175 W. Va. 518, 336 S.E.2d 30 (1985); Blamble v. Harsh, 163 W. Va. 733, 260 S.E.2d 273 (1979); State Road Comm. v. Oakes, 150 W. Va. 709, 716, 149 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1966); syl. pt. 3, Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1955). There is uncontroverted evidence that the statutory requirement of ten years of public travel was met.

This Court has consistently held that the mere use of a road will not make it a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the owners of the land unless the use is accompanied by an order showing its recognition by public authority or by its maintenance by such authority. Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27; Monk v. Gillenwater, 141 W. Va. 27, 87 S.E.2d 537; Holland v. Flanagan, 139 W. Va. 884, 81 S.E.2d 908; Zirkle v. City of Elkins, 93 W. Va. 39, 115 S.E. 875; Hicks v. City of Bluefield, 86 W. Va. 367, 103 S.E. 323; Dickens v. Liverpool Salt and Coal Company, 41 W. Va. 511, 23 S.E. 582; Boyd v. Woolwine, 40 W. Va. 282, 21 S.E. 1020; Yates v. West Grafton, 33 W. Va. 507, 11 S.E. 8. In Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27, in considering Section 3, Article 1, Chapter 17, Code, 1931, the present statute, this Court said that in order that a road shall be conclusively presumed to be established as a public road it must have been used by the public for a period of ten years or more and public moneys or labor duly authorized by a public agency or official empowered to maintain, repair or accept such road must be expended on it. The evidence is insufficient to establish the Salt Works Road as a public road and the circuit court was correct in holding that the Salt Works Road is no

In order that a road, by virtue of Section 3, Article 1, Chapter 17, Code, 1931, shall be conclusively presumed to be established as a public road, it must have been used by the public for a period of ten years or more and public moneys or labor, duly authorized by a public agency or official empowered to maintain, repair or accept such road, must be expended on it; and the occasional expenditure of public money or the occasional performance of public labor on such road, which is not so authorized, even though such road has been used by the public for ten years or more, does not satisfy the requirements of the statute or render effective the statutory presumption of its establishment as a public road.Baker v. Hamilton, syl. pt. 3, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959) (emphasis added), quoted in part in Wilson v. Seminole Coal, Inc., syl. pt., 175 W. Va. 518, 336 S.E.2d 30 (1985); Miller v. Hoskinson, syl. pt., 189 W. Va. 189, 429 S.E.2d 76 (1993). To be classified as a public road, there must be ten years of public use as well as "some recognition by a public authority or maintenance through public funds."

The mere use of a right-of-way by members of the public will not make it a "public road," unless there is also "some action amounting to an acceptance of the road as such by public authorities." Syllabus Point 2, Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959). The circuit court's reasoning underlying its conclusion that the right-of-way across the defendants' properties is public is not contained in the court's orders. If a right-of-way truly exists across the defendants' properties, the circuit court should have considered these guidelines in determining whether the right-of-way is "public" in nature.

The court actually stated: The Court concludes as a matter of law that the road, referred to as Marion County Route 73/2, prior to the construction of Interstate 79, and now referred to as Marion County Route 78/4 in the Complaint, is a private but not a public road; that public authority has never accepted the road as a public road; that the decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia of Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959), and State Road Commission v. Oakes, 150 W. Va. 709, 149 S.E.2d 293 (1966) are controlling that the chain placed across the road by the defendant, Clarence D. Edman, is not an obstruction within the meaning of Code 17-16-1, and the plaintiff is not entitled to the injunction or damages demanded in the complaint. It is ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the road is a private and not a public road, the prayer for an injunction and for damages is denied, and this action is dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff.

We recently stated our scope of review in estate cases in syllabus point 3 of In re Estate of Foster, 180 W. Va. 250, 376 S.E.2d 144 (1988): `The findings of a commissioner in chancery, on questions of fact, should generally be sustained unless not warranted by any reasonable view of the evidence and such findings are entitled to peculiar weight in an appellate court when they have been confirmed by the decree from which an appeal has been granted.' Syl. pt. 1, Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959). It is not clear from the record upon what evidence the fiduciary commissioner relied in determining that the farm equipment was the sole property of the decedent, Mr. Kidwell. It is even more unclear from the record upon what evidence the circuit court relied in determining that the personal property in the house was the sole property of the decedent.

We explained the following in the syllabus of Wilson: "`In order that a road, by virtue of Section 3, Article 1, Chapter 17, Code, 1931, shall be conclusively presumed to be established as a public road, it must have been used by the public for a period of ten years or more and public moneys or labor, duly authorized by a public agency or official empowered to maintain, repair or accept such road, must be expended on it; and the occasional expenditure of public money or the occasional performance of public labor on such road . . ., even though such road has been used by the public for ten years or more, does not satisfy the requirements of the statute or render effective the statutory presumption of its establishment as a public road.' Syllabus Point 3, in part, Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959)." In Cramer v. West Virginia Dep't of Highways, 180 W. Va. 97, 375 S.E.2d 568 (1988), we held that sporadic grading and snow plowing, through the use of public funds, did not constitute sufficient application of public monies and labor to render the road public.

After receiving the special commissioner's findings and conclusions, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, by order entered on December 10, 1986, adopted the commissioner's findings in toto. It is from that order that the appellants now appeal. In syllabus point 1 of Baker v. Hamilton, 144 W. Va. 575, 109 S.E.2d 27 (1959), this Court stated that: The findings of a commissioner in chancery, on questions of fact, should generally be sustained unless not warranted by any reasonable view of the evidence and such findings are entitled to peculiar weight in an appellate court when they have been confirmed by the decree from which an appeal has been granted.